Volume LXVIII *September 1953* *Number 3*

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE DECLINE OF POLITICAL THEORY

POLITICAL theory is not a progressive science. At least, anyone who puts, say, Aristotle's *Politics* beside the political writings of the twentieth century could be excused if he thought that progress in the subject was imperceptible. A cynic might even argue that everything that is worth saying on political theory has already been said *ad nauseam*, and draw the conclusion that it is time we gave up such wearisome reiteration. But this view would be false, because if political ideas do not progress, their formulation certainly changes. The conditions of social life alter, sometimes more slowly and sometimes more rapidly, in the last few centuries at an increasingly dizzy pace; and as they alter, the words we use, and the ideas they convey, lose old meanings and acquire new ones. For this reason a continual restatement of political principles is both necessary and inevitable—as long, that is, as the tradition of political thinking, which is one of the peculiar characters of Western civilization, remains alive.

It is a tradition with a history of some two and a half millenia, though with one considerable break. Century after century the political ideas of the Western World have undergone progressive modification. The interplay of idea with institution has changed now one and now the other, and the flow of ideas has been punctuated at intervals by the synthesis created by a great political thinker. No such synthesis has appeared in our own day or for some time past, but this is not surprising. Great political thinkers cannot be produced to order, and we need not wail and beat our breasts because there is no con-

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temporary Burke or Bentham. If a general tendency to cease thinking about society in terms of political theory were to be observable, that would be a matter of greater significance than the mere fact that there are no intellectual giants in the field of political theory today. I propose to suggest that there *is* such a tendency.

The view that our cherished political ideas may be capable of dying will naturally meet with opposition, yet there is nothing impossible in such a development. Political ideas are not immortal, however we try to identify them with eternal values. Conscious of our own mortality, we cling all the more to the belief that there must be something presiding over our destinies which is eternal. There may be, but it is not likely to be the little gods of our own creation, whether we call them Imperial Rome, or Divine Right of Kings, or even Democracy. The belief in the permanence of such ideas is only another form of the sophism of the ephemeral—the faith of Fontenelle's rose, which nodded its head and proclaimed in the wisdom of a day that gardeners were immortal, for no gardener had ever died within the memory of a rose. Ideas grow and decay, change into new forms and are reborn. It would be a cause for amazement if the process of continuous transformation were to come to an end while political thinking, as it has existed since fifth-century Athens, still survives.

But does it survive? Conceivably political theory at the present day may *not* be undergoing one of its many metamorphoses, passing through a chrysalis stage before emerging in a new form. It may just be coming to an end. This has happened in the past. Once before in the history of Western civilization a great age of political thought came to an end. The development of Greek political ideas reached its climax in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. In the Hellenistic age attention began to turn away from political theory and into other fields. For a time, with the rise of the National Law school of thought and the elaboration of juristic conceptions by the Roman lawyers, it might have been possible to regard the process as still one of growth and development. But in the Roman Empire politics turned into the struggles of court fac-

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tions and military dictators, and political thinking as the Greeks understood it ceased.

The experience of the Greco-Roman world is not without relevance to our own time. Some at least of the conditions which accompanied this earlier decline and fall of political theory are repeated today. It is a commonplace that state activity is irresistibly expanding. More and more of the activities of society are falling under the control of bureaucracy and therefore are to some extent outside political control. Great military machines are being created, to the support of which more and more of the wealth of society has to be diverted. These are as yet, it is true, the servants and not the masters of the civil power, but so the legions were in Rome for a long time. This is an age of revolutions, like the age of Marius and Sulla and Caesar, and revolutions are apt to end in military dictators; in more than a few countries they begin with them as well. The knowledge of this tendency is perhaps one reason why it has hitherto failed to operate in Soviet Russia. In Nazi Germany also the Army was never able to challenge the party successfully.

Possibly in the new form of party organization a technique has been found for averting military dictatorship and the rule of pretorian guards to which the Roman Empire degenerated. But the substitution of the party machine for the military machine is not necessarily a great improvement. It means the rule of a small oligarchy, with political life concentrated in the internal struggles of its factions. Both bureaucracy and party seem also in practice to involve the emergence of a superbureaucrat or party chief, or both rolled in one, in whom ultimate power is concentrated, and who is himself semideified as the incarnation of the state, like the Roman emperors. Since the majority of the population are naturally outside the chosen circle of bureaucracy or party there is also a need, as long as a degree of political consciousness survives in any part of this excluded majority, for a machinery of repression, a system of delation and espionage, political police, concentration camps or prisons and the rule of universal suspicion—such as Tacitus described in dreadful detail in his imaginative account of the

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last years of Tiberius, and Camille Desmoulins borrowed for a description of France under the Terror.

It may be said that this picture represents only half of the world, and that is doubtless so. But are some of these tendencies completely absent anywhere? Contemporaries naturally notice differences. Historians, looking back on an age, are often more struck by similarities. The most fundamental trends in any period are those which exist at the same time in the most diverse and apparently opposed camps. If I were asked what are the deepest underlying tendencies of our age I should look for those which are common to both sides of the Iron Curtain. I should look for something which communist Russia and capitalist America have in common. At bottom, it seems to me that there are more similarities than either side would be very pleased to admit, and that they are sufficient to make the parallel with the ancient world a fair one, though obviously it must not be pushed too far.

The parallel is also noticeable with respect to the decline of political theory. In the period when Caesarism was rising, the ideas associated with the old Roman conception of *libertas* were falling. The connection between new conditions of society and the decline of political thinking may be obscure, but it would be dangerous to suggest that there is none. The rule of *senatus populusque romanus* led to anarchy when an empire had to be governed instead of a city. Rome was faced with the choice of abandoning the political principles by which it had achieved greatness, or seeing the Roman world degenerate into a chaos of warring states. Its solution was the Empire, in which, however, the classic political theories of the city-state could find no place, any more than the institutions by which they had achieved some measure of realization. For political theory to exist, it seems to me, there must be an active political life. One does not expect to find it flourishing among Australian aboriginal tribes, in the Russia of Ivan or Peter, the Paraguay of the Jesuits or the empire of the Caesars.

Are there signs—I do not say more—that our own political ideas may be coming to their end as those of the ancient city-states did? It would be absurd to suppose that one wants a

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continual stream of new political ideas, or old ones new-fashioned; but I suggest that there has been rather a long interval since there was last any original political thinking. It is necessary to go back to the eighteenth century to find it. This, I admit, is a sweeping statement, which it would require considerable space to attempt to justify.

But let me present one consideration. The dominant political idea in the modern world is democracy. Most of the contradictions of contemporary politics find their place under the democratic umbrella, but broad as that is they jostle one another, and moreover the umbrella seems to be leaking badly. And where are the political theorists of democracy today? Instead of a rational theory it has become a sort of incantation. It is the "open sesame" of political treasure hunters everywhere. The world is full of would-be Aladdins chanting "democracy". The masses, at least in those countries which have no experience of democracy, are waiting in a state of mystic faith on the revelation that the word is to produce. Where at least the idea has been known longer, expectations are not so high. Is it unfair to suggest that there is even a certain degree of disillusionment, a feeling that the traditional conceptions of democracy do not answer our greatest problems?

Liberal democratic principles ceased to evolve in the nineteenth century: in general, the world of practice is apt to be a generation, sometimes a century, behind the world of original thought. But the nineteenth century failed to refashion and think out anew, for the benefit of its successors, the ideas that it was living on. It provided, admittedly, an intellectual ancestry for nationalism and Fascism and communism, but that is another story. Liberal democratic principles ceased to evolve then, but the world did not stop at that point, and it has become a very different place since. Meanwhile democracy, for lack of thought, has ceased to be a living political idea. It has become a shibboleth, and not even serviceable as such. A password is no good when all the hostile camps use it indiscriminately. For the most part it has ceased to be discussed seriously and in relation to the concrete problems of practical politics. It has largely become a meaningless formula. Politicians, like

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the princess in the fairy tale condemned to the oracular utterance of frogs, seem scarcely able to open their mouths without some platitude flopping out, wet and flabby and slightly repulsive, but is this political theory? If it is, no wonder that practical men prefer to ignore it. Coins can remain valid currency even when they are worn quite smooth. Political ideas need periodical recoining if they are to retain their value.

It may be said that this is not a fair argument, that practical politics has always been conducted on the basis of platitudes. A Burke was the exception, his fellow member for Bristol, whose political principles were summed up in "I say ditto to Mr. Burke", the norm; but at least he had a Burke to say ditto to, and besides Burke a great body of informed and serious public discussion existed on the rights and wrongs of political behavior. Where will the average politician find a discussion of theoretical questions on the same level today?

Of course, there have been writers in the last few decades who have had something significant to say about the contemporary political situation, but the same conclusion about the decline of political theory seems to emerge from a study of their work. I am thinking of such writers as Ferrero, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Russell, E. H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, Lasswell, Hans Morgenthau and others. The thing that impresses them most about political life is the state as power. They envisage power as a kind of electric force, now diffused and now concentrated, which not merely runs through society but is its very essence. "The laws of social dynamism", says Lord Russell, "are only capable of being stated in terms of power." The wretched individual atoms of which society is composed are massed together, hurled violently about, disintegrated by power, which they did not create and cannot control.

Traditional political theory, in so far as it has failed to recognize this fact, is regarded as no more than a beautiful fairy tale. To quote Reinhold Niebuhr,

> It may be possible, though it is never easy, to establish just relations between individuals within a group by moral and rational suasion and accommodation. In inter-group relations this is

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> practically an impossibility. The relations between groups must therefore always be predominantly political rather than ethical, that is, they will be determined by the proportion of power which each group possesses at least as much as by any rational and moral appraisal of the comparative needs and claims of each group.[1]

According to Niebuhr the tragedy of the human spirit is " its inability to conform its collective life to its individual ideals." This is the reason why men " invent romantic and moral interpretations of the real facts, preferring to obscure rather than reveal the true character of their collective behavior." In other words, it is the dilemma of " moral man and immoral society ". Man, when he became a social and political animal, sacrificed his individual morality to the egoism that is the accompaniment of social life. The complaint is not a new one: it was the theme of Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality*. But for the modern thinker, unlike Rousseau, there is no resolution to the tragedy of society. Humanity is caught in a cul-de-sac. In such a situation absolute pessimism is unavoidable. There is no possibility of creating, as Rousseau set out to do in the opening chapter of the *Contrat social*, a society in which justice can be allied with utility and power with freedom. There is no hope of establishing rational or ethical control.

In a different way the same conclusion was reached by Ortega y Gasset. He wrote:

> we live at a time when man believes himself fabulously capable of creation, but he does not know what to create. Lord of all things, he is not lord of himself. He feels lost amid his own abundance. With more means at his disposal, more knowledge, more technique than ever, it turns out that the world to-day goes the same way as the worst of worlds that have been; it simply drifts.[2]

All this is degrees of pessimism below Machiavelli. The author of the *Prince* saw society at the mercy of arbitrary power, but

[1] *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York, 1933), pp. xxii-xxiii.

[2] *The Revolt of the Masses* (London, 1932), p. 47.

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believed that somehow out of evil would come good; the tyrant would serve social ends that a better ruler might not be able to fulfill. We have lost the innocence of a Machiavelli now and do not look for moral good to be born of political evil. Political pessimism is deeper than it has been perhaps since St. Augustine wrote the *De Civitate Dei.* Indeed, for a century and a half pessimism has slowly been infecting the intellectual world. That is a process I have no space to trace, though it has, I believe, a close connection with the decay in political ideas that has been contemporaneous with it.

The decline of political theory may thus be regarded as a reflection of the feeling that ethical values have no place in the field of social dynamics and power politics. This, I believe, is the real significance of " the revolt of the masses ": it means the rise to control of those who live their lives without theory, to whatever class they may happen to belong. Another term for it is the rule of the expert, I mean the technician, the *Fachmann,* to use the German word for an especially German disease. Twenty years ago Ortega y Gasset saw what it meant. " Anyone who wishes ", he said, " can observe the stupidity of thought, judgement and action shown to-day in politics, art, religion and the general problems of life and the world by the ' men of science ', and of course, behind them, the doctors, engineers, financiers, teachers and so on." [3] The politician whc merely repeats platitudes is no worse than his own experts; he is not to be singled out for criticism. And how can he be held responsible for failing to translate political theory into practice if there is no theory to be translated?

There is another way of looking at the decline of political thought. Professor Toynbee sees our civilization going the way of previous civilizations, and consoles himself with the idea that the death of a civilization may be the birth of a religion. Ferrero put it differently. Mysticism, he said, is a form of escapism from the horror of illegitimate power. One seems to remember the early Christian invocation: " The poet has said, ' O lovely city of Cecrops ', wilt thou not say, ' O lovely city of God '? " And a modern poet repeats the cry:

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 124.

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Man, frustrated and sleep-forsaken,
Gloom-regarding from inward sight,
Sees the city of God unshaken
Steeply stand in unworlded white;
Sees, adrift from his faith-lost learning,
Sun-remote from terrestrial thought,
Power, envisioned by earth's discerning,
Peace, by mortal aspiring wrought.[4]

A nobly phrased restatement of an ideal that appeared to men in a former time of troubles, but one that belongs to a non-political age. Religious revival *may* be a way out, but it is not a political way. And will it be the resurgent idealism to give substance to our hopes, or merely a narcotic to our discontents? The religious approach to political problems is also not without its dangers. The Nazi Revolution of Destruction gained greatly in force by being able to drape itself with the robes of chiliastic aspiration.

In this analysis—though that is to dignify a brief indication of some contemporary tendencies, as I see them, with too ambitious a title—I may seem to be bent on a pessimistic interpretation of the modern world; but what I have said so far is only a one-sided view of the current situation. To take it as the whole truth would be to despair of the political community prematurely. If it is true that political theory has ceased to develop, is this a sign that political life is in fact coming to an end and that we are entering a nonpolitical age, as the ancient world did? Here one must appeal to a broader view of the facts. The differences are far greater than the similarities. If there are signs that the world is moving in the direction of universal empire, there is no reason to believe that it will reach that goal before the present age of catastrophes has been long continued. Bureaucracy is not yet the major reality of government in any Western country; nor are pretorian guards or political parties yet our masters rather than our servants. In short, there seems no reason to believe that if there has been a decline of political theory this is the necessary result of the appearance of a social and political situation in which it no longer

[4] Siegfried Sassoon, "Ode", in *Vigils* (London, 1935).

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has any valid *raison d'être*. If this is so, the only alternative explanation is to suppose that it is declining because of some internal condition, and not because of the inevitable pressure of objective fact. Perhaps something has gone wrong with political thinking itself. I believe that it has, and that it is even possible to suggest a diagnosis.

If the decline of political theory is to be explained by some inherent misdirection in contemporary thinking about politics, the remedy might appear to be to work out, on abstract grounds, the proper way of thinking about politics. This method has certain attractions. It can be used to justify practically any form of political theory that appeals to us; because naturally the conclusions we arrive at will be determined by the assumptions we start from, and we are not in much danger of starting from assumptions that do not appeal to us.

However, I propose not to adopt this line of approach. Fortunately, we have not to *invent* political theory; that was invented long ago. If there is a right way of considering its problems, I think we should be modest enough to believe that it might possibly be the way of all the greater political thinkers of the past; that is, if there is a way which so many, and such diverse, theorists have in common. I think there is. In the first place we have the simple, obvious fact that they all wrote with a practical purpose in mind. Their object was to influence actual political behavior. They wrote to condemn or support existing institutions, to justify a political system or persuade their fellow citizens to change it: because, in the last resort, they were concerned with the aims, the purposes of political society. Even Machiavelli does not merely describe the way in which things are done, without also indicating the way in which, and to what ends, he thinks they *ought* to be done. At the opposite extreme, Plato's *Republic* may represent an ideal to which the human race—perhaps happily—cannot attain, but in his mind it was no mere Cloud-Cuckoo-Land of fantasy.

Political theory in the past, I suggest, was essentially practical. The political theorist, in his way, was a party man, and party men themselves used not to be afraid to season their practice with the salt of theory. One of the striking differences

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between political discussion in, say, the eighteenth century and at the present day is that politicians have on the whole ceased to discuss general principles. This is not stated as a criticism, but as a fact which needs explaining, and I think one clue to the explanation has already appeared. The study of political theory, I have just said, was formerly the work of men intently concerned with practical issues. It has become instead an academic discipline, written in various esoteric jargons almost as though for the purpose of preventing it from being understood by those who, if they did understand it, might try to put it into practice. It has entered the high realm of scholarship, and, as Whitehead has pointed out, some modern forms of scholarship, at least, reproduce the limitations which dominated thought in the Hellenistic epoch. "They canalize thought and observation", he says, "within predetermined limits, based upon inadequate metaphysical assumptions dogmatically assumed." [5]

Political theory has in this way become disengaged from political facts. Even worse, it has become disengaged on principle, as it has seldom if ever been in the past. The academic political theorist of today may study the great political thinkers of the past, but in the name of academic impartiality he must carefully abstain from doing the kind of thing that they did. I put it forward as a hypothesis that this may conceivably be one source of the decline of political theory.

The view that the connection between political theory and practical politics is a condition of the survival of theory deserves a more elaborate discussion than it can be given here. But if it were to be accepted, then there is an important corollary to be noticed. The implication is that the issues with which political theory has been concerned in the past were not chosen arbitrarily, or as a result of some theoretical argument, and that theory was able to come to grips with the practical world because its discussions were determined by the actual conditions and problems of the day. For example, John Stuart Mill lived in an age when new social problems called for measures of state action which conflicted with established ideals of individual liberty: his thought derives its value from the fact

[5] A. N. Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (London, 1933), p. 151.

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that he devoted himself to the task of attempting to reconcile the two demands. Bentham's lifework was to establish a theoretical basis for the legislative and administrative reforms that were urgently needed in *his* day. Burke, faced in Great Britain, America, Ireland, France with a challenge to the existing bases of political allegiance, attempted to provide an alternative to the new democratic principle of the sovereignty of the people. Rousseau, conscious of the moral collapse of divine-right monarchy, offered a new justification for the rightful powers of government. Montesquieu, earlier, had seen the defects of absolutism, but his alternative was a return to the aristocratic organization of society, and the limitation of all power by law. Locke provided a political theory for a generation which had overthrown divine right and established parliamentary government. Hobbes and Spinoza, in an age of civil wars, maintained that sovereignty meant all or nothing. And so we might continue, till we reached in the end—or rather the beginning—Plato and Aristotle, attempting to prescribe remedies for the diseases of the city-state. Among recent political thinkers, it seems to me that one of the very few, perhaps the only one, who followed the traditional pattern, accepted the problems presented by his age, and devoted himself to the attempt to find an answer to them was Harold Laski. Though I am bound to say that I do not agree with his analysis or his conclusions, I think that he was trying to do the right kind of thing. And this, I suspect, is the reason why, practically alone among political thinkers in Great Britain, he exercised a positive influence over both political thought and action.

If political theory *has* become generally disengaged from practice, and if this is one cause of its decline, it will be worth while asking why this has happened. The bias of the academic approach away from action is not a new thing, and it can hardly provide an adequate explanation by itself. An answer which goes a little deeper can be found, I think, again by a comparison with traditional political thought. The object of this was to arrive at the judgment that one form of political activity was better than another. Academic impartiality between what it believed to be good and bad it neither sought nor attained. Be-

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cause its aim was to influence action, it had to consider the forces that move men, and these are not the products of abstract analysis but of the passions. And since not all passions could be regarded as conducive to a good end, it had to be the passions under the guidance of ethical motivation. In other words, politics was essentially a branch of morals, or ethics. It is not my object here to discuss the problems of ethical theory. What I want to do is to suggest that modern political theory has largely ceased to be discussed in terms of what ought to be; and the reason, I believe, is that it has fallen under the influence of two modes of thought which have had a fatal effect on its ethical content. These, and they have come to dominate the modern mind, are history and science.

The historian naturally sees all ideas and ways of behavior as historically conditioned and transient. Within itself, history has no standard of value but success, and no measure of success but the attainment of power, or survival for a little longer than rival individuals or institutions have survived. Moreover, history is the world studied under the category of what is past: however much we may proclaim that all history is contemporary, its nature is to be a field into which practice cannot penetrate. The paradox of history is that though its writing is a contemporary action, with practical consequences, the historian puts this fact in the back of his mind and tries to behave as though it were not so. By itself, in political theory, history can produce only the crudest Machiavellianism. If all historians are not little Machiavellis, it is only because they take their political ideals from some other source and carry them into their history. This is, fortunately, almost unavoidable, though it might sometimes be a good thing if they were a little more conscious of the ideals they are in fact applying and inculcating through their histories. This is yet another problem which can be raised but not discussed here. It is sufficient to say that at least there is a tendency among modern historians to regard the passing of ethical judgment as an illegitimate process against which historical discipline should be a safeguard. In so far as it is a successful safeguard it is also one against thinking about the problems of political theory at all.

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The influence of historical thought did not stop at this. History acquires more positive, and more dangerous, implications, when it is made into a philosophy of history. This was particularly the achievement of Hegel and Marx. The dominant trend in both Hegelianism and Marxism was to associate ethics with the historical process—by which I do not mean the grand pattern of the universe, which I suspect was not revealed even to Hegel or Marx, but the little corner of the fabric which came under their immediate notice, the few strands which they took for the pattern of the whole. Even if Hegel and Marx themselves did not intend this result, in those who followed them there was an uneasy slip from saying, "This is what will be", into saying, "This is what ought to be." The result was to base moral judgments on temporary and limited historical phenomena. Hegelian and Marxist politics, therefore, have had the ultimate effect of setting up a politics devoid of ethical foundations. In this way they played an important part in creating a breach between modern political practice and the traditions of political thinking in the West.

The influence of history over the modern mind is, however, challenged by that of science. Particularly in the forms of mathematics and psychology, science has influenced political thinking practically from the beginning; though of course the scientific bases on which earlier political theories were sometimes built are about as closely related to modern science as the voyages of Sinbad the Sailor are to modern geographical discovery. This did not prevent Plato and Aristotle from being great political theorists. It is only in recent times that a general belief has grown up in the possibility and desirability of studying politics by the methods that have achieved such remarkable results in the natural sciences. This belief is embodied in the now common term, political science. I do not ask, is political science possible? It must be, it exists. But what is it? The object of science is to show how things happen, and why, in the nexus of cause and effect, they *do* happen. There is no reason why political phenomena, as well as any other phenomena, should not be treated in this way so long as we do not mistake the result for political theory and expect it to answer questions which in the nature of things it cannot answer. What I mean

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is simply that it is not the function of science to pass ethical judgments. That statement can hardly be questioned. I imagine that any scientist would indignantly repudiate the suggestion that his scientific thought entered into the category of what ought to be. The political theorist, on the other hand, is essentially concerned with the discussion of what ought to be. His judgments are at bottom value judgments. The kind of opinion he offers is that one line of political action is ethically preferable to another, not merely that it is more efficient, whatever that may mean; and surely we have seen enough in our day to know that the difference between political systems is not merely a difference between relative degrees of efficiency.

In case I am thought to be unjust to the political scientist, let me give what seems a fair description of the way in which he envisages his task. It is fallacious, says a recent writer, to suggest that the only way of understanding politics is to participate in it: we do not teach the principles of geometry by a manual training course in carpentry. Political science is a body of knowledge, which must be taught and learned like any other body of knowledge. What this definition neglects is the fact that the degree of moral disinterestedness possible in natural science is impossible in the field of political theory. The political scientist, in so far as he wishes to remain a scientist, is limited to the study of techniques. His subject may be compared to eighteenth-century German cameralism, which was a political theory by bureaucrats, about bureaucrats, for bureaucrats. Mostly, what is called political science, I must confess, seems to me a device, invented by university teachers, for avoiding that dangerous subject politics, without achieving science. Taking it at the highest valuation, political science can give us guidance of the greatest possible importance in achieving the objects we want to achieve; it cannot help us to decide what those objects should be, or even what they are. And to believe that we are all agreed on them and therefore do not need to discuss them is surely, in the light of contemporary events, the wildest utopianism. In the last resort science, like history, leaves us, as Ortega y Gasset put it, to drift: we have a magnificent technical equipment for going somewhere, without anywhere to go.

The image of political life which emerges from the prevail-

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ing tendencies in political thought is not a pleasing one. The state appears as a ship in the sea of politics, with no port of embarcation or destination inscribed on its papers, manned by a pressed crew, whose whole endeavor is devoted to the task of keeping the vessel afloat in uncharted waters, with little to help them save their own traditional seamanship, and the records of earlier captains and crews who have for all time been tossed on the seas in the same endless, meaningless motion. A depressing picture, I think, perhaps dreamed up by some remote philosopher who has seen the ships scudding by from the lantern-room of a dead lighthouse, dead because he has carefully extinguished the light.

Luckily we need not take the picture too seriously: it is only an analogy, and analogies are the camouflage of loose thinking. The sea is, of course, the sea of politics. But the state is itself the community as a political organization, the bond that holds it together; the life it lives is also politics. And how is the ship distinguishable from the crew? The state is no mere wooden artifact inhabited by men; it *is* men as political animals. And sea, ship and crew move on together for they are the same. How can we envisage ourselves as inhabiting the ship of state in the sea of politics when the ship is ourselves and the element it moves in our own political being, and *we* rouse the storms and *we* still the waters?

One thing is missing from the picture. It is missing from contemporary politics also. This, as I have said, is the idea that the ship is going anywhere. A sense of direction is lacking, a feeling of purpose. That, I think, is what the decay of political theory means in ordinary terms to the ordinary man. Does it matter? If we were all of us, all our time, porkers not even from the sty of Epicurus, perhaps it would not: our purpose would be set by something outside ourselves, and it would be just as well that it should not be revealed to us in disturbing detail. Such, of course, may be the facts of the case; but rightly or wrongly the human mind demands something more than living from trough to snout. In the absence of a more or less rational theory to justify its sense of political obligation and the rightful powers of government, it will fall victim to an irrational one. If it cannot have, say, Locke on *Toleration*, it will

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have, say, Hitler on *Mein Kampf*. That is what the decline of political theory means in practice.

One last word. The analysis I have made is perhaps moderately pessimistic; but it is not intended to lead to the conclusion that in political thinking we have reached the terminus, the end of that line. The reasons that I have given for its decline are in themselves even encouraging, since there are signs that they may be only temporary aberrations. Historians are in revolt against philosophies of history: ethics is sapping the lack of morale of professors of history. Hegelian politics is already dead. Marxist politics is increasingly revealed as a dialectical apologia for the pursuit of power for its own sake. The inadequacy, in relation to the broader issues of political society, of the scientific study of administrative methods, constitutional devices, electoral statistics and the like—I hope it will not be thought that within their own field I am attempting to deny the value of the techniques of political science—is gradually becoming apparent.

For a century and a half the Western democracies have been living on the stock of basic political ideas that were last restated toward the end of the eighteenth century. That is a long time. The nineteenth century did pretty well on them, but provided no restatement for its successors. The gap thus formed between political facts and political ideas has steadily widened. It has taken a long time for the results to become evident; but now that we have seen what politics devoid of a contemporary moral and political theory means, it is possible that something may be done about it. After a generation's experience of drifting directionless on a stormy sea the need of recovering a sense of direction, and therefore control, is beginning to be felt. And if political theory revives, if the idea of purpose is reintroduced into political thinking, we may take up again the tradition of Western political thought, and in doing so resume that " continuous transformation of morals into politics, which still remains politics ", in which, according to Croce, lies " the real ethical progress of mankind."

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SEMI-RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN THE BRITISH WEST INDIES

WITHIN the British Commonwealth two major trends may be noted in the development of political institutions. While the Dominions, now known as Her Majesty's Realms, drift further and further from the norm of British parliamentary government, the colonies [1] have tended to conform more and more to a set pattern. Owing to the immense variation in local political, cultural and economic patterns, and to the different means by which the constitutional instruments have been prepared, considerable differences still exist, and the student of comparative government is finding a wonderful new lode in the sixty-odd political units which still come under the supervision of the Colonial Office.[2] The British West Indies are the easiest to study, for here centuries of slavery long ago destroyed tribal and language units which still complicate Africa's politics; nor have these colonies developed the plural society which in East Africa and Southern Asia has so far defied any attempt to provide a satisfactory governmental structure within which violent racial passions and the subsequent struggle for political and economic power can be canalized and reduced.

Once the West Indies were among the wealthiest and most advanced of Britain's possessions; during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries they possessed the Old Representative System, that divorce of executive and legislature which existed

[1] The old term has not yet been replaced by the more discreet but too unwieldy non-self-governing territories; the latest bon mot is to refer to junior and senior partners in the Commonwealth.

[2] Among recent publications are a series, " Studies in Colonial Legislatures ", edited by Margery Perham (London, 1946-52) which includes a survey volume by Martin Wight and monographs on the Gold Coast, Northern Rhodesia, Nigeria, Ceylon and Trinidad; Mr. Wight's *Colonial Constitutions, 1947* (London, 1952); and a joint report *Problems of Parliamentary Government in Colonies* (London, 1952-53).

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in the thirteen Continental Colonies. However, the abolition of slavery suddenly changed the political balance; and white planters and merchants, fearing that the freed slaves would soon dominate the electorate as they qualified under the property and income franchise qualifications, deliberately reduced the powers and representative character of their legislatures. By the end of the century only Barbados retained the old system. In Jamaica and British Guiana peculiar halfway houses existed, and in the remaining colonies—the five presidencies which made up the Leeward Islands Federation, the three islands united in the Windward Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, and British Honduras—only nominated members, chosen by the Governor, sat in the legislatures. Coupled with this political retrogression was an economic decline as the sugar-dominated economy fell before free trade and new competitors. The result was that for half a century West Indian society stagnated until the Great War, when returning servicemen led a movement for increased representation in the legislatures of their individual colonies.

It must be noted that this was by no means a West Indian movement, but rather a Trinidadian or a Grenadan effort; at no time have politicians of the various territories made more than a token gesture towards coöperation, although since the Second World War there has been an attempt to " keep up with the Jones's " new constitution. After a visit by Lord Halifax, Major Wood as he then was, elected members were reintroduced to the Legislative Councils of Trinidad, Grenada, St. Vincent and St. Lucia in the Windwards and Dominica in the Leewards. In 1936 the principle was extended to the other islands in the Leewards and in 1935 to British Honduras.

Still the West Indies remained rather a backwater of the Empire, or, as Lloyd George put it, " the slums of the Empire ". It was not until a wave of rioting affected most of the colonies in the years 1935-1938 that the West Indies were again on the map. In these disturbances many have seen the watershed of recent West Indian history. In August 1938, a Royal Commission of unusual size and brilliance was appointed, with Lord Moyne as Chairman. Its terms of reference were " to investi-

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gate social and economic conditions in Barbados, British Guiana, British Honduras, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Windward Islands, and matters connected therewith, and to make recommendations." The Commissioners reached Jamaica in November 1938 and left Trinidad at the end of March 1939, after making a tour of all the colonies listed. Their Report [3] as a survey of economic and social conditions remains a masterpiece of cogent observation, but it is solely on the constitutional and political recommendations that attention must be focused here. They held that the weakness of Crown Colony government lay, not, as was usually alleged, in the autocracy which it apparently involved, but in the opposition which it engendered between the government—the Governor and the Civil Service—on the one hand, and elected members of the legislature on the other. The people of the West Indies, when they became politically conscious, were compelled to resort to vehement and continuous criticism of the government, and their elected representatives were forced into permanent opposition with no responsibility to provide practical alternatives to official policy.

As a result of this analysis, the Commissioners suggested certain changes which might democratize the Crown Colony system, while retaining " that control which, though not necessarily in its present form, must continue to be exercised in the interests of the home taxpayer, over the finances of Colonies receiving substantial assistance from funds provided by Parliament." These changes covered the whole structure of government from the Executive Council, the embryonic cabinet of colonial government, to the franchise. While the initiative in formulating policy should remain with the Governor in Executive Council, " the representatives of public opinion " should be given more opportunity to influence policy, and governors should broaden the base of representation in the Executive Council. Wherever possible elected members should be included. Some sort of committee system was recommended for the larger colonies which would both give unofficial members an

[3] Command Papers 6607 (1945).

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insight into administration and allow heads of departments to withdraw from the legislatures where previously they had held ex officio seats. Their vacant seats could be filled by unofficial members nominated to give useful advice on public policy and to broaden the composition of the legislatures. On the franchise, members of the Commission differed as to whether the time was ripe for the introduction of adult suffrage, but all felt that existing requirements should be reduced.

This Report provided the impetus and gave form to much of the constitutional reform which has taken place in the West Indies since its publication in an abbreviated version in 1940. Such is the process of the development of political consciousness and the desire for self-government that soon these recommendations were overridden by events, and the great majority of West Indian territories now possess constitutions far in advance of anything envisioned in the Royal Commission Report. It is the path of the four largest colonies, Jamaica, Trinidad, British Guiana and Barbados, from 1939 to the present day that this paper attempts to trace.

The nomenclature of British colonial government is perhaps unfamiliar to American readers, and might be described to advantage. The usual division of governments is into eight stages or classes, depending primarily on the composition of the legislature; in the event of a bicameral legislature it is the lower, and invariably dominant, chamber which is the key. The most primitive form is that in which the Governor incorporates in his own person both executive and legislative functions, an arrangement which has been used only as a temporary measure or for the administration of colonies which were primarily military bases. The second form adds a nominated Executive Council to advise the Governor, and the third a nominated Legislative Council to that. While an Executive Council might well consist solely of officials, the creation of a Legislative Council means the introduction of unofficial members into the machinery of government. The fourth stage comes when elected members are added, although official members remain in a majority in the Legislative Council, and the fifth when unofficial members for the first time become a majority in the

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Council, although elected members by themselves are still a minority. The sixth stage is an important one, for it brings an elected majority and the achievement of what is known as representative government. During the nineteenth century this status was of greater value than it is today because it gave certain legal protection against interference by the metropolitan executive branch, though not from the Imperial Parliament. The seventh and eighth stages, semi-responsible and responsible government, depend not on the composition of the legislature but on the relations of that body with the Executive Council, which at last begins to fulfill its promise as the future cabinet.

In 1939 the four colonies had reached various levels on this ladder. Barbados, with its venerable constitution modeled on that of Stuart England and itself dating from the seventeenth century, alone had representative government with a lower chamber, the House of Assembly, wholly elected, and an upper chamber, the Legislative Council, wholly nominated. British Guiana was a stage lower with a unicameral Legislative Council of eleven officials, five nominated unofficial members and fourteen elected members. Trinidad's constitution was similar to that of British Guiana with twelve officials, six nominated unofficial members and seven elected, although the unofficial majority was much smaller than in British Guiana. Jamaica, too, had a substantial elected minority of fourteen members, with ten official and six nominated members.

Jamaica was the first colony to press for a new constitution at this time, and indeed the demand had begun before the Royal Commission Report was published. In December 1938, the Legislative Council had passed a resolution calling for adult suffrage, and in April 1939 a motion was introduced by the most liberal member, J. A. G. Smith, to create a Select Committee to study and draft a constitution giving representative government. The Committee reported in May and the report was adopted unanimously in June. This contained a draft constitution which became known as the "Smith Constitution". It called for a bicameral legislature returning to the Old Representative System, with a House of Assembly of fourteen and a nominated Legislative Council of ten. The Privy Council, as

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the Executive Council was known in Jamaica, should be known as the Executive Committee, as in Barbados, and have half its members elected by the House of Assembly, the other five to be nominated by the Governor. The Executive Committee should be "the official organ of intercommunication" between the Governor and the legislature, and should advise the Governor on all questions, political, financial and administrative. As franchise reform had already been recommended, the Report proposed to continue the existing requirements pending a decision.

After a delay of some twenty-one months, a reply was sent from England in March 1941. The Colonial Office agreed to adult suffrage, but proposed to broaden the existing unicameral legislature by doubling elected and nominated membership, rather than turn to bicameralism. Major changes would have to wait for local government reform, the taking of a census and elections under adult suffrage. With the reduction in the government's strength in the legislature, reserve powers to enable the Governor to override the legislature would be necessary. This draft became known as the "Moyne Constitution". It was rejected in August 1941 by the Legislative Council which affirmed its backing for the Smith Constitution. A period of negotiation followed, during which Jamaican organizations of all political views rallied behind the Legislative Council and the Smith Constitution. Finally, in February 1943, the Secretary of State accepted their proposals. Details were slowly ironed out, and the old Council met for the last time on January 9, 1945, after a general election under adult suffrage.

The new constitution provided for an all-elected House of Representatives of thirty-two members, and an all-nominated Legislative Council of fifteen. Representative government was achieved. Five members of the House were to be elected to the Executive Council and known as Ministers, although they had few of the attributes usually associated with the title. This Council was to be the principal instrument of policy and also to prepare the annual budget. Except in certain unusual circumstances the Governor was required to consult with the Executive Council and to act on the advice given him. The

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committee system was unwisely divorced from the members of the Executive Council, and provision was made that Ministers could not belong to standing committees.

From the first, certain frictions were generated by the constitution. Ministers claimed that they were blamed for events which they had no power to control, but seemed loath to make use of what opportunities they had. In July 1947 a committee of the House was set up to study further constitutional reform. It met in January and February 1949 and proposed that true ministerial powers should be granted, that elected members should have a substantial majority on the Executive Council, and that the delaying power of the upper chamber should be reduced from one year to six months. These proposals had the backing of the majority, the Labor Party, but were strongly opposed by the People's National Party which wanted a unicameral legislature, to be obtained by abolishing the Legislative Council, and an all-elected Executive Council. However, only minor changes were made before the 1949 general election, and the new House appointed another Select Committee to examine reform. This body reported in March 1951. As the Labor Party had only a small majority, it opposed any changes which would necessitate another election; the P. N. P., within reach of power, insisted that a new election was a necessary prerequisite of any change. In April 1952, the Governor, Sir Hugh Foot, announced that the constitution would be amended within the year to give ministerial powers, and an elected majority on the Executive Council. In a debate in the House in July certain alterations of the proposals were made, and at the same time, under P. N. P. pressure, yet another Select Committee was created to continue the search for proposals which would achieve self-government. At the end of the year the Governor visited London and on his return announced that the new system would come into force on May 1, 1953.

While the Jamaican experiment has received more publicity overseas, other West Indian territories have engaged in experiments which are of equal importance. Barbados which had achieved representative government was excluded from the constitutional recommendations of the Royal Commission.

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After several false starts franchise requirements were halved in 1944, and thereafter party politics became an integral part of the life of the House of Assembly. In Barbados the keystone of government ever since the nineteenth century has been the Executive Committee composed of members of both chambers of the legislature nominated by the Governor and the senior officials. After some agitation by labor members, the Governor, Sir Henry Grattan Bushe, announced in his speech proroguing the House on October 1, 1946, that the executive and legislative branches should be more firmly linked and that accordingly when the House reassembled the Governor would send for the person who appeared to him best able to command a majority in the House of Assembly, and ask him to submit names from the House for membership on the Executive Committee. Such members would be asked to take charge of the general policy relating to particular departments of government in order to deal with the affairs of those departments in Executive Committee and in the House. As a result the Executive Committee would cease to be merely a collection of the Governor's nominated advisers and become " an effective organ of government accepting collective responsibility ", even though the Governor still retained ultimate responsibility. In maintaining their collective responsibility, the members of the Executive Committee should be prepared to resign if they lost the support of the House.

This system worked fairly well, but party divisions in the House forced Mr. Grantley Adams, Q.C., who was chosen Leader of the House to choose a coalition of members of his own Labor Party and the pro-labor Congress Party from 1946 to 1948. Since then there has been a Labor majority, and the grant of executive powers to the elected members of the Executive Committee is expected in 1953, although a date has not yet been announced. The predominantly colored and laborite lower chamber has long planned to reduce the powers of the largely white and strongly conservative Legislative Council which has grimly hung on to life. The Labor Party favors legislation modeled on the Parliament Act of 1911.

In Trinidad implementation of the Royal Commission Report

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was prompt. By December 1940, the Governor announced that official representation in the Legislative Council would be reduced from twelve to three, while two more members would be elected; one more unofficial member would be nominated to the Executive Council. Thus the new Legislative Council would just qualify as a representative legislature with nine elected and nine other (six nominated, three official) members. A large commission on franchise reform was set up locally; it reported in March 1943 in favor of adult suffrage with a test to prove ability to understand spoken English; this was accepted by the legislature in October 1944, but the Colonial Office rejected the English qualification which might have discriminated against older members of the immigrant Hindu community.

Various proposals were made concerning constitutional reform, but not until after the first general election under adult suffrage in 1946 was anything concrete done. Unofficial members were in a majority in the Executive Council but the elected members were in a minority and had no opportunity to formulate policy. In December, on a motion by an elected member, a committee to study constitutional reform was created. It was appointed by the Governor in February 1947, and it reported in May. Two groups in the committee prepared widely different proposals, the minority favoring virtual self-government, the majority, led by Mr. Albert Gomes, a grant of increased responsibility. When it became apparent that the majority report would be accepted, the minority led a vigorous campaign in the Legislative Council and in the country. The majority views were accepted by the Legislative Council 8-5, but after discussions with London a compromise version of the report was approved by the Secretary of State in January 1949.

The Legislative Council was to be greatly enlarged by doubling the number of elected members; the nominated members whom the majority had wanted to keep unchanged, and the minority to banish completely, would be reduced from six to five; official members should remain. Five members of the Legislative Council should be elected to the Executive Council where they would constitute a majority over the three officials and one nominated member, and assume administrative control

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over the various departments which would be grouped in ministries. This was an achievement of semi-responsible government which placed Trinidad's constitution in advance of any other in the West Indies for a time.

In British Guiana, where racial divisions run deeper and economic progress has been slower, the government was more hesitant in giving responsibility to the local government. In the summer of 1941 the official bloc in the Legislative Council was reduced in line with the Royal Commission Report, and two more nominated members were added to the Council; at the same time a Franchise Commission set about increasing the size of the electorate. In Trinidad the supporters of immediate adult suffrage had been in the majority, but in British Guiana they were in a small minority. The Commission recommended moderate reductions in income and property requirements which would give the vote to about one third of those who would have come under adult suffrage. The changes in the composition of the Legislative Council were implemented in 1943, and in the franchise in 1945.

The demand for increased self-government was less organized in British Guiana than in the other three colonies, but a solicitous Colonial Office at the first demands for a new study of constitutional development promised the appointment of an independent commission. This body was appointed in October 1950 and reported in the summer of 1951.[4] The Report ranks with the Wood Report of 1922 and the Royal Commission Report of 1938-1939 as an interpretation of existing conditions and a source of constructive recommendations, ranging over the whole apparatus of government. The Chairman of the Commission, Sir John Waddington, wrote a minority report favoring moderate changes and keeping as much as possible to existing institutions, for example, the unicameral legislature; the other two members proposed radical innovations. A constitution superficially resembling the Old Representative System should be introduced, with an elected House of Assembly which would include as ex officio members the three senior officials of the Colony, and with a nominated upper chamber, one

[4] Colonial Paper No. 280 (1955).

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third of whose members would be chosen on the advice of members of the House of Assembly. The device of a joint session in case of intercameral conflict should be tried. The Trinidad system of ministerial government should be used. The number of elected members should be increased from fourteen in the old Legislative Council to twenty-four in the new House of Assembly, and they should be chosen on the basis of adult suffrage for the first time. Their report was accepted with minor modifications by the Secretary of State and by the existing legislature, and the date for the new constitution to come into being was set for April 1953.

The future of these four colonies is open to discussion. There are many, both in the United Kingdom and in the West Indies, who feel that the political fragmentation of the Empire has been carried too far, and that it must be made clear that complete self-government, which used to be known officially as Dominion status and for which there is no definite label at the moment, will not be given to such minute units as Barbados (population 300,000; area 166 square miles) or even Jamaica (population 1,400,000; area 4,400 square miles). Only in the event of a federation of the West Indies could such a major step be taken, and then the grant would probably not be immediate.[5] The majority of West Indian leaders argue that a federation must have internal self-government, and that it would be preferable that the individual constituent units should have reached such a stage before the establishment of the federal government. In the case of the smaller territories whose finances are more precarious and who suffer from a dearth of trained personnel and capable leadership, it is obvious except to the most bellicose Grenadan or Vincentian nationalist that there is a point beyond which they cannot advance alone, but for the four largest territories the decision is difficult. All of them manage to balance their budgets without grants in aid from the United Kingdom Treasury but the margin of safety is small, and any signs of depression in sugar, bauxite and petroleum, the major exports, would wreck the young social services which

[5] The latest survey of the federation issue is Lord Listowel, Rawle Farley, Rita Hinden and Colin Hughes, *Challenge to the British Caribbean* (London, 1952).

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have grown up since the war. Whether local politicians can keep their heads in such a crisis is a serious problem to Whitehall. In three of the four colonies the Finance Ministry has been retained by an official Minister, and in Jamaica the Finance Secretary, although the equivalent of a Permanent Under-Secretary, will sit in the Executive Council in his own right. Defense is no problem in the West Indies where budgets are limited and the automatic protection of the British and American fleets is assured; the control of what microscopic local forces do exist has been left to officials. Internal security which is of much greater importance and interest is kept firmly under the Colonial Secretary of the colony concerned; since the Second World War political violence has taken place in all but Barbados, and has been especially serious in Jamaica.

To evaluate the chances of success of greater independence for these colonies, it is necessary to decide how well the existing constitutions have worked and what lessons they teach. The process of change in both political and constitutional spheres in the British colonies is fantastically rapid by metropolitan standards: within a single lifetime the form of government may change from an absolute autocracy, through forms of monarchy existing under the Tudors and Stuarts to the parliamentary supremacy of the Windsors. West Indian political development comes closer to the "old" Dominions, Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, than to Africa or Asian experience, as racial differences in the West Indies are closer to national differences existing in the multi-national Dominions.

With the extension of the franchise, the small white minorities who once dominated politics have largely withdrawn from active political life and are content to accept nomination to the few seats which the Governor still controls. In all cases a few white members retain their seats, but they are usually independents and have little to do with the young political parties which must crystallize if parliamentary government is to work. In Barbados and Jamaica the party system seems to have matured successfully, and in British Guiana it is in a state of flux, but in Trinidad it is completely nonexistent. In Barbados, the Labor Party led by Mr. Adams was founded in 1938 and has

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with the advent of adult suffrage won a large majority, defeating and probably permanently weakening the conservative Elector's Association (founded 1941) and the pro-labor Congress Party (founded 1944). In Jamaica nomenclature is somewhat different; there the party comparable to Mr. Adams' in Barbados, and also taking its inspiration from the British Labor Party, is the People's National Party led by Mr. Norman Manley, Q.C., which has always been in opposition. It was created in 1938. The "government" or more accurately the majority party is the Jamaica Labor Party (1944) which is the label used by the personal following of Mr. Alexander Bustamente, Mr. Manley's cousin. In the first election under adult suffrage, that of 1944, the J. L. P. won a sweeping victory with twenty-two of the thirty-two seats in the House of Representatives, while five went to independent members and five to the P. N. P. In 1949 the gap was greatly reduced when the J. L. P. won only seventeen seats, while the P. N. P. carried fourteen. Both parties have survived secessions of their parliamentary membership, the Labor Party of five members in 1947, and the P. N. P. which expelled two in 1952. In Trinidad, in both elections fought under adult suffrage, 1946 and 1950, party labels have been borne by some candidates but they have meant nothing with respect to vote getting or following a party program in the legislature. In British Guiana, the victory of the People's Progressive Party, an extreme Left-wing labor party with an important Communist element, in the April 1953 election has probably destroyed the tiny moderate and Right-wing parties which sprang up to contest the election. The P. P. P. won eighteen of the twenty-four seats. The only possible opposition is the moderate National Democratic Party with two seats.

Two main tendencies may be noted in West Indian political life. First there is a strong lone-wolf tradition, due to the novelty of political responsibility and to the extreme individualism of many elements of West Indian society, but contrasted with this reality is a tendency to over-organize on paper, to draw up endless party programs and constitutions, all roughly identical and all equally incapable of delivering votes or main-

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taining a party whip in the legislature. Parties are constantly foundering on the reefs of personality. The close connection of the labor parties with the trade-union movement has often ended in demoralizing both. The status of legislator is rated higher than that of trade-union official, and as a consequence leaders rate their own political careers above the welfare of their union and its members. A trade union may provide a solid bloc of votes and its presidency a standing advertisement of one's interest in the working class, and therefore no political organization is complete without its captive union. Such a union may cut across craft or industry lines, invade territory already occupied by well-established unions, fail to serve any legitimate trade-union function and fail to bring its members any benefits, or even worsen their position as the union is used as a pawn for political maneuvering.

As Professor V. O. Key has noted, loosely organized politics do not invariably lead to undesirable results in government action, but when the form of government is one of the transitional stages of responsible government in which many opportunities exist to avoid political accountability, this point may be crucial. The absence of any party control over the majority of the legislature or over the members of the Executive Council allows each member to explain away the absence or weakness of a legislative program by referring to the deficiencies of his colleagues. The types of political organization which exist in the West Indies may be classified into political parties, and quasi parties or electoral alliances. The first would include those formed around the persons of charismatic leaders such as Mr. Bustamente or Mr. Butler; tiny middle-class splinter parties often confined to one urban neighborhood or to the personal friends of a candidate for office; and finally true parties as they exist in Europe, the United States and the Dominions.

The demagogue has long been the most outstanding figure on the West Indian scene. Much has been made of the great partiality of the West African for interminable oratory, and to this his West Indian descendants have added a weakness for obscurantism, ponderous language and all the paraphernalia of quotations and Latin tags. In the same way certain character-

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istics of eccentricity have been developed—Mr. Butler's Vandyke and a Bible under the arm, Mr. Bustamente's leonine hair, white tie and two revolvers. The Bible is in great demand as a campaign document, for amid the innumerable sects which have proliferated in the West Indies the Bible has been one of the few common elements. An ability to quote from it has become the hallmark of education among the working class, much as the Overseas School Certificates serve the middle class. The techniques of addressing political meetings are as carefully studied—

> the stage set in the village market place, the glaring bulb over the speaker's rostrum, the delayed arrival, walking through massed crowds amid thunderous applause, the opening prayer and singing of hymns, and finally the carefully modulated voice, through the loud-speaker, varied from gentle sarcasm to the screaming peroration that rouses the audience to a crescendo of wild excitement.[6]

The smaller one-man parties are quite different from these large disorganized followings. While the demagogues' greatest appeal is in rural areas or among the recently urbanized, a less sophisticated audience than the confirmed cinema-goers of the towns, the one-man parties are usually urban middle class. The difference between such parties and the following of independent candidates is often hard to draw. Some politicians feel that a party label and a platform are valuable assets and provide a certain dignity; others state that they would not have such endorsement as a gift and make an appeal based on purely personal qualities. Perhaps most would agree with the traditional French politician that the ideal party is one just big enough to contain himself and enough voters to get him elected. Few of the small parties last for any length of time, as their leaders either seek more profitable alliances and form larger parties, or decide that the problem of maintaining the organization exceeds any value received from it.

Having been spared the task of acting as umpire between the several communities as is necessary in plural societies, the Colo-

[6] *Daily Telegraph* (London), 14 March, 1951.

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nial Office and successive Secretaries of State, both Tory and Labor, have given West Indians very nearly everything they have wanted in the last decade. The process has been slowed by the difficulties of getting West Indians of different degrees of political optimism to agree on what is best for their colony, and when agreement has been achieved, by the bottleneck which exists in the Colonial Office where a small legal staff churns out new constitutions for the colonies. The delay has been most marked in the question of federation where, despite the lip service paid to federation by almost all West Indian politicians and the support of the Colonial Office and both parties in the United Kingdom, discussions are drawn out from year to year, but can be seen at work in every colony. West Indian Ministers have begun to attend Commonwealth Conferences as advisers to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, but until responsible government has been tried and worked successfully there is little possibility of them attending in their own right as representatives of equal partners. A five-year cycle would seem to be average for constitutional growth, but there are many variants, and sooner or later federation must become the dominant issue. The year 1956 or 1957 should set the four colonies examined on the topmost rung of the ladder to complete independence.

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HUMAN NATURE IN AMERICAN THOUGHT

The Age of Reason and Morality, 1750-1860 *

THROUGHOUT the ages much has been written about human nature, in both Western and Eastern cultures. The attention given to it in American thought is considerable. Students of our folklore, of our literature and philosophy, and of our religion have illuminated various phases of the subject. Yet no one has made any systematic historical study of changing conceptions of human nature on various levels in the light of the larger intellectual development of the American people.[1] The task would not be easy, for a search through many books brings home the point James Russell Lowell once made so tellingly. In a critique of Harriet Beecher Stowe's *The Minister's Wooing*, Lowell remarked, "it is a proverb that 'there is a good deal of human nature in man.' But", he added, "it is equally and sadly true that there is amazingly little in books." [2]

The theme of human nature in American thought is a difficult one, but it is central. More than a hundred years ago William Ellery Channing, an outstanding leader of nineteenth-century thought, called attention to its centrality. He wrote:

> All our inquiries in morals, religion, and politics must begin with human nature. Certain views of man are involved in all speculations about the objects of life, and the proper sphere of human action. On such views all schemes of society and legislation are built. . . . And not only is it true, that morals, religion, and

* This article in its present form inaugurated the Gino Speranza Lectures at Columbia University.

[1] Of special note is Robert C. Binkley's "The Twentieth Century Looks at Human Nature" in the *Virginia Quarterly Review*, X (July 1934), 336-350. This essay is reprinted in *Selected Papers*, edited by Max H. Fisch (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1948), pp. 286-300.

[2] The review by Lowell is available in Charles Edward Stowe, *Life of Harriet Beecher Stowe* (Boston and New York, 1889), pp. 328 *et seq.*

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> politics, in their application in certain views of human nature, but every individual's principles, his whole system of duty, will take its character from the light in which he regards himself and his race.[3]

For some time, and especially since the Second World War, we have been aware of the constantly close relation between America and the larger Western civilization of which it has been a part. Literary critics and social scientists here and abroad have also been concerned with discovering the unique factors in the American story and the bearing of these on values and ideals. Any discussion of human nature in the history of American thought must, therefore, take into account the similarity of views about it here and in other countries. Any inquiry must also seek tentative answers to the question, has the unique experience of the American people given a special tone to their ideas about human nature? We may first consider what can well be called the Age of Reason and Morality—roughly the century from about 1750 to 1860.

No date, of course, can mark any sharp break with traditional thought. This, certainly, is the case with the year 1750. To that point the single most important factor in shaping ideas about human nature, in the New World as in the Old, was Christianity. This continued to be immensely important in the century between 1750 and 1860 despite innovations that modified many traditional Christian concepts, gave new importance to others, and in limited quarters replaced Christian thought about human nature altogether. In the last hundred years science has played an increasing rôle in shaping thought on this subject, but Christianity has of course remained the foundation stone. And certain special ideas that dominated the century ending in 1860 continued to count in the next one, the one ending now. Thus it is not merely busy work for scholars to inquire into the ideas about human nature prevalent in the century ending in 1860. Some of these ideas, quaint as they appear when we meet them in the elegant or flowery prose of a

[3] The quotation is from the draft of a projected study, "The Principles of Moral, Religious, and Political Science", included in William H. Channing, *The Life of William Ellery Channing D.D.* (Boston, 1899), pp. 437-438.

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century ago, are far from dead: their underlying assumptions color much of the thought of today.

Thus far I have referred to the Christian influence on ideas about human nature as if that influence were unique and entirely of one piece. Actually, of course, Christianity borrowed from the Greeks and from the Orient some of its central ideas about the dual nature of man, about man's capacity to reason, and about his proneness to sin. And in the long span of the Christian centuries religious ideas responded to many events and varied with the times—there has been no one Christian view.[4]

To be more specific, in the span from 1750 to 1860, the varying branches of Christendom (and we might also include the scattered Jewish synagogues) emphasized in different degrees man's essential baseness and depravity on the one hand and his reason and capacity for receiving grace on the other. Some stressed his utter dependence on God and his necessary acceptance of the fate God had ordained for him. Others preached his capacity to influence his fate through reason, conduct, and the acceptance of divine guidance. Certain groups exalted the mystical intuitive component which brought man closer to God and led him to express his love for both his Creator and his less-advantaged neighbor. For the most part these varying emphases in the Christian concepts of human nature followed their Old World counterparts in Calvinism, Lutheranism, Catholicism, Anglicanism and Quakerism.

But even by 1750 there had been some evidence that New World experience had exercised a selective rôle. In New England in the middle 1700's certain Puritan emphases were still influential. One such emphasis was on the innate, intuitive capacity of man to grasp divine truth and to approach the divine vision of God. This Platonic note in early New England Puritanism flowered in the teachings of Jonathan Edwards. It found a wider if less sophisticated and refined amplification in the Great Awakening that swept up and down

[4] For an interesting discussion see James Luther Adams, "The Changing Reputation of Human Nature", *Journal of Liberal Religion*, IV (Autumn 1942), 59-79, and IV (Winter 1943), 137-160.

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the Atlantic seaboard. This emphasis reduced the rational element in the scholastic-Calvinist conception of human nature. In Edwards, at least, it did not alter the old doctrine that God called some men to be rulers and others to be ruled. But it did have, in many aspects of the Great Awakening, a democratic overtone. For in this upheaval the common man discovered his own value in the eyes of God and set premium, not on the trained reason which only a few enjoyed, but on the feelings common to all, however humble in station.

A second Puritan emphasis that survived in 1750 was the doctrine of the covenant between God and His chosen people.[5] In many European Calvinistic circles God was made out to be a strict, even tyrannical sovereign. But in the New World a more liberal interpretation of the covenant came to prevail as God ceased being an absolute ruler and became a constitutional monarch. The faithful thus enjoyed a greater part in grace than was permitted by certain tenets of a Calvinism that was still much in vogue in parts of the Old World. The covenant theology did not make man a completely free agent. It nevertheless gave him some responsibility and was thus better suited to his rôle in a new environment in which he was to create a Bible Commonwealth than the stricter line of Calvinism. One might parenthetically add that the New England Bible Commonwealth failed because it put too great a strain on human nature in the abundant environment of a new country. Magistrates and parsons could not be at once saints, philosophers, statesmen and entrepreneurs; and rank and file refused to submit to their fiat and to abide by irksome blue laws and economic regulations that limited their opportunity to profit from the opportunities of the new land.

The freer environment of the New World also helped shape emphases in the discussion of human nature in religious circles outside New England. In Pennsylvania the Mennonite schoolmaster, Christopher Dock, declared that by reason of the freedom and humanitarian sentiments prevailing in the America of 1750 it was inadvisable to treat children as strictly as Old

[5] Perry Miller, *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century* (New York, 1939), especially Appendix B.

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World custom prescribed. The cause of moral infractions on the part of children must rather be patiently and intelligently inquired into, with an emphasis on the principle of loving understanding as the basis of all discipline.[6] Thus even before America became the United States we see the beginnings of the American tradition of greater freedom for children of which Europeans have long complained—and still do complain!

Again, take the case of another Pennsylvanian, John Woolman, wandering Quaker tailor and preacher. In favoring a training that combined the cultivation, in children, of reason and the mystical emotions he was sure God had implanted in every human being, Woolman insisted on carrying this training to downtrodden Negroes. And he reminded all who would listen of the Christian obligation to effect an equitable use of God's worldly goods. He wrote:

> If our views are to lay up riches or to live in conformity to customs which have not their Foundation in Truth, and our demands are such as requires greater Toyl, or application to business in them, than is Consistent with pure Love, we invade their rights as Inhabitants of that World, of which a good and gracious God is proprietory, under whom we are Tennants.[7]

No doubt Woolman found it all the more logical to insist that no man deprive others of the use of the earth in a new land where, after all, abundance made the realization of "Universal Righteousness" more easy than in the cluttered Old World.

The emphasis on God as a rational being and on his created image, man, as a rational creature was in the spirit of the Enlightenment as represented by Newton and Locke. Newton revealed the rational laws that governed a mechanically perfect universe. Locke formulated a relatively new conception of human nature. According to him, man possesses at birth no innate ideas, only capacities. His ideas are developed out of his sense experience. He is thus born, not in the fallen state of

[6] The text of Dock's "Schulordnung" is printed in Martin G. Brumbaugh, *The Life and Works of Christoper Dock, America's Pioneer Writer on Education* (Philadelphia and London, 1908). See especially pp. 102-103, 122.

[7] *The Journal and Essays of John Woolman*, edited by A. M. Gummere (New York, 1922), p. 404.

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orthodox Christian doctrine, but is, like white paper or soft wax, capable of developing whatever ideas experience and environment dictate. Human nature being thus so largely plastic, man may by suitable education develop his rational and moral capacities. The political implication was constitutionalism and democracy, for man being reasonable and moral, in potentiality at least, could govern himself in his own and his fellows' interests. The economic implication was laissez faire capitalism; for man being reasonable and moral, at least potentially, could be trusted to advance the common interest in advancing his own. The social and cultural corollary of this conception of human nature was the elimination by education of the inherited relics of a superstitious and inhumane past—war, slavery, poverty, ignorance, the exploitation of man by man.

It is clear that the experience and the environment of America played a part in the development of these ideas in the Old World.[8] For America was a living witness to the latent reason in man whereby he seemed to be creating a new environment in which Old World feudalism, tyranny, superstition and inhumanity existed only as dim shadows. When the thirteen colonies invoked their natural right to create a new government of law and of reason, and incorporated in their constitutions the fundamental rights of man to freedom of thought, expression and affiliation, many European philosophers were inspired. They found confirmation of their belief that America was to lead the world to that progressive state for which man's inherent reason and morality destined him.

American experience not only provided illustration and support for the doctrines of the Enlightenment. Americans shared in developing and expressing its characteristic ideas. John Wise, Charles Chauncy and Jonathan Mayhew took their places beside Shaftesbury, Clarke and Priestley in espousing the natural rights of man in society and deistic concepts in religion. Benjamin Franklin intrigued the wits of France with such aphorisms as " men and melons are hard to know " and enjoyed

[8] See Gilbert Chinard, " The American Dream " in *The Literary History of the United States*, edited by Robert E. Spiller, Willard Thorp, Thomas H. Johnson and Henry Seidel Canby (New York, 1948), vol. I, chap. 15.

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a prestige equal to that of the great Voltaire. Samuel Stanhope Smith of the College of New Jersey put forth the view that "the minutest causes, acting constantly, and long continued, will necessarily create great and conspicuous differences among mankind."[9] These differences included the pigmentation of Negroes. In thus arriving, independently of Revelation, at the doctrine of the genetic unity of mankind, the Princeton scholar can be associated with Montesquieu on the one hand and the modern anthropologists on the other. Dr. Benjamin Rush pioneered, along with Pinel in France, in ascribing mental illness to bodily disorders,[10] thus laying the basis for the movement for decent care and treatment of the insane associated with Dorothea Dix and her followers.

Jefferson gave a peculiarly American expression to the ideas of the Enlightenment. He believed that nature had implanted in all breasts, including even those of the more intellectually limited female, "a love of others, a sense of duty to them, a moral instinct which prompts us irresistibly to feel and succor the distresses" of the suffering and the needy. Jefferson did not, contrary to some assertions, expect that every man would be made virtuous any more than that every tree would be made to bear fruit. He said: "The brier and bramble can never become the vine and the olive; but their asperities may be softened by culture, and their properties improved to usefulness in the order and economy of the world."[11] In much that he wrote about human nature Jefferson was furthermore responding to American conditions. For his conception of the potentialities of his fellow countrymen rested in part on the American abolition of feudal tenure and on an agrarian economy of freeholders; on separation of church and state; on the subordination of the military to civilian authority; and above all

[9] Samuel Stanhope Smith, *An Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species* (Philadelphia, 1787), p. 3.

[10] Benjamin Rush, *Medical Inquiries and Observations upon the Diseases of the Mind* (Philadelphia, 1812). See also the *Letters of Benjamin Rush,* edited by L. H. Butterfield (Princeton, 1951), II, 1132.

[11] *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (Monticello edition, Washington, 1903-1905), XIV, 399-400.

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on American accomplishments and promises in all that made possible the free mind—equal opportunities for education and a truly free press.[12]

One prominent early nineteenth-century approach to the analysis of human nature, phrenology, seems at first sight not to be consistent with a belief in the perfectibility of man. Yet leading Americans of the time, including Dr. Benjamin Rush, Nicholas Biddle, Daniel Webster, Dr. Samuel Gridley Howe, and, later, Henry Ward Beecher and Walt Whitman, accepted phrenology in whole or in part. In it they found a key to an understanding of human nature. For some it opened the path to self-knowledge and individual success; to others it provided scientific support for a tolerant understanding of misfits and criminals and a mighty bulwark for all the humanitarian crusades.

In the beginning, at least, phrenology as developed by its Old World sponsors, Gall, Spurzheim and Combe, was a pioneer effort to study the human mind objectively and impartially. Gall and Spurzheim inductively investigated the anatomy of the brain and the nervous system and insisted that the mind could not be understood apart from an understanding of the body. The phrenologists assumed that the brain was made up of a plurality of cerebral organs that were specifically located and described in terms of such domestic propensities as amativeness and adhesiveness, such selfish propensities as combativeness and destructiveness, and such moral and intellectual sentiments as spirituality, benevolence, causality and reason. The phrenologists maintained that the possession of well-developed areas in the head indicated a corresponding development of the related organs. Thus character analysis was possible—an analysis aided by the association of bodily shape and texture of skin with the several temperaments, nervous, bilious and sanguine.

Spurzheim visited Boston in 1832 and won many friends and influenced many people—including notables in the American Athens. He attended Harvard commencement by special invitation of President Quincy, met the leading ministers and phy-

[12] Adrienne Koch has an interesting chapter on Jefferson's ideas about human nature in *The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson* (New York, 1943), pp. 113 *et seq.*

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sicians, and, on his untimely death in Boston, was honored with a public funeral at which the Handel and Hayden Society sang an anthem specially composed by one of Boston's leading divines. Six years later the eminent British phrenologist, George Combe, arrived to spend more than twenty months in lecturing and making converts. Meantime scores of phrenological societies had been established and a special periodical launched.[13]

It is not too much to say that for several decades phrenology was the popular psychology. In becoming a cult and a fad it was inevitably vulgarized. Thus ladies wore hairdresses designed to accentuate their favored phrenological features. Wandering phrenologists, untutored and shrewd, gave character readings for a consideration; and Fowler and Wells established parlors in Nassau Street in New York, to which flocked business men in search of advice, lads and lasses in quest of counsel as to whether they were properly matched from a phrenological standpoint, and the eternally curious. Horace Mann advised every young fellow to spend his last dollar in seeking phrenological advice as to his career; and countless thousands chose their vocations on the basis of readings, Clara Barton being one of the multitude.

But phrenologists, living in an age of belief in progress, did not think of human characteristics, even of bumps on the head, as unalterably fixed. They maintained that by the exercise or neglect of specific mental and moral faculties the contours of the skull might actually be altered. One "Professor" reported that a client possessed a marked depression or cavity in his head at the point corresponding to the propensity of devotion. Advised to exercise and develop this deficient propensity by daily prayer and acts of piety, the client heeded the counsel. On reexamination six years later the phrenologist found that what had been a vale on his head had become a hillock!

The excesses of this popular cult led, of course, to a reaction.

[13] The best treatment of the vogue of phrenology in the United States is that of Robert E. Riegel, "Early Phrenology in the United States", *Medical Life*, XXXVI (July 1930), 361-376. See also Nahum Capen, *Reminiscences of Dr. Spurzheim and George Combe* (New York and Boston, 1881), and Nelson Sizer, *Forty Years in Phrenology* (New York, 1882).

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The doubts that many physicians and ministers entertained from the start were confirmed. Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes summed up the skepticism of the more sophisticated in declaring that "to attempt to read character by phrenology is as absurd as it is to judge the contents of a money-safe by the size of its rivet-knots." [14] Clerical leaders denounced phrenology as a pretentious and impossible effort to unravel the mysteries of the soul.[15] But phrenology was one expression of a widely held faith that science could reveal the secrets of human nature, guide the individual along the path of personal success, and furnish a tower of strength in the crusade to reform the criminal, educate the masses, free the slaves, and put an end to war. Nor should we forget that even today serious claims are made in the name of science for diagnosing mental aberrations, predicting delinquency, and classifying personalities on the basis of physical characteristics. Some day this may seem as far-fetched and as amusing as the phrenological fad of a century ago seems to us.

The faith of the phrenologists in man's capacity to change the mental characteristics with which nature endowed him was, in a sense, an excessive distortion of an attitude toward nature implicit in the thought of the Enlightenment. But in so far as the Enlightenment challenged traditional Christian ideas about the origin and destiny of man it met with opposition and denunciation, just as phrenology did in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. We recall the scurrilous attacks on Thomas Paine by the exponents of orthodox religion. It is also true that the Federalists scorned the enlightened doctrines of human nature. "The truth is", wrote Fisher Ames of Massachusetts, "the most ferocious of all animals, when his passions are aroused to fury, and are uncontrolled, is man; and of all governments, the worst is that which never fails to excite, but was never found to restrain, those passions, that is, a democ-

[14] *The Works of Oliver Wendell Holmes* (Boston and New York, 1900), II, 195 *et seq.* See also *The Phrenology Journal and Science of Health*, XCVIII (December 1894), 274.

[15] *North American Review*, XXXVII (July 1833), 59 *et seq.*, and *Christian Examiner*, XVII (November 1834), 249-269.

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racy." [16] John Adams pondered on what he called "the weakness, the folly, the pride, the vanity, the selfishness" of men and attributed these to inherent weaknesses in human nature.[17] His political theory was an effort to curb the tiger in man by establishing a system of checks and balances designed to entrust power to a natural aristocracy—the rich, the well-born, and the able—an aristocracy based on innate superiorities to the common clay. In attacking public education for the masses, Mr. Justice Kent declared that it would "only enlarge their capacity for mischief." [18] And Calhoun, inheriting the Calvinist-Federalist conception of human nature, rested his political theory on two assumptions. One was that rulers, by virtue of human nature, oppress the ruled. The second assumption was that the ruled, when possessed of the means of so doing, inevitably resist the rulers.[19]

With representatives of interest and power holding ideas so antithetical to the teachings of the Enlightenment on human nature, it was natural that the program of the Jeffersonians should meet with obstacles. The American power structure, while more equitable than that of the Old World, did not readily yield to manhood suffrage, public education, free homesteads, the emancipation of women, and the abolition of slavery. But the victories that were recorded for these causes, as the years passed, testified to the strength of the humanitarian views about human nature.

Meanwhile the acceptance in Unitarian circles of the Enlightenment's view of human nature and the influence of this on the more orthodox sects heralded a new synthesis. This synthesis could be illustrated by the writings of a Congregationalist minister, Horace Bushnell, of Hartford. His book, *Christian Nurture,* repudiated the traditional Puritan view of

[16] *Works of Fisher Ames* (Boston, 1809), p. 432.

[17] *The Works of John Adams,* edited by Charles Francis Adams (Boston, 1850-1856), V, 273; VI, 234, 262; VIII, 66, 271-272, 279, 397-398.

[18] John Theodore Horton, *James Kent: A Study in Conservatism* (New York, 1939), p. 312.

[19] *The Works of John C. Calhoun,* edited by Richard K. Cralle (Charleston, 1851-1856), I, 33 *et seq.*

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human nature and argued that the child should be surrounded from infancy with a Christian environment.[20] Thus one might never recall having been anything but a Christian—in the true sense of the word. But let me illustrate the synthesis which may properly be described as that of the Age of Reason and Morality by taking more than passing note of another New Englander, Thomas C. Upham.[21] For Upham's systematic expositions of mental philosophy guided many generations of college and academy students and continued in use almost until the appearance of William James's *Principles of Psychology* in 1890. Upham, moreover, is a good example because his work for humanitarian reforms was an effort to institutionalize man's potential reasonableness and morality.

Having graduated from Dartmouth in 1818, and having entered the ministry by way of theological studies at Andover, Upham was called in 1824 to the newly established chair of philosophy at Bowdoin in order to combat the threats to orthodoxy implicit in the doctrines of Coleridge and Kant. The University of Vermont, sad to say, seemed to have succumbed to them under the leadership of its president, James Marsh. The young scholar seriously took up the task of defending the faith of the fathers. But he was unable, alas, to refute the Kantian metaphysics—in fact, it looked very reasonable to him! He was on the point of resigning when he conceived a way of distinguishing between the feelings and the will which promised to put new life into the tripartite classification of human faculties.

In making his important distinction Upham was not entirely original, however; for he acknowledged indebtedness to an obscure preacher in Thetford, Vermont—Asa Burton.[22] This re-

[20] Horace Bushnell, *Christian Nurture* (New York, 1861), pp. 29, 31.

[21] The best biographical sketch is that in the *Dictionary of American Biography*, XIX, 123-124. See also Nehemiah Cleveland, *A History of Bowdoin College* (Boston, 1882), pp. 131-132.

[22] Asa Burton, *Essays on Some of the First Principles of Metaphysicks, Ethicks, and Theology* (Portland, Maine, 1824). For sketches of Burton see *American Quarterly Register*, X (May 1838), 321-341, and William B. Sprague, *Annals of the American Pulpit* (New York, 1869), II, 140-147. Burton's treatise is sympathetically discussed in Jay Wharton Fay, *American Psychology Before William James* (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1939), pp. 75-89.

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markable man had only recently published a manuscript he had written many years earlier in connection with the training he gave young candidates for the ministry. Burton conceived of three faculties, understanding, taste and will. This classification did correspond to that of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason,* but it had been proposed before Kant's book appeared. Thus aided by the Vermont theologian, Professor Upham felt on sufficiently sound ground to give up his idea of resigning his chair! He proceeded rather to the writing of an important book, *A Philosophical and Practical Treatise on the Will* (1834). This won high praise from the *British Quarterly Review,* an organ little given to generosity toward American productions.[23] But *The Will* was only the first of some twenty books. It was followed by *Elements of Mental Philosophy,* revised many times, and translated into German; by an *Abridgment,* used in the Armenian translation at Robert College; and by volumes on religious and domestic themes.

A man of great industry, Upham was a writer of clear and at times of beautiful prose, an active participant in the peace and antislavery movements despite his nervous trembling at the mere thought of giving a public speech. He was an extraordinarily successful fund-raiser for Bowdoin, notwithstanding his retiring disposition; the first in Brunswick to sign a temperance pledge; a devoted husband and father of several adopted children. General O. O. Howard recalled him as a tall man, with head modestly drooping, sitting at his desk in so fatherly a way that "even the boy's wrong-doing seemed to be a source of drawing him nearer to a fatherly heart."[24] The boys apparently even forgave Professor Upham when in 1864 he took the lead in opposing the proposition to move chapel-hour forward from 6 A.M. to 8 A.M. This sweet, reasonable and loving soul feared the young men would find their beds too attractive and would not devote sufficient time to their morning lesson! As a result, the boys suffered the torments of six o'clock chapel for another twelve years.

[23] *British Quarterly Review,* IX (February 1847), 88-119.

[24] General Oliver Otis Howard, *Autobiography* (New York, 1909), I, 33.

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Now for Upham's concepts of human nature and the applications he made of these. His work was obviously that of a widely read scholar. In one sense it marked a backward step. Unlike the writings of some of his American predecessors in the flood tide of the Enlightenment, Upham's books excluded all consideration of the nervous system and of the influence of environment, physical and social, on mental activity. The Bowdoin psychologist drew heavily on the Scottish common-sense school; but he also wrote as a follower of Locke, especially in his treatment of ideas and association. The *Elements of Mental Philosophy* was heavily overweighted in its great emphasis on reasoning. In this it reflected a predominant interest of the Enlightenment. But it anticipated more modern studies in intimately connecting all parts and powers of the mind—intellect, sensibility, will. While the intellect, Upham held, acts on the sensibility, this in turn reacts on the will. And, in Upham's view, it is the will that maintains harmony of the mind. Given as he was to thinking of the mind in terms of rational organization, he " discovered the laws of the will," as Newton had discovered those of the physical universe. These " laws " included the principle of the freedom of the will. But if Upham's mental philosophy was in accord with the Age of Reason in its conception of the mind as an active entity functioning in a rational way in accordance with rational laws, it also looked forward. Upham was ahead of his time in making allowance for the constitutional individual differences " which pervade every part of the mental structure," in anticipating the James-Lange theory of emotions, the concepts of rationalization and the emergence of suppressed desires in perverted forms, and theories of introversion and extroversion. He was interested in child development and in the implications of anthropology.[25] In addition Upham discussed the pathological developments of every normal mental function. His textbook on abnormal psychology was the first American work of its kind.[26] It was

[25] Thomas C. Upham, *Mental Philosophy* (New York, 1869), I, 69-70; II, 62-63, 101, 283, 352-354, 356.

[26] Thomas C. Upham, *Outlines of Imperfect and Disordered Mental Action* (New York, 1840).

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not as pathbreaking as the earlier work of Dr. Benjamin Rush. But it was remarkable for its parallel presentation of the disordered aspects of the normal components of the mind.

The many generations of students who read and recited Upham's texts thus received an ever so systematic if somewhat arid picture of a human nature primarily motivated by reason and morality—not by irrational and emotional forces. Sex, of course, was never mentioned! Upham "demonstrated" by clear, exhaustive logic not only that man has free will, but that he can clearly distinguish between good and evil, will the good, and by appeal to reason bring it to pass. Here we have an optimistic conception of human nature, a bulwark to Christian faith as well as to a people engaged in conquering a continent, building a material civilization, and combating such social evils as slavery, intemperance and war. A highly rational, a highly moral depiction of human nature. And, it should be added, an essentially static conception. For Upham shared the weakness of the Enlightenment, and of most Christian doctrine, in viewing the mind and human nature, not as a historical development, but in terms of static structure and functioning.

Upham, as I have said, applied his concept of human nature to current social issues. Some of his poems illustrated this application. Note this one, entitled "Christian Benevolence":

> Who is my brother? Tis not merely he
> Who hung upon the same loved mother's breast;
> But everyone, whoever he may be,
> On whom the image of a man's impressed.
> True Christian sympathy was ne'er designed
> To be shut up within a narrow bound;
> But sweeps abroad, and in its search to find
> Objects of mercy, goes the whole world round.
> No matter what their color, name, or place,
> It blesses all alike, the universal race.[27]

The humanitarian sentiments reflected in these verses were likewise exemplified in *The Manual of Peace*, published in 1836 at the solicitation of William Ladd, father of the American

[27] Thomas C. Upham, *American Cottage Life . . .* (Portland, 1852), p. 185.

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Peace Society.[28] The manual was circulated by that organization as a major item of propaganda. Upham declared that many persons of intelligent benevolence thought that war is so deeply rooted in the passions of mankind that it is ineradicable. But war cannot be waged without minds to will it, and hands to wage it. It is just as subject as dueling, the slave trade, or any other custom, to the will of men. It exists only because they choose it. There is nothing in man's nature, or customs and habits, or structure of government and society, or in nature, which makes war inevitable. For there is an enobling and amiable part of our nature despite the fact that some institutions, like war, make men barbaric and destroy kindly and generous sensibilities. So Upham did not stop with an appeal to men's sympathies or mere prudential views. His argument entered, rather, "into that more elevated portion of the soul, which may be characterized as the sanctuary of duty." As moral beings, as beings subject no less to reasonable laws of nature than to those of religion, we must, he continued, ask ourselves, have we "the RIGHT to destroy each other?"[29] For the light of nature is nothing more and nothing less than the light of natural reason and of moral conscience. Since it embraces, not just one people, but all mankind, since it is intuitively operative in the perceptions of all, even when the reason tarries and halts, Upham was convinced that the cause of peace was sustained by a plain and frank appeal to the intuitive common sense and common feeling of mankind. Elsewhere Upham expressed his conviction that the abolition of war was merely a matter of reason and will on the part of the people. "If", he wrote, "they would but once consider the subject in all its facts, and in all its bearings, they could not fail both to feel and to act; they would at once lift up a note of remonstrance, which would reach their rulers, and compel them to stop in their ministrations of blood."[30] Here we see

[28] Merle Curti, *The American Peace Crusade 1815-1860* (Durham, N. C., 1929), p. 190.

[29] Thomas C. Upham, *The Manual of Peace* (Boston, 1842), pp. 88-89.

[30] Thomas C. Upham, *A Philosophical and Practical Treatise on the Will* (Portland, 1834), p. 240.

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again the shortcomings of a concept of human nature that said little or nothing about the irrational forces, the readiness to inflict pain on others, the sense of power and satisfaction in laying others low.[31]

Thomas Upham's clear and highly schematized view of a human nature which endowed all mankind with the power to reason, and to will the right, needs to be viewed in terms of a qualification. Nowhere, apparently, did he discuss the inborn traits of women or their mental capacities or the strength of their will. He did not include the women's rights crusade in the wide scope of his humanitarian interests. He may well have shared the dominant view about women's capacities. This view ascribed to them the innate capacity for morality possessed by all human beings but denied, save in exceptional cases, a rational capacity equal to that of men. Upham, then, seems to have shared the dominant view of the place of women in human nature.[32]

A minority in Upham's time did view women as equal to men not only in moral but in potential intellectual capacity. This position stemmed from two main currents of thought. The one was the Enlightenment. Here we find such a pioneer as the late eighteenth-century writer of Gothic tales, Charles Brockden Brown. Here we also find that bold and courageous band of women's rights advocates who insisted that as human beings women were endowed with the same capacity for reason as men—by and large—and that as human beings they should enjoy the natural rights of man. Who could doubt, they asked, that the reason for the benighted intellectual level of their sex was to be laid at the door of cramped opportunities? The prevailing view of women's capacities, they insisted, was a

[31] A. A. Roback in his *History of American Psychology* (New York, 1952) overemphasizes Upham's "modern" tendencies. For a similarly enthusiastic account see Frank Hugh Foster, *A Genetic History of the New England Theology* (Chicago, 1907), pp. 249-251. For a more critical view, see R. C. Davis, "American Psychology 1800-1885" in *The Psychological Review,* XLIII (November 1936), 477-478.

[32] For varying views on the nature and abilities of women in nineteenth-century American thought see Sidney Ditzion, *Marriage, Morals and Sex in America: A History of Ideas* (New York, 1953).

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medieval superstition, a blind prejudice that rated women as a mere afterthought of the Deity—a lame appendage to man. "Women are free to adorn their persons," remarked Sarah Josepha Hale, "but if they seek to cultivate their minds, it is treason against the prerogatives of man." [33] A later feminist tartly summed up the matter:

> There little girl, don't read,
> You're fond of books, I know,
> But brother might mope
> If he had no hope
> Of getting ahead of you! [34]

The other movement that strengthened the minority view of women's capacities was Transcendentalism. Emerson did on one occasion note that the female mind seemed rarely to be impersonal, but he ascribed this to the subordinate rôle women occupied in society; for Emerson denied any great difference between the sexes. He believed that the essence of the human being is its relationships, and that its divine nature makes any notion of innate inferiority untenable. As he put it, since "every woman is a man's daughter, and every man a mother's son, every women is too near to man, was too recently a man, than that possibly any wide disparity can be." [35] And further, if women as sharers of the divine nature relied on their own intuitions they too would hear the divine word and convey it to mankind. But the Emersonian view was too dissident to find expression in such systematic treatises as those of Thomas Upham. Nor did it become acceptable to the writers of school textbooks, as Ruth Miller of Vassar College has shown.[36]

But if the prevailing opinion denied to women equal endow-

[33] Sarah Josepha Hale in 1868, quoted in Mary Roberts Coolidge, *Why Women Are So* (New York, 1912), p. 219.

[34] Alice Duer Miller, *Are Women People?* (New York, 1915), pp. 34-35.

[35] *Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson,* edited by Edward Waldo Emerson and Waldo Emerson Forbes (New York, 1909-1914), IV, 81; VI, 192, 379, 405.

[36] Ruth V. Miller, *Nationalism in Elementary Schoolbooks Used in the United States from 1776 to 1865,* Columbia University doctoral dissertation, 1952 (Ann Arbor, University Microfilm, Pub. No. 3906), pp. 176-178.

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ment of rationality, it conceded them equal or even superior native capacity for morality. To be sure, there were villainesses, but on the whole the female sex was symbolized in the charming steel engravings as shiny haired creatures, regular of feature, and soulful and sweet in their inborn modesty. As one piece in the *Ladies' Magazine* had it, a woman should " present herself as a being made to please, to love, and to seek support; a being inferior to man and near to Angels." [37] She might gratify her instinct for self-adornment, as Sarah Josepha Hale pointedly remarked, for this was certain to please. But above all she was to realize her moral nature by exerting a restraining influence on her husband's animal spirits. No doubt many Americans agreed with the eminent British authority on sexual matters who, as cited by Havelock Ellis, declared that, " happily for society " the supposition that women possess sexual feelings can be put aside as a " vile aspersion ". Another medical authority, according to Havelock Ellis, stated in regard to the most simple physical sign of healthy sexual emotion that it " only happens in lascivious women." [38]

Thus endowed with moral purity women were by nature intended to rear and guard the young. A typical description of children spoke of them as " the blossoms and dewdrops of life." [39] True, the older Calvinist view that they were little vipers whose wills must be broken still enjoyed credence, but in narrowing circles. Up-to-date counselors rather admonished mothers " to suffer not the chilling hand of vice to blast that spotless beauty." [40] Women, then, were to realize their moral endowments not only in their virtuous subservience to and elevation of the mentally superior if more passionate male. They were also to realize their moral endowments in the all-comprehensive function of motherhood, although childbirth itself was never directly mentioned in polite circles.

[37] Coolidge, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

[38] Havelock Ellis, *Little Essays of Love and Virtue* (London, 1922), p. 110. *Cf.* William Acton, *Prostitution, Considered in Its Moral, Social and Sanitary Aspects* (London, 1857).

[39] *Peterson's Magazine*, XXX (September 1856), 155-156.

[40] *Ibid.*

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This matter of the high moral gifts of women and their inferior rational endowment was, then, a notable exception to the general view of human nature in the Age of Reason and Morality. That view, you recall, endowed mankind with capacities which, given proper tutelage, promised to realize the hope of Christianity and the dream of the Enlightenment. Yet I must not pass by other exceptions to the dominant view. Southern proslavery apologists, for example, had little truck with these ideas of human nature, considering them utopian and mischievous.[41] This was also true of Northern exponents of the stake-in-society philosophical heritage from the Federalist régime. It is worthy of note that these conservative views of human nature guided most writers of school textbooks.

Nor will it do to stop with out-and-out social and economic conservatives. Occasionally one finds a witty presentation of the older view combined with an anticipation of that more common in our time. Such, for instance, was an anonymous piece in the *Knickerbocker Magazine* for 1845. The author noted that man shared many intellectual and social capacities with the lower animals. The beaver also laid up stores, the ants also established communities and governments. It was, furthermore, the nature of all animals to love, hate, sorrow and rejoice. There were differences, to be sure. If dogs and men alike stole, dogs did not pray to their Maker nor take His name in vain! Since man did both, it was fair to concede, our writer went on, that he possessed a conscience—however little it actually checked his animal propensities in the routine of living. And the general anti-intellectualism of the piece was reflected in the remark that little could be learned about human nature from books or schools or even colleges! "He who trusts to theory alone, in the science of human nature, will be as bad off as the woman who made her first pudding by a cookery book; of which her husband said, in attempting to eat it, that she had 'booked it and booked it' but she had never 'cooked it.'" [42]

[41] Rollin G. Osterweis, *Romanticism and Nationalism in the Old South* (New Haven, 1949), p. 90.

[42] "Hints on Human Nature", by "One of the People", *Knickerbocker Magazine*, XXVI (December 1845), 536-543.

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The *Knickerbocker* essayist certainly introduced a note of realism in noting that everyone put on his best face when he wanted to make a good impression, on his minister, on his boss, on his girl. Realistic too was the discussion of man's acquisitiveness, secretiveness and combativeness—factors, however to be explained, that reduced man below the dignity that William Ellery Channing ascribed to him. But for all his dissent from the widely held view that man is unique in his inherited rational and moral endowments, the *Knickerbocker* writer did reflect the climate of opinion of his day in holding that " man is essentially the same the world over."

We should also remind ourselves of such dissidents as Hawthorne, a student of Upham's at Bowdoin, who accepted many but not all of his teacher's theories of man, for Hawthorne probed profoundly the depths of evil in the human heart; and Melville, whose vogue today is no accident, for Melville was a lonely figure in the Age of Reason and Morality. Democrat though he was in many respects, he conceived of human nature as a great mystery, unsolved and insoluble. It was as inexplicable, he believed, in terms of his own age as it was in those of the shadowy Calvinism that few intellectual leaders any longer professed, at least in its older rigid forms; or, for that matter, as inexplicable as it was in terms of the rising science. Long before Darwin, the author of *Moby Dick* knew about the ape in man. Long before Freud, he took into account unconscious motivations, repressions, conflicts and rationalizations. And he knew that in his great insecurity man needs and must move with his fellows. But beyond some point or other, he knew that man is alone. " Oh lonely death in lonely life! " Captain Ahab exclaimed at the very last.

But this was a minor note. Lincoln was more representative of the underlying folk wisdom of mid-nineteenth-century America. Property, Abraham Lincoln said, has a deep and far-reaching influence on its owners—whether in the North or in the South. " Human nature is the same, people at the South are the same as those at the North, barring the difference of circumstances ", the property basis. Slavery, he continued, is founded on the selfishness of man's nature. But opposition to it is founded on his sense of morality—his love of justice.

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> These principles are in eternal antagonism. . . . Repeal the Missouri Compromise, repeal all compromises, repeal the Declaration of Independence, repeal all past history, you still cannot repeal human nature. It still will be in the abundance of man's heart that slavery is wrong; and out of the abundance of his heart and his mouth will continue to speak.[43]

Here we have a memorable testimony to the hold of the Age of Reason and Morality. But we also have a testimony to its failure to resolve all the basic conflicts between reason and irrationality, between morality and evil. There were other conflicts than slavery to trouble students of human nature, be it not forgotten, as it is easy to forget in our present-day time of neoconservatism. There was the conflict between acquisitiveness and coöperation, a conflict that the Owenites and Fourierists did not solve satisfactorily. Nor, within the frame of rationality and morality, did Charles Sumner's New England industrialists, the Lords of the Loom as he called them. Perhaps no scheme of human nature, however realistic, could have provided a more satisfactory guide, given the total equation. Perhaps Lincoln was right when he said, in the midst of civil war, that "in any future great national trial, compared with the men of this, we shall have as weak and as strong, as silly and as wise, as bad and as good." He added, "human nature will not change."[44] This is, surely, a time of great national trial. Has human nature changed? Either it has changed, or theory about it is very different, for we no longer live in the serene and reasonable world of Upham's time.*

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[43] *The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln*, edited by John G. Nicholay and John Hay (New York, 1894), I, 199.

[44] *Ibid.*, I, 609.

* A second article on this theme and dealing with the period since 1860 will appear in the December issue of the QUARTERLY.

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA

INDIA, with more than twice the population of the United States, has a land area only half as large. Perhaps nowhere else in the world, except in Japan and Java, is the problem of the pressure of population on the land more intense than in India.[1] The existence of the present moderate government and India's continued adherence to the free world seem dependent upon the ability of Indian planners, with outside assistance, to solve the problem within this decade.

The present Indian population of 361 million is growing by some 45-50 million each decade. It has increased by more than 50 per cent over the last fifty years. The threat is not so much in the rate of population increase (now about the same as that in the United States), but in the sheer magnitude of the absolute numerical increase in relation to the practically stationary acreage under cultivation.[2] Over two thirds of the Indian labor force is engaged in agriculture, yet India is not self-sufficient in foodstuffs. In India 75 million agricultural workers cultivate 320 million acres while in the United States only 8 million work 360 million acres. The United States uses 2.5 million tractors, India about 10,000. The United States applies twenty million tons of fertilizer to its land each year; India uses less than half a million, and this in good part on nonfood acreage. Indian yields are only a third to a half of those in other major agricultural countries and annual per capita food consumption has been declining there in recent years.

The burden of food imports imposes a very heavy drain on India's foreign exchange resources, amounting in some years to as much as 500 million dollars. That Indian leaders are acutely

[1] For an Indian view see Baljit Singh, *Population and Food Planning in India* (Bombay, 1947); also M. B. Nanavati and J. J. Anjaria, *The Indian Rural Problem*, Indian Society of Agricultural Economics (Bombay, 1947).

[2] An excellent picture is provided in *The Population of India and Pakistan* by Kingsley Davis (Princeton, 1951).

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aware of the magnitude and gravity of their economic situation is seen in their enthusiasm for economic planning. Perhaps in no other country in the free world has so much attention been paid to, and so large an effort directed toward, economic development.

Post-War Economic Trends

Partition added to India's economic troubles. That part of undivided India which became Pakistan had produced surpluses of wheat, raw cotton and raw jute. Partition left India with most of the processing facilities but with a shortage of the necessary raw materials.[3] Furthermore the trade war between India and Pakistan, which followed Pakistan's failure to devalue its currency in September 1949 along with other sterling countries, including India, and which lasted until early 1951, made it difficult for India to buy Pakistan's cotton and jute surpluses. To increase domestic production of cotton and jute the government of India raised the price ceilings on these two crops; but since low price ceilings and procurement controls were retained on food in order to assure minimum supplies at reasonable prices, the net results of these measures were shifts in production from food to cotton and jute, despite the nation-wide, largely exhortatory campaign to grow more food.

By 1951-52 the output of cotton and jute had increased substantially over the 1947-48 level, while the output of food grains had declined by almost one sixth. In 1952, however, fortified by the food loan from the United States, the Indian government tried to rectify this imbalance by also decontrolling food grains in areas that were not normally in short supply and where the state governments had sufficient stocks on hand to restrain excessive price increases.[4] It was hoped that with the removal of controls cultivators would switch back to production of food crops.

In the industrial sector, output fell in 1949 and 1950, partly as a result of the shortage of raw materials due to the trade

[3] See *Economic Consequences of Divided India* by C. N. Vakil (Bombay, 1950).

[4] See "India in 1952", *The Eastern Economist*, Annual Number, New Delhi, December 26, 1952.

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war, but recovered and advanced in 1951 and 1952. The gain in output in 1951 and 1952 was due principally to the greater availability of raw materials and to increased imports of capital equipment. The Indian Planning Commission has noted, however, that "While in the aggregate India's industrial output may look massive, per head of population, it is very much lower than the industrial output in advanced countries." The relative backwardness of industrial development may be judged from the fact that factory establishments account for only approximately 7 per cent of total national income and that the total labor force engaged in such establishments is about 2.5 million, or less than 2 per cent of the total working population in the country.[5]

In its foreign trade, a substantial deficit was incurred in every year of the past five, except in 1950. These deficits, due largely to heavy expenditures for food and more recently for capital equipment, were financed primarily by drawing on sterling balances, although approximately a third of the total was met by other foreign loans and grants. India's sterling balances, which by the end of World War II had totaled approximately £1.7 billion, are scheduled, under the latest agreement with Britain, to be utilized fully, apart from a minimum currency reserve, by 1957. The anti-inflationary effects of the sizable import surpluses offset the inflationary pressures from other sources only to a degree, and India experienced a considerable inflation that reached a peak in the spring of 1951 and then receded thereafter.

Between 1947 and 1951 wholesale prices rose almost one half, while the urban cost-of-living index rose one fifth. Although wholesale prices have now receded, the cost-of-living indices remain virtually at, and in a number of cities above, the 1951 highs.[6] The pressure of the price level intensified the demand for rapid economic development during most of the post-war

[5] See *First Report of the National Income Committee,* Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance (New Delhi, 1951); also *India's National Income, 1948-49 to 1952,* Estimates by the Eastern Economist (New Delhi, 1952).

[6] See "A Review of Economic and Financial Conditions in India", *Tata Quarterly,* Bombay, January 1953.

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period, since it was recognized that the greater availability of food and consumer goods, made possible by higher yields and larger output, would tend to lower prices.

Development Planning in India

For more than two decades numerous planning proposals have been advanced in India. The Indian National Congress party, through its All-India Congress Committee, was responsible for the establishment of a National Planning Committee in 1938. The work of this body was interrupted by World War II and the imprisonment of Congress leaders but was resumed afterwards and some thirty planning reports on subjects ranging from Public Health to River Valley Development were issued. At its final meeting in New Delhi on March 26, 1949, the Committee, in turning its records and reports over to the President of the Indian National Congress, recommended that the new government take official action in the planning field. Accordingly after some little delay, the government established a new National Planning Commission in February 1950, with Prime Minister Nehru as chairman.[7]

Indian attitudes in favor of planning were stimulated also by the publication of the Bombay and Gandhian Plans. The famous Bombay Plan, prepared by eight leading Indian industrialists and first published in January 1944, called for the expenditure of Rs. 100 billion over three five-year periods. The aim was to double per capita income within fifteen years by doubling agricultural output and by increasing industrial output fivefold. While the Bombay Plan was never carried out the magnitude of its proposed expenditures and the scope and challenge it presented had considerable influence on later planning.[8]

The Gandhian concept of village self-sufficiency formed the basis of the Gandhian development plan prepared by S. N. Agarwal, Principal of the Govindram Seksaria College at Wardha. This plan proposed, probably as a counterweight to the industry emphasis of the Bombay Plan, that agricultural

[7] D. S. Nag, *A Study of Economic Plans for India* (Bombay, 1949).

[8] V. V. Babu, *Towards Planning* (New Delhi, 1950).

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development looking toward national self-sufficiency in food stuffs be given the main emphasis. Limited industrial development was sponsored but the stimulation of rural industry with a view to a more balanced village economy was given the greater emphasis. The plan contemplated the expenditure of Rs. 37 billion over a ten-year period for rural self-sufficiency.[9]

The National Planning Commission was no sooner established in 1950 than it was called upon to prepare the Indian section of the Colombo Plan for the Commonwealth Consultative Committee meetings in London in September 1950. Two six year plans were worked out, the larger involving an expenditure of Rs. 31.6 billion. Because of India's limited financial resources, however, a small program with an estimated cost of Rs. 18.4 billion was submitted.[10] After the September meetings this plan was modified and reissued in July 1951 as the preliminary draft of India's official Five Year Plan, " for the widest possible public discussion." As a result of public comment and discussion, constructive changes were undertaken and a final draft was officially adopted by Parliament in December 1952.[11]

While the first Five Year Plan attempts to pursue a middle course between the Bombay and Gandhian Plans, it tends to lean, as will be indicated later, toward the latter in the considerable priority it gives to agricultural development and in the emphasis on the fuller utilization of existing capacity in consumer- and producer-goods' industries rather than upon broad expansions of capacity in the capital equipment industries. Although there are in the Plan numerous evidences of a continual search for a proper balance between sacrifices and incentives for the various economic sectors, the concern for immediate social welfare shows itself not only in the emphasis on food and other consumer goods but also in the sizable allocation for education, health, housing and other social services. The

[9] S. N. Agarwal, *The Gandhian Plan of Economic Development for India* (Bombay, 1944).

[10] See V. V. Babu, *The Colombo Plan and India* (New Delhi, 1951); also V. K. R. V. Rao, "The Colombo Plan for Economic Development: An Indian View", *Lloyd's Bank Review*, July 1951.

[11] *The First Five Year Plan*, Government of India, Planning Commission, New Delhi, No. PC (P) /62/52/, December 7, 1952.

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conscious sacrifice of greater production for the sake of fuller employment and the preference for investments which will yield a greater quantity of consumer goods are based on the government's recognition of the real need to enlist wide public support and to produce some obvious and tangible results by the end of the first five years.

The First Five Year Plan

Although the final version of India's first Five Year Plan was adopted by its Parliament in December 1952, expenditures for development made the Plan date from April 1, 1951, and thus two full years have elapsed under it and the third has begun (April 1, 1953).[12] The Indian government had already been spending substantial sums for development. In 1950-51, the year just before the beginning of the Plan, development expenditures totaled over 400 million dollars.

The Plan, which runs from April of 1951 through March of 1956, calls for a total outlay of 20.69 billion rupees, or 4.3 billion dollars. In its first year, 1951-52, 2.8 billion rupees were spent and in the second year, 3.4 billion rupees—some 570 million dollars and 690 million dollars respectively. Thus, over the first two years, about 30 per cent of the total contemplated outlay has already been expended.

Over the current fiscal year (April 1953 through March 1954), an expenditure of over 4 billion rupees is in process, and in the two terminal years of the Plan even larger payments are anticipated. Thus the tempo of economic development in India will be increasing over the next few years, at least to the extent that the impulse transmitted by larger expenditures makes itself felt through the whole economy.

In the three years from April 1950 to date India has spent the not inconsiderable sum of 1.7 billion dollars on economic development. To this, the International Bank is contributing 109.8 million dollars in the form of five loans. The United States has provided $290 million, $99.4 million in the form of direct grants for development under the Indo-American Tech-

[12] The Indian fiscal year runs from April 1 through March 31 of the next calendar year.

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nical Assistance Agreement, and $190.6 million in the food loan, the rupee proceeds of which were used for development. The Commonwealth countries, under the Colombo Plan, have contributed substantial technical assistance and direct grants of lesser sums.[13] The Soviet Union and communist China have contributed nothing.

Of the total expenditure of 20.69 billion rupees, the government of India estimates it can raise 12.58 billion from internal resources over the five years, leaving a gap of 8.11 billion, but of this, 1.56 billion rupees have already been obtained from abroad, reducing the deficit to 6.55 billion rupees. This can be further reduced by the creation of 2.9 billion rupees against sterling balances and the expenditure of these sterling balances over the period of the Plan. Thus the deficit falls to 3.65 billion rupees (about 730 million dollars) which can be met either by increased taxation in India, by further United States grants, or by Indian deficit financing, or a combination of all three.

The Planning Commission itself, in the full text of its report, points out that India's total tax revenue (both central and state governments) amounts to only 7 per cent of its national income as against 35 per cent in the United Kingdom, 22 per cent in Australia, 23 per cent in the United States, 20 per cent in Japan, 27 per cent in New Zealand, 19 per cent in Canada, and 20 per cent in Ceylon.[14] While there are obvious limitations in comparisons of this sort, this one does suggest room for increased taxation in India.[15] Unless there is increased taxation, supplemented by United States grants, the government of India proposes to close the gap by deficit financing, and while experts of the International Monetary Fund, after a recent survey, concluded that this would not impair the stability of the

[13] *Report of the Consultative Committee on Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, Fourth Meeting at Karachi, Pakistan, March 1952*, U. S. Department of State Publication No. 4650, Economic Cooperation Series 33, July 1952; also "Australian Aid to India", *Hindustan Times*, September 2, 1952, and "Canadian Wheat for India", *Times of India*, September 24, 1952.

[14] *The First Five Year Plan*, vol. I, chap. iii, "Assessment of Resources".

[15] See *Public Finance Surveys—India*, United Nations, Dept. of Economic Affairs (New York, 1951); and *Report on Currency and Finance for the Year 1951-52*, Reserve Bank of India (Bombay, 1952).

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economy, it would be inflationary, and inflation in an underdeveloped country may interfere with the process of capital formation rather than stimulate it.[16]

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development defines economic development as " the process of increasing real capital and improving techniques of production." While over the long run inflationary expansion of money and credit may bring forth concrete results in increased output and thereby justify the means, in a country like India where so many live so close to the margin, over the short run inflation of the money supply, unmatched by materially increased output, may so severely worsen the economic plight of most urban inhabitants, government functionaries, village artisans and shopkeepers that grave political unrest and instability may result. Inflation is, after all, a form of taxation, and a most inequitable one. It would seem wiser to tax directly and more equitably. At all events, by one means or another, it is apparent that funds will be found to carry the Plan to completion.

Division of Expenditures under the Plan

Of the contemplated expenditures, 45 per cent are being devoted to agriculture, irrigation and power; 24 per cent to transportation and communications (largely railway rehabilitation and road development); 21 per cent to social services and refugee rehabilitation; and 8.4 per cent to industrial development. The last figure is small because India has a " mixed " economy and the Plan covers only expenditures in the public sector. Industrial development is, with some few key exceptions, being left largely to the private sector. With respect to agriculture the Plan declares:

> For the immediate five year period, agriculture, including irrigation and power have topmost priority. Without a substantial increase in the production of food and of raw materials needed for industry, a higher tempo of development in the latter cannot be sustained. The economy has first to be strengthened at the base, and a sizable surplus created in the agricultural sector and mobilized for sustaining increased employment in other sectors.

[16] See " The Measurement of Inflation ", *Eastern Economist*, March 13, 1953.

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Yields in India are among the lowest in the world. In wheat India averages but 6.5 kilograms per hectare compared to 17.6 for Japan; in rice only 12 kilograms per hectare compared to 40 for Japan. Irrigated land is just 16 per cent of total arable land in India as against 48 per cent in Japan. Although India produces 60 million tons of food grain a year,[17] its population on rations grows larger each year—114 million in 1950, 125 million in 1951, 140 million in 1952. Both per capita acreage under food crops and per capita food consumption have fallen in recent decades. Twenty years ago Indians consumed some 370 pounds of food grains. By 1950-51 this had declined to 315 pounds, and by 1956, when it is estimated that the Indian population will have reached 378 million and its food grain deficit in the absence of development, some 7.2 million tons per year, the per capita food grain consumption will be down to about 300 pounds. By 1960, India's population will exceed 400 million and the implications for food supply are obvious.[18] The annual increase in population requires 700,000 tons of additional food grains per year. Fortunately something is now being done about this. A multi-pronged attack on the food problem is now under way, utilizing the village development program, tried so successfully at Etawah, and involving better seeds, better farm tools, use of fertilizer, agricultural extension workers to teach improved techniques, and a considerable expansion of reclamation and irrigation by tube wells, river-valley development and other irrigation methods.

Most, although not all, of the Indo-American Technical Assistance Operations Agreements and funds have been devoted to furthering this program. In the majority of cases, however, it should be noted that the Indian contribution is several times the amount supplied by the United States. The agreements

[17] Official estimates of the Ministry of Agriculture are 48 million but the recent National Sample Survey placed the figure at 60 million tons. The National Sample Survey, *General Report No. 1 on the First Round, October 1950-March 1951*, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance (New Delhi, 1952); also "First Fruits of the National Sample Survey—A Study of Rural India", *Indian Finance*, Calcutta, January 24, 1953.

[18] See "Problems of Economic Development in India" by Jerome B. Cohen, in *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (Chicago, 1952).

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have covered the community development program, provision for iron and steel for use by blacksmiths and small agricultural implement plants to make improved farm tools, supply of fertilizer for village demonstrations, establishing of a national extension service, control of locusts, construction of tube wells, soil research, training of village-level workers for community projects, development of marine fisheries, survey of subsoil water resources, engineering surveys for river-valley irrigation projects, malaria control program, and the like.

Perhaps the most interesting program is that for community development projects. On October 2, 1952, the anniversary of Gandhi's birthday, 55 such projects were initiated. The total cost is estimated at $80 million, of which $72 million is to be supplied by the government of India and $8 million by the United States. Each project area will include about 300 villages with a combined population of 200,000. Thus the initial program, now under way, will reach some 16,500 villages having a total population of 11 million. The projects, involving use of village-level workers to aid cultivators in raising agricultural yields, improving sanitary, health and education levels, eliminating rinderpest and other livestock diseases, are to be completed in three years. These villages are then to serve as models for the extension of the program.

It is quite clear from various experiments that output in Indian agriculture can be increased markedly. By far the most hopeful means of increasing yields per acre is by the use of nitrogenous and phosphatic fertilizers. It has been estimated that by their proper use crop yields could be raised from 30 to 100 per cent.[19] Furthermore, in areas where water supply can be regularized, as for example by tube wells, yields have been increased 50 and 60 per cent. Sir William Stampe, who introduced this California device into the United Provinces in 1934, and who over the next four years directed the construction of some 1,800 tube wells in the Western Ganges plain, estimated

[19] W. Burns, *Technological Possibilities of Agricultural Development in India,* Department of Education, Health and Lands, Government of India, 1944. This subject is also covered by A. B. Stewart in his *Report on Soil Fertility, Investigations in India* (Delhi, 1947).

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that the average well driven to a depth of 250 feet can water about 500 acres of crop, raise yields 50 to 60 per cent in all years and save the entire crop in drought years.[20]

No contrast in Northern India is more striking than that between a village with a tube well and one without. With the tube well the crops are laid out in neat squares, and are green and thriving; where there is no tube well the crops are in straggly patches and poor. On experimental farms the use of improved seeds, better farm tools and crop rotation methods have all yielded substantially better results. The problem in the past has been the great and almost unbridgeable gulf between the agricultural officials and their experimental farms on the one hand, and India's unpalatable 700,000 villages on the other. The problem has been well stated by Sir E. John Russell:

> Reviewing all the evidence it is clear that India still has considerable possibilities of increasing food production. Experimental farms commonly obtain yields well above the average, yet on the neighboring peasant farms the yields may be only half as good or even less. The better methods are known, but are not used. The obvious reason and the one usually given is the deep-seated poverty of the peasant. His holding is usually small, often scattered and generally uneconomical to operate; his oxen are inefficient, too ill-fed to be able to work well; also his implements are clumsy, so that cultivations are often not done to time and sowing may be late or missed altogether; his wife has so little fuel that she must perforce burn the cow dung which ought to go to the land.
>
> In many areas the land tenure system is based on share-cropping, which often acts as a deterrent. It is intended to abolish this and replace it by peasant proprietorship and some form of cooperative farming. Something of the kind has been accomplished in the tubewell areas and may yet be achieved for purposes of tractor cultivation. The ultimate goal, as the Planning Commission recognizes, is the change over from the old subsistence farming to modern economic farming.
>
> The main difficulty as I see it lies in lack of effective social and agricultural leadership in the Indian villages. Men are trained for the purpose but they do not take it up. Good agri-

[20] *Empire Journal of Experimental Agriculture*, vol. 16, 1948, pp. 47-51.

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cultural colleges have been operating for fifty years but most of the students want government jobs, not farms; a few take to farming and some are employed by sugar cane companies and other commercial bodies, but these are only a small minority. Courses for peasants' sons are well attended, but these young men too want jobs, not a return to their fathers' holdings. The fact is that the villages are unattractive, often indeed unsavory, insanitary, and unhealthy, and people who can leave them do so.

The result is an almost complete absence of the good farmers who are always the best instructors to their neighbors. Unfortunately it is a vicious circle: the farming cannot improve until the villages are made more attractive, and the villages cannot become more attractive till the farming improves. Much was done by devoted pioneers like F. L. Brayne, Malcolm Darling, Higginbotham, and others, but the circle can be broken only when the village welfare movement becomes a vocation for India's young people, and they realize the truth of Tagore's saying: "In the keeping of the village lies the cradle!" [21]

It is to the breaking of this circle that the community development project is devoted. Success was achieved by techniques applied at Etawah. The Etawah project centers in the village of Mahewa (70 miles from Agra, the home of the famed Taj Mahal), covers about 97 villages spread over 60,000 acres of land, and includes approximately 79,000 people. There are 52 village councils (panchayats) and seven coöperatives in the area, carrying out the development program. Twenty-four trained workers live with the villagers and help them in their various activities. Improved agricultural techniques have been introduced. For example, Sinai and Dhenica, despised green weeds growing abundantly, have been used as green manure. Berseem (Egyptian clover) has been rotated with wheat and added to cattle fodder. Improvements have been made in simple farm tools. As a result of these and other improvements, food grain yields have been increased 40 to 50 per cent and yields of vegetables and other crops were doubled.[22]

[21] "Food Production Problems in India" by Sir E. John Russell, in *International Affairs*, vol. XXVIII, No. 1, January 1952.

[22] "A Progress Report on Pilot Development Projects at Etawah and Gorakhpur, U. P., India" by Albert Mayer, Agricultural Missions, Inc., Mimeograph Series 212, No. 573 (New York, 1951).

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Education has been provided for both children and adults. A third of the villages have literacy centers. Field libraries, reading rooms, and an information center have been provided. A fortnightly newspaper in Hindi has been established. It now has a considerable paid circulation, is run coöperatively and provides information relating to crops, tillage and sanitation, as well as news of general interest. To extend work of this type the government plans to establish a number of centers to train village-level workers and many have already been put into operation with the financial support of the Ford Foundation.

By means of these, and allied programs, it is hoped to increase food grain production by 14 per cent by 1955-56. Raw cotton output is to be increased by 42 per cent, to 4.2 million bales. Raw jute production is to be increased to 5.4 million bales, a gain of 63 per cent. It is, of course too early to measure results in terms of actual increase of output—though the situation has begun to improve. The community development and agricultural phase of the program has only recently gotten under way,

TABLE I

TARGETS IN AGRICULTURE, IRRIGATION AND POWER UNDER INDIA'S FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN

		1950–1951	1955–1956
I	Agriculture		
	Food grains[a] (million tons)	52.7	61.6
	Cotton (100,000 bales)	29.7	42.2
	Jute (100,000 bales)	33.0	53.9
	Sugar cane (million tons)	5.6	6.3
	Oil seeds (million tons)	5.1	5.5
II	Irrigation and power		
	Major irrigation (million acres) .... Minor irrigation (million acres)	50.0	+ 8.5 + 11.2 = 69.7
	Installed electric generating capacity (million kws.)	2.3	3.5

[a] Including gram and pulses. Output in 1949–50 (used as the base for fixing the target for 1955–56) was 54.0 million tons.

Source: *The First Five Year Plan: A Summary,* Government of India, Planning Commission (New Delhi, 1952), p. 28.

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while the river-valley projects which were initiated earlier take longer to complete.[23]

River-Valley Projects

There are 135 river-valley projects actually under construction in different parts of India. Of these, 11 are multi-purpose, 60 irrigation, and 64 purely power projects. Twelve are classified as "major" projects, costing more than $21 million each. In addition there are almost as many other projects in which preliminary investigations are in progress or have been completed. The total estimated cost of all these projects, both those under construction and those under investigation, is about $4.2 billion. If and when completed, these would add some 40 to 45 million acres (roughly twice the present irrigated area in the United States) to the area now under irrigation and create additional power-generating capacity of about 7 million kilowatts.

Under the Five Year Plan, India has wisely concentrated upon completion of those projects already under construction and it is expected that 110 of the 135 will be completed by 1955-56 and a start made on five of the 122 new projects. The large multi-purpose projects are planned in stages and only the first of these are expected to be completed by the end of the first Five Year Plan. The Plan allocates $1.2 billion out of a total outlay of $4.3 billion, or about 27 per cent, to irrigation and power projects. For this expenditure, the government of India expects that, by the last year of the Plan, an additional area of 8.5 million acres will be under irrigation and 1.08 million kilowatts of additional power will be generated. However, after completion and full development of the projects covered in the Five Year Plan, the total addition to the area irrigated and power generated will be 16.7 million acres and 1.4 million kilowatts respectively. To the 8.5 million acres which will be irrigated by river-valley projects under the Plan, must be added

[23] Projected targets in agriculture, irrigation and power are shown in Table I. The government of India has just published a progress report on the first two years of its economic plan. See *Two Years of Progress, Report to the House of the People*, by Gulzarilal Nanda, Minister for Planning, New Delhi, May 15, 1953.

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an additional 11 million acres from minor irrigation and tube-well schemes, making a total of 19 million additional irrigated acres.

The Industrial Sector

The Plan's goals in the industrial sector are quite modest because the government feels that the scope and need for industrial development are so great and its own resources are relatively so limited that it should concentrate on development in those areas, such as agriculture, irrigation, etc., where private enterprise is either unwilling or unable to raise the money required and to undertake the necessary risks. This seems quite reasonable. As a result, however, only limited gains in industrial output are anticipated. Finished steel production, for example, is expected to rise from 980,000 tons per annum to only 1,370,000 tons; cement from 2,690,000 tons to 4,800,000 tons;

TABLE II

TARGETS IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR UNDER INDIA'S FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN

	1950–1951	1955–1956
Finished steel (thousand tons)	980	1,370
Cement (million tons)	2.69	4.8
Aluminum (thousand tons)	3.7	12.0
Fertilizers (thousand tons)		
Ammonium sulphate	46.3	450.0
Superphosphate	55.1	180.0
Locomotives (no.)	...	150.0
Machine tools (no. in thousands)	1.1	4.6
Petroleum, refined (million gallons)	n.a.	403.0
Cotton textiles		
Yarn (million pounds)	1,179	1,640
Mill cloth (million yards)	3,718	4,700
Handlooms (million yards)	810	1,700
Jute manufactures (thousand tons)	892	1,200
Agricultural machinery		
Power driven pumps (thousands)	34.3	85.0
Diesel engines (thousands)	5.5	50.0
Bicycles (thousands)	101.0	530.0
Power alcohol (million gallons)	4.7	18.0

n.a. Not available.

Source: *The First Five Year Plan: A Summary*, p. 29.

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aluminum from 370,000 to 1,200,000 tons; and jute manufactures from 892,000 to 1,200,000 tons.[24] Indeed it is this feature, or limitation, of the Plan which has called forth more criticism than almost any other.

Three Points of Criticism Considered

Serious critics of India's present development plan—and here I exclude India's Socialists and Communists, who are merely using the Plan as a convenient whipping boy to express their displeasure at the present moderate, middle-of-the-road course of the Indian government—voice three basic objections to it.

First, they say it is only a very limited effort—it does not go far enough or fast enough.

Second, they claim that its emphasis on agricultural rather than industrial development is mistaken and misguided.

Third, they claim that it is a manager's plan, not a people's plan; that the Plan has been imposed from the top and is not a manifestation of popular will; and that there is little popular enthusiasm for it.

To return to the first point of criticism, most of my Indian friends are impatient—they want a bigger plan; they want more immediate gains; they want a doubling of per capita national income within the life of the Plan. They fear that India will be no better off five years from now than it is at present. Perhaps their views were most succinctly summed up by the *Manchester Guardian* when it declared:

> The Plan is grandly conceived, yet when it is fulfilled it will only have cut into the outer crust of India's immemorial problem of poverty. Even the longer-term list of river-harnessing schemes is still only one-sixth the size of America's programme of river projects—although India's population is two and a half times that of the United States. In the village development programme only about 2½ per cent of India's villages can at present be included. The living standard is so low today in India's villages that the growth of a revolutionary movement under Communist leadership seems almost inevitable unless a

[24] Targets in the industrial sector are shown in Table II.

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> great improvement can be brought about. Yet the Plan, when all contingencies have been allowed for, is hardly likely to do more than keep pace with present population increase.[25]

Is the Plan as limited as the critics imply? There is now general recognition that capital formation is the key to economic development. Presently the rate of net capital investment to gross product is estimated to be about 5 per cent in India, compared to 18 per cent in the United States, 16 per cent in Japan, 23 per cent in Canada and 13 per cent in the United Kingdom. Thus capital formation in India is at an extremely low level. The Planning Commission estimates that, by the end of the first Five Year Plan, national income in India will have risen by about 11 to 12 per cent and the rate of capital formation raised to 7 per cent. It anticipates that, subsequently, if the rate of gain established in the first Five Year Plan can be projected, the rate of capital formation can be raised to 11 per cent by 1960-61 and to 20 per cent by 1967-68, after which it will stabilize at this level. On these assumptions, per capita income in India will be doubled by 1977, or in about 24 years, and the consumption standards raised about 70 per cent over the 1950-51 level.[26] Any Indian will tell you that India cannot wait 24 years to double the present $57 per capita national income. If this is the best the Planning Commission can do, it had better resign now, he will argue. But is this an inadequate rate of progress? What has been the experience in other countries, particularly those that have had a rapid development?

For Britain, statistics of national income and investment are not available for the first half of the nineteenth century, which was perhaps the most significant period in its economic development. Figures for the period 1870-1913 show a net investment rate fluctuating between 10 and 15 per cent depending on whether times were prosperous or not, and over this period per capita national income rose by about 100 per cent. In the

[25] "India's Five Year Plan", *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, December 23, 1952, pp. 8-9.

[26] See "The Mechanics of Indian Economic Development", *The Eastern Economist*, February 13, 1953.

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United States from 1869 to 1913 net investment ran from 13 to 16 per cent (gross investment from 21 to 24 per cent) and over the 44 years per capita national income rose by 130 per cent. In Japan, with the population growing at an average annual rate of 1¼ per cent, about the present rate in India, net capital formation averaged about 12 or 13 per cent, from 1878 to 1912, and over this 34-year period per capita income is estimated to have doubled.

One need go no further. If these figures are even approximately correct, to double per capita incomes within a generation (25 years) and raise the rate of net investment from 5 to 20 per cent, as the Indian National Planning Commission hopes to do by the present and subsequent Five Year Plans, would be a stupendous achievement, and, rather than criticize the rate of progress in the first five years, one can only wonder at the contemplated rate of acceleration. A slow, heavy overloaded plane needs a long runway and gathers momentum only gradually. To raise the rate of net investment from 5 to 7 per cent and at the same time increase national income by 11 per cent, to increase food grain output by 7.6 million tons, to add 19 million irrigated acres and over a million kilowatts in increased power capacity by 1955-56, in addition to numerous minor benefits, can hardly be regarded as inconsiderable.

Is the emphasis on agriculture rather than industry a mistake? Asian comparisons are useful. There is hardly any present critic of the Plan who would not concede that the process of industrialization in Japan was rather rapid and remarkable. How was it accomplished? Where was the capital obtained? Professors Lockwood and Reubens have shown that foreign capital played a relatively small rôle in the economic transformation of Japan.[27] In a fascinating study, entitled *Agricultural Productivity and Economic Development in Japan*,[28] Professor B. F. Johnston, of the Food Research Institute of Stan-

[27] Unpublished manuscripts: W. W. Lockwood, "Economic Development of Japan, 1868-1938"; E. P. Reubens, "The Role of Foreign Capital in Economic Development".

[28] *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. LIX, No. 6, December 1951, pp. 498-513.

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ford, indicates that between 1880 and 1920 Japanese food grain output rose 77 per cent. This expansion of domestic output outstripped the population growth (about 44 per cent over the period) so that the per capita food grain availability increased by over 20 per cent. The increase in output was accompanied by a reduction in the agricultural labor force and was attained chiefly by improved techniques, principally the extensive use of fertilizer, improvement of rice strains, and weed, water and pest control. These innovations were almost all land-saving. Crop area, over the four decades, increased by only 21 per cent, yields rose 46 per cent, production rose 77 per cent, and output per farm worker increased by 106 per cent.

The nature of the innovations was such that they could be applied effectively even on very small farms, and most importantly the capital outlay required was small relative to the increase in output obtained. It was the increased output in agriculture, accomplished with relatively little capital, and drained off by taxation and increased savings, which largely provided the capital for Japanese industrial expansion. For a poor country, where capital is short, there appears to be no cheaper or more effective way of industrializing, particularly if there is a strong national aversion to any extensive use of foreign capital.[29]

The growth in productivity in agriculture releases foreign exchange previously needed for food imports, and by increasing per capita availability of food it also aids in counteracting inflationary pressures generated by industrialization; and when food prices are held down, industrial production and export are fostered by permitting a relatively low level of wages in manufacturing. Of course, it may not be as easy in twentieth-century India to drain away the agricultural surplus as it was in nineteenth-century Japan. To the extent that this is less effectively done in India, the pace of industrialization will be slower, but on the other hand the improvement in living standards in rural areas will be greater and this may be all to the good. Also what the economic historian of Western Europe is

[29] See chapter ii, "Problems of Foreign Capital" in *International Aspects of Indian Economic Development*, by D. T. Lakdawala (Bombay, 1951).

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wont to call the Puritan or Protestant ethic—the impluse to frugality and thrift—which seems to have been equally present in the Japanese, appears to be lacking among wealthy Indians. If effective use of the surplus is to be achieved in India the propensity of wealthy Indians to consume conspicuously or to hoard must give way to an urge to invest and reinvest.

Finally, the criticism that this is not a people's plan has little meaning or validity. By their nature, all plans initially are managers' plans. In contrast to the Soviet Five Year Plans, however, which for a generation, thus far, have regimented the populace, denied them consumer goods, or much of the fruits of their labor, given them no voice in the conduct of economic affairs, and suppressed and stifled any criticism in a ruthless attempt to build heavy industry, the Indian Plan, by pouring in funds at grass roots levels, by giving farmers land and then helping to increase the product of that land, and by allowing some, most or all of that increased product to remain in the hands of the producer, seems much more of a people's plan. Increasing yields, regularizing water supply, controlling floods, eliminating famines, providing cheap power, improving cattle strains and milk yields, eliminating malaria, providing better sanitary facilities, a little education, some medical care—these things *may* help the managers but they certainly *will* help the common man. The real danger is that this may be so much of a people's plan that essential capital formation may suffer because too large a share of any increased product may be consumed.

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THE RÔLE OF THE LIBERAL PARTY IN RECENT CANADIAN POLITICS

SINCE the early 1930's the world has passed through a major economic depression, a world war and a difficult post-war period of reconstruction and readjustment. In most countries the accelerated rate of economic and social change accompanying these momentous events in world history has resulted in the rapid rise and fall of different governments and ideologies. Canada, however, presents the unusual spectacle of a country where the same party has been in power during practically this whole period. The Liberal party came into power in 1935 by defeating the Conservatives in the general election of that year. The party was returned to power again in the general elections of 1940, 1945 and 1949. When it has finished its present term of office, that is in 1954, it will have completed a nineteen-year dominance of Canadian politics.

It is proposed in this paper to undertake an analysis of the factors underlying the success of the Liberals in remaining in office over such a long period. The purpose of such a study is to throw some light not only on the basic characteristics of the Canadian party system, but also on the nature of political parties in general and the rôle that they play in the democratic process. Our procedure will be first of all to make a close examination of the electoral support received by the Liberals as compared to that of the other parties in the four general elections held between 1935 and 1949. Our analysis will show the popular vote of the various parties not only in the country as a whole, but also in each of the economic regions into which Canada is divided. This will enable us to see quite clearly the strength and weakness of each party in different parts of the country. The next step will be to make a survey of the various policies pursued by the Liberals over this period, in order to determine the extent to which such policies reflected the viewpoint of different sections of the electorate toward the political

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issues of the day. Our assumption here is that the success of a political party depends largely upon its ability and willingness to pursue policies which are in conformity with prevailing currents of public opinion, and at least partially meet the demands of the electorate for certain specific lines of action.

Table I shows the seats won and the percentage of the popular vote polled by each party during the period 1935-1949. The most striking feature of the figures in this table is the disparity between the number of seats won by the Liberals and the popular vote polled. In the 1949 election, for instance, although the party received only half the votes it won 74 per cent of the seats. On only one occasion, in 1940, did the party receive more than 50 per cent of the vote. These distortions arise, of course, out of a large number of candidates contesting elections under a single-member constituency system where a plurality is sufficient to win a seat.

TABLE I

SEATS WON AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULAR VOTE POLLED BY EACH PARTY DURING THE PERIOD 1935–1949

ELECTION	1935		1940		1945		1949	
	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%
Liberal	176	46.5	181	54.8	125	41.4	194	50.0
Progressive Conservative	39	29.8	39	30.7	66	27.7	41	29.8
Co-operative Commonwealth Federation	7	8.7	8	8.5	28	15.7	13	13.4
Others[a]	23	14.9	17	6.0	26	15.2	14	6.8

Because of rounding, percentages may not add to 100.

Source: The number of seats won by each party is taken from the *Canadian Press Election Handbook* (Toronto, 1949). In regard to popular vote polled, the figures for the 1935 election are to be found in *Canadian Parliamentary Guide* (Ottawa, 1936). The figures for the other three elections were supplied by the Chief Electoral Officer, Ottawa, Ontario. In all cases where there were candidates who called themselves Independent Liberal, Independent Conservative, and so on, they have been included in the figures for their respective parties.

[a] Includes straight independents and also the candidates of several minor parties: the Reconstruction party which went out of existence after the 1935 election, the Bloc Populaire which disintegrated shortly after the 1945 election, and three other parties which were still in existence at the time of writing, the Labor Progressive party, Social Credit party, and the Union des Electeurs. The last-named party is the Quebec version of the Social Credit movement.

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Even if we take all the above factors into consideration, this table indicates quite clearly nevertheless that the Liberals were the dominant party in Canadian politics during this whole period. With a popular vote fluctuating between 41 per cent and 55 per cent, they were well ahead of their closest opponents, the Conservatives. In all elections except that of 1945 the Liberal vote was greater than the combined vote of the other two main parties, the Conservatives and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C. C. F.). The Conservative vote showed an amazing consistency, hovering around 30 per cent during the whole period. The C. C. F., with a popular vote of 9 per cent to 16 per cent, played a minor rôle compared to the old parties, although it gained in strength after 1940. The votes obtained by independent candidates and minor parties showed considerable variation from election to election, fluctuating between 6 per cent and 15 per cent.

Table II shows the percentage of the popular vote polled by the Liberal and other parties in each of the four economic regions into which Canada is divided, that is, the Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario and the West. Before discussing the significance of the figures shown in this table we will first of all examine very briefly the main characteristics of each region. The Maritimes consists of the provinces of Newfoundland,[1] Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Although there is some manufacturing in these provinces, the extractive industries, fishing, agriculture, mining and forestry, play the predominant rôle. Quebec and Ontario are the two most urbanized and industrialized provinces in Canada. Most of the country's manufacturing production is centered in these provinces. It is here that we find the largest proportion of industrial workers[2] and the greatest development of the trade-union movement. The West consists of the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia. The first three

[1] As Newfoundland joined the Dominion only in 1949, the election of that year was the first one in which it participated.

[2] Out of a total of 1,156,006 people employed in manufacturing establishments in Canada, in 1948, 935,624 lived in Quebec and Ontario. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Canada Year Book*, 1951, pp. 576-77.

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are agricultural, mainly wheat farming, while British Columbia has a mixed economy with a considerable amount of manufacturing, as well as agriculture, mining, forestry and fishing. In describing these different regions it is also important to point out that, from the point of view of language and religion, Quebec is predominantly French-speaking and Roman Catholic while the other three regions are English-speaking and Protestant.[3]

TABLE II

PERCENTAGE OF POPULAR VOTE POLLED BY EACH PARTY, IN EACH ECONOMIC REGION DURING PERIOD 1935–1949

Region	MARITIMES				QUEBEC			
Election	1935	1940	1945	1949	1935	1940	1945	1949
Liberal	54.7	54.8	47.5	55.8	59.9	74.2	51.1	61.6
Conservative	32.8	41.6	38.5	37.7	28.0	19.8	9.8	25.0
C.C.F.	0	3.6	12.1	6.1	0.6	0.6	2.4	1.1
Others	12.5	0	2.0	0.4	11.4	5.4	36.7	12.3
Region	ONTARIO				WEST			
Election	1935	1940	1945	1949	1935	1940	1945	1949
Liberal	42.8	51.5	41.1	46.0	34.8	41.5	29.8	40.3
Conservative	35.7	43.0	41.7	37.5	22.1	21.3	23.5	20.7
C.C.F.	8.0	3.8	14.4	15.1	21.5	23.1	31.8	27.6
Others	13.4	1.6	2.9	1.4	21.6	14.0	14.9	11.4

Because of rounding, percentages may not add to 100.
Source: Same as Table I.

The table indicates that the Liberals received their greatest support from Quebec and the Maritimes where they polled a much higher percentage of the popular vote than the other parties. Although the party was not as strong in Ontario and the West as in the eastern part of the country, nevertheless it was well ahead of the other parties in every election except that of 1945—in spite of the fact that up to 1935 Ontario had been a traditionally Conservative province, and that the C. C. F. has tended to look upon the West as its special preserve. The Con-

[3] For a more complete description of the different economic regions and their problems see A. W. Currie, "The Economy: Eastern Canada", and Wm. C. Fowke, "The Economy: Western Canada", in *Canada*, Geo. W. Brown, ed. (Toronto, 1950).

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servatives were weak in Quebec and the West, but showed considerable strength in the Maritimes and Ontario where their vote hovered around 40 per cent in most elections. The C. C. F. had practically no support of any significance except in the West, although it made slight gains in Ontario in the 1945 and 1949 elections. In regard to the votes for "others", the most significant feature here is the unusually large vote polled by independents and minor parties in Quebec in 1945. It is evident that this vote came mostly from former Liberal supporters, as the latter party suffered a heavy drop in its vote between 1940 and 1945.

In summary, it is evident that during the whole period under consideration the Liberal party was the dominant party, not only in Canada as a whole, but also in each of the regions which make up the country. It is a party in the North American tradition, and like the Republicans and Democrats in the United States is made up of many divergent interests and groups. It does not depend for support on any one economic region, class, religion or ethnic group, and is a truly national party. Western farmers, Nova Scotia fishermen, industrial workers in the urban areas of central Canada, English Protestants in Ontario and French Catholics in Quebec, all are to be found among its supporters. In contrast the Conservatives and the C. C. F. are largely regional parties, and are at the same time almost completely English Protestant as their lack of support in Quebec indicates.

We turn now to an examination of the policies which enabled the Liberals to obtain such widespread support from the electorate. Our analysis can be broken down into two parts coinciding with the two great issues on which the political struggles of this period were mainly centered. The first one was the economic issue, that is, the controversy as to the extent to which the government should actively intervene to regulate and direct the economy in order to promote social welfare. The second issue was concerned with external relations, and particularly with the question of whether or not Canada should participate in the war of 1939, and if so what the extent of its contribution should be.

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The Economic Issue

The great controversy of the 1930's as to the proper rôle of the state in economic life was not peculiar to Canada, nor was it nonexistent before that time. The severe economic depression of that period, however, raised the issue in its most acute form. In Canada, as in other countries, the breakdown of the economy resulted in widespread deprivation, economic hardships, and falling incomes which affected practically all sections of the population. From 1930 onward national production fell off sharply, unemployment increased by leaps and bounds,[4] and many of those who managed to retain their jobs had to take sizable cuts in wages and salaries. Farmers and other primary producers, unable to find markets for their produce, were in a precarious position. The direct result of these conditions was widespread dissatisfaction and criticism of the capitalistic system, and a demand from all sides that the government intervene and take drastic measures to rectify the situation. The farmers and industrial workers were particularly vocal in expressing their dissatisfaction, and through their agricultural associations and trade unions they lost no opportunity to bring their viewpoint to the attention of the government. Politically, the depression resulted in considerable disillusionment with the old parties, that is, the Conservatives and the Liberals, and in the rise of new parties of protest such as the Social Credit, C. C. F. and Reconstruction parties.

Although one of the basic tenets of the Liberal party had always been support of private enterprise and opposition to socialism, nevertheless it was quick to grasp the significance of the leftward shift in political thinking and recognized that it must meet the challenge from the new parties of reform, particularly the C. C. F. The latter was a Socialist party modeled on the British Labor party. In the election of 1935 the Liberals went to the electorate on a program of social reform, and a pledge to solve the unemployment problem and open up new markets for primary producers. The Conservative party also

[4] At the low point of the depression in 1933 it was estimated that 265 out of every 1,000 wage-earners were unemployed. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Canada Year Book*, 1938, p. 769.

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attempted to meet the challenge from the left by announcing a "New Deal" program just before the election. The latter party, however, was in the disadvantageous position of having been in power since 1930, and rightly or wrongly had to shoulder the blame for all the country's economic difficulties. Although the Liberals won the election, the extent of the dissatisfaction with the old-line parties was indicated by the fact that the C. C. F. and other new parties together received almost a quarter of the popular vote.[5]

Between 1935 and 1939 the Liberals took several important steps to strengthen their position with the electorate. Trade agreements were concluded with various countries in an endeavor to assist the farmer and other primary producers in their search for markets. The farmer was also protected against the hazards of crop failure by a government-sponsored system of crop insurance. A special government commission was appointed to study the problem of unemployment, and negotiations were entered into with the provinces with a view of setting up a nation-wide system of unemployment insurance. The right of labor to organize and bargain collectively was strengthened by an amendment to the criminal code making it illegal for employers to discriminate against workers for trade-union activity.[6] The Liberals also stole some of the thunder of their Socialist opponents by nationalizing the Bank of Canada, and establishing the government-owned Trans-Canada Airlines and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

The outbreak of World War II in September 1939 had important repercussions on the country's economy and upon the income and living standards of its people. Within a comparatively short time after the war started there was a tremendous increase in industrial production, unemployment rapidly disappeared, wages and salaries began to move upward, and the farmer soon found that there was a steadily increasing demand for his products. Practically all sections of the population experienced a substantial improvement in income and economic security which was in sharp contrast to the situation prevailing

[5] Table I.

[6] *Statutes of Canada*, 3 Geo. VI, c. 30, s. 11 (1939).

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in the "hungry thirties". These rising standards of living did not, however, eliminate dissatisfaction with the economic system or lessen the demand for reform. On the contrary, all during the period from 1939 onward the demands for increased state control over the economy, and the enactment of labor and social legislation, increased. Although there were several reasons why this leftward trend in political thinking carried over into the 1940's, the most important factor was that the government, in its efforts to enlist the support of the people behind the war effort, intensified the demands for reform by continually proclaiming that defeat of the enemy was only one of the country's war aims, and that, equally important, was the creation of a new and better world in which hunger, insecurity and the fear of want would be eliminated. Organized labor was the group which was most aggressive in putting forward these demands for reform, as it had become a powerful political force in the country because of the phenomenal growth in trade-union membership after 1939.[7]

In the face of this steady pressure the Liberals found themselves in the difficult position where they had either to move along the road in the direction of the welfare state or lose the support of important sections of the electorate. The way in which the party met this challenge and held on to the reins of power becomes apparent when we examine the economic and social policies pursued by the administration during the war and post-war years. When the war began the government immediately announced its intention to base its economic policies on the principle that the burden and sacrifices of the war should be shared equitably among all classes, and that vigorous measures would be taken against profiteering.[8] In line with this policy steeply graduated personal and corporation income taxes were introduced, and a special tax was levied on excess profits. In 1941 an over-all price ceiling was introduced to prevent rising prices from threatening the standard of living of

[7] From an estimated 358,967 in 1939 to 831,697 in 1946, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Canada Year Book*, 1948-49, p. 658.

[8] See statement of Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King, Canada, *House of Commons Debates, Special War Session*, September 8, 1939, pp. 22-23.

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salary and wage-earners.[9] Price controls were accompanied by a system of rationing of foodstuffs and other necessities of life. Steps were taken to raise the standard of living of those sections of the farming population living in depressed areas or suffering from substandard incomes. When farm products were brought under the price ceiling farmers were compensated by the payment of subsidies. The income of the farmer and other primary producers was also protected during the war and postwar period through the gradual development of a system of government-guaranteed floor prices for all kinds of farm and fish products.

With an eye on the increasing importance of the labor vote, all industries working on munitions, war supplies and defense projects were required to conform to existing government regulations guaranteeing fair wages and hours of labor on construction work done under contract with the Dominion government. Although most wages and salaries were frozen at the time the price ceiling went into effect in 1941, nevertheless increases were permitted in those wages and salaries which were substandard or abnormally low. One of the most important developments during the war years from the viewpoint of labor was the establishment in 1944 of a comprehensive labor code applying to all industries essential to the prosecution of the war. This code considerably strengthened the ability of trade unions to organize and bargain collectively. Although the code was revised in some particulars after the war, it continued to be looked upon favorably by organized labor.[10]

Probably the strongest proof of the government's sensitivity to the pressure of public opinion, and its acceptance of the principles of the welfare state, was the comprehensive program of social legislation which it enacted between 1939 and 1949.

[9] The success of the government's wartime price-control policy is indicated by the fact that the cost of living rose by only 12 per cent during the period 1941 to 1946. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Canada Year Book*, 1948-49, p. 954.

[10] See the opinion expressed by Percy R. Bengough, President of Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, regarding the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act of 1948, cited in T. M. Greer, "A Survey of Recent Labour Legislation in Canada", *The Quarterly Review of Commerce*, vol. XIV, No. 2, 1949-50, p. 118.

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The main features of this program were: a nation-wide system of unemployment insurance covering most wage and salary earners, a scheme of family allowances under which the government made a monthly payment for each child in a family, annual grants to the provinces for health services, an extensive system of pensions and rehabilitation allowances for war veterans, national housing legislation to facilitate the construction of low rental housing, increased contributions by the Dominion to provincially administered schemes of old-age pensions and pensions for the blind.

Before concluding this analysis of the economic and social policies pursued by the Liberals over the period from 1935 to 1949 there are certain aspects of these policies which require some comment. First of all, it must be emphasized that although the policies in question were a response to the leftward shift in public opinion, this does not mean that they were completely satisfactory to the various groups which had been pressing for reforms. On the contrary, the farmers wanted higher guaranteed prices for their products, increased subsidies and bonuses, and drastic reduction of railway freight rates. Organized labor felt that the government's program of social and labor legislation did not go far enough, and was inadequate to meet the serious problem of economic security. The government was also attacked by labor for not exercising more control over business profits, and was severely criticized for its action in removing most price controls by 1947, with the rapid rise in the cost of living which followed.[11] Another rather important point to be borne in mind is that dissatisfaction and criticism of the government's policies were by no means limited to those forces on the political left. On the right the business and commercial interests could hardly be expected to look on with detachment as the country advanced along the road to the welfare state. This group was extremely critical of the increased intervention and control over the economy by what it termed " the bureaucrats at Ottawa ". As long as the war con-

[11] Between December 1946 and August 1948 the cost-of-living index rose by approximately 30 per cent. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Canada Year Book*, 1948-49, pp. 953-55.

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tinued the business community for the most part accepted such things as price and production controls and the government's policy of high taxation. With the end of the war, however, the government was vigorously attacked for not immediately removing all price controls and other restraints on business activity. Perhaps the greatest cause of dissatisfaction among this group in the post-war years was the continued high level of taxation which was at least partly due to the government's social welfare program.[12] This program was looked upon by business with a considerable lack of enthusiasm.

It would have been impossible, of course, for the Liberals to meet the demands of all these economic interests at the same time, to have price control without wage control, to extend social services without a high level of taxation, to raise the prices of farm products and lower the cost of living, to advance toward the welfare state without a growing bureaucracy. In the face of these conflicting pressures, the strategy of the party was quite obviously not to ignore altogether the claims of any one interest but to follow a middle course of partly satisfying the demands of each group. This resulted in an economic policy which was somewhere between laissez-faire capitalism and socialism.

External Policy and the War Issue

The second and equally important issue dominating the politics of this period was the question of foreign policy, and particularly the question of participation in the war of 1939. On this issue the basic cleavage was between the English- and French-speaking sections of the population who held exactly opposite points of view. This was not unexpected as the greatest friction between the two groups has always been over the question whether or not Canada should become involved in European wars. In this regard the French have always been strongly isolationist, while the English have been wholeheartedly participationist, particularly in any war in which England has been involved. To many English Canadians Eng-

[12] See report of first post-war convention of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in 1946, *The Montreal Gazette*, October 9, 1946.

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land still is " the mother country " which must be defended in time of peril. The First World War created a serious crisis in the relationship between the two groups, and when conscription for service overseas was adopted in 1917, by a national government composed largely of Conservatives, riots broke out in Quebec.

When the Liberals came into office in 1935 the international situation had already begun to look extremely grave. As a consequence the government found itself under considerable pressure from that time onward to state what its stand would be if war broke out. On the one hand important sections of the English-speaking population wanted Canada to state definitely that it would be at the side of Britain in case of war, while on the other side the French population wanted Canada to declare beforehand its neutrality in the case of any conflict. Confronted by these diametrically opposed points of view, the strategy of the government right up to 1939 was to make no advance commitments in either direction, but to take the stand that parliament would decide if and when an emergency arose. When war finally broke out in 1939 the government could no longer side-step the issue of participation, and was faced by the difficult problem of formulating a policy which would not alienate either its English- or French-speaking supporters. The solution to the problem which Prime Minister Mackenzie King presented to parliament was in the form of a compromise which called for Canada's active participation in the war at the side of the Allies, but with a pledge that under no circumstances would conscription for service overseas be adopted.[13] This compromise was fairly satisfactory to both groups. From the point of view of the English group the conscription issue did not appear to be important as the need for manpower at that time was not very great, and there appeared to be sufficient volunteers to meet Canada's needs. From the viewpoint of the French Canadians the government's manpower policy meant that they would not be compelled to fight in a war which they saw in a different light from that of their English-speaking

[13] See Mr. King's statement on war policy, Canada, *House of Commons Debates, Special War Session,* September 8, 1939, p. 36.

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compatriots. The decision to declare war passed the House of Commons almost unanimously.

It was obvious that the success of this compromise and the ability of the Liberals to retain the support of both ethnic groups were dependent on the voluntary system providing sufficient troops to meet Canada's commitments overseas. With the fall of France in 1940, however, and the rapid deterioration in the military situation from that time onward, it soon became apparent that Canada would be called upon to supply an ever-increasing number of troops. As a consequence the possibility grew that the voluntary system would prove inadequate. By 1942 Prime Minister King was under considerable pressure from the English-language press across the country, from the Conservative party, and even from within his own party, to conscript for service overseas those troops which had been called up purely for home defense.[14] Although Mr. King resisted these demands, he did agree to having a bill passed through parliament in June 1942, known as Bill 80, under which the government could introduce conscription at any time it deemed such a step necessary merely by passing an order-in-council. This action aroused considerable resentment among the government's French-Canadian supporters, and practically all of the Quebec Liberals bolted the party on the issue and voted against the bill. However, the split in the party was only temporary, as the Quebec members continued to support the party on all other issues.

Mr. King's compromise policy was maintained, although not without difficulty, right up to 1944. Through strenuous efforts the government was able to meet the country's manpower needs by voluntary methods without having recourse to the powers it had received under Bill 80. In the fall of 1944, however, rumors had begun to circulate that the voluntary system was failing to provide sufficient recruits, and that Canadian units overseas were going into action without adequate reinforcements behind them. The demands on Mr. King to imple-

[14] Compulsory service for home defense had been in effect since 1940. This was not looked upon as "conscription" however. When a Canadian uses the latter term he means compulsory military service overseas.

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ment the provisions of Bill 80 and conscript the home-defense troops for service overseas came now not only from the opposition and the English-speaking members of the Liberal party, but even from within the cabinet itself. Mr. King, reluctant to alienate his French-Canadian supporters, had one last attempt made to raise the necessary recruits through voluntary methods. When this failed, and after a cabinet crisis which resulted in the resignation of two ministers, he finally bowed before the aroused public opinion of English Canada, and agreed to the passing of an order-in-council authorizing the immediate dispatch overseas of 16,000 of the 70,000 home-defense troops.

The passing of the order-in-council added further fuel to the resentment of Quebec against Canada's war policy, in spite of the government's attempt to soften the blow by providing that only some of the home-defense troops were to be sent overseas for the time being. It was fortunate for the Liberals that the war ended shortly afterwards and only a comparatively small number of these forces actually saw military action. Even so, the extent to which the conscription controversy weakened the party in Quebec is indicated by the drop in the Liberal vote in that province from 74 per cent in 1940 to 51 per cent in 1945.[15] This loss was due to the large vote polled by antiwar and anticonscriptionist candidates, some of whom were independents, while others were adherents of a newly formed nationalist party, the Bloc Populaire.

In the post-war years the government's approach to external affairs followed the same general pattern as in the pre-war period, that is, it attempted to pursue policies which would not alienate the support of either language group. While committing Canada to active participation in different forms of international coöperation such as the United Nations and the Atlantic Pact, at the same time the government never lost sight of the isolationist or neutralist (to use a modern term) sentiment which still dominated the thinking of most French Canadians. The clearest indication of this was its consistent refusal to consider any form of peacetime conscription.

[15] Table II.

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The Reasons for the Success of the Liberals

Now that we have completed our survey of the policies pursued by the Liberals on the major issues dominating Canadian politics since 1935, we are in a position to formulate fairly definite conclusions as to why the party was so successful in defeating its opponents. The first and most striking point to be emphasized is that throughout this whole period the party showed a keen awareness of the shifting trends of public opinion, and never lost sight of the conflicting goals and attitudes of the diverse economic, ethnic and sectional groups forming the national community. It recognized the extent of the cleavage between those who favored economic reform and those who were opposed to it, those who were participationist and those who were isolationist. In the face of these divergent attitudes as to the proper function of government, the strategy of the party on each major issue was to pursue a policy which was a carefully worked out compromise between the extreme points of view. Although these compromises were seldom completely satisfactory to any one section of the electorate, they nevertheless obtained sufficient support from each group and interest across the country to keep the party in power. In making the principle of compromise the cornerstone of party policy the Liberals were thus rejecting any clear-cut or rigid political philosophy, and instead were adopting the attitude that in the formulation of governmental objectives the viewpoint of each one of the various social groups forming the national community must be taken into consideration.

The ability of the Liberals to remain in office over such a long period was not due, however, solely to the skillful way in which they managed to obtain the support of widely differing sections of the electorate. It is quite obvious that the success of the party was also closely connected with the failure of its main opponents, the Conservatives and the C. C. F., to evolve a strategy which would be equally effective. Our analysis would not be complete therefore if we did not also make a brief examination of the policies pursued by the latter parties on the two main issues dominating the politics of this period.

In the case of the Conservatives and their attitude toward

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the economic issue, this party up until the 1940's had been traditionally identified with support of private enterprise, opposition to social services, and the rejection of any form of governmental intervention or control over the economy.[16] This approach to economic policy, while appealing to the business and commercial interests, was not likely to find much favor with labor, farmers, and some sections of the middle class, all of whom were, as we have seen, demanding that positive steps be taken by the government to raise incomes and standards of living. At its 1942 convention, however, the party made a sudden shift to the left by drawing up a program which incorporated many features of the labor and social legislation being demanded by the electorate.[17] At the same time the name of the party was changed to " Progressive " Conservative, and in an obvious bid for the support of the farmers a Western agrarian leader was elected to head the party. In spite of these changes in economic policy, the party was unsuccessful in living down its past record as an exponent of unrestrained capitalism and rugged individualism. This was largely due to the fact that many of the ultraconservative forces behind the party, such as the large metropolitan dailies, refused to accept the inevitability of the social-service state, and were extremely vocal in their opposition to such popular measures as family allowances.

On the issue of external policy, the Conservative attitude even before 1939 was one of full and unqualified support of Great Britain in any war in which that country was involved. The party was in complete agreement with Canada's decision to declare war in 1939, and after 1942 campaigned for all-out conscription of manpower for service overseas. These policies appealed to most English-speaking voters, and secured many votes for the party among this group. They had just the opposite effect on the people of Quebec, although the weakness of the Conservative position in that province really went back to

[16] With the exception of a short period in 1935 when party leader R. B. Bennett put forward a " New Deal " program. This program failed to receive the support of the party's more influential supporters.

[17] *Policy of the Progressive Conservative Party Adopted at the National Convention Held at Winnipeg*, the Progressive Conservative Party (Ottawa, 1942).

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the First World War and the prominent rôle played by the party in the adoption of conscription in 1917.

The failure of the C. C. F. party requires a somewhat fuller explanation, as one would have expected a socialist party to make a much better showing during a period when there was such a definite leftward trend in public opinion. The main features of the economic program on which the C. C. F. campaigned were state ownership of the means of production, government control and planning of all aspects of the economy, and widespread extension of labor legislation and social services. With a program of this nature why did the party receive such comparatively little support from the farmers and industrial workers to whom it specifically directed its appeal?

The answer to this question appears to be that, while the farming interests and industrial workers were dissatisfied with prevailing economic conditions, and were in favor of such things as curbing of monopolies, price control, labor and social legislation, and various types of government subsidies and financial assistance, at the same time they were not ready to accept the comprehensive program of government ownership and economic controls which were such an essential feature of C. C. F. plans for the future. In Canada most farmers own their own farms and are thus private entrepreneurs in a small way.[18] It is easily understandable, therefore, that they should be hesistant about supporting a party which expends a considerable amount of energy condemning the principle of private enterprise as compared to that of socialized enterprise. It is true that the official program of the C. C. F. contains a special plank guaranteeing " the security of tenure for the farmer upon his farm." [19] In spite of the official stand of the party on this issue, however, some of its more radical members have from time to time expressed the opinion that the farmer cannot expect to be immune from the planning and socialization pro-

[18] According to the 1941 Census 75.55 per cent of all farms in Canada are fully owned by the occupier. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Canada Year Book*, 1945, p. 240.

[19] *Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Programme*, National C. C. F. Office (Ottawa, 1933).

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gram which affects all other branches of production. In the case of labor, there seems to be little doubt that most of Canada's industrial workers have yet to be convinced that a change-over from private to government ownership of industry is essential for the strengthening of their economic position. The Canadian worker, like the American worker, and in sharp contrast to his brethren in continental Europe, lacks any clear-cut economic and social doctrine, and up to the present has shown little interest in the theoretical and ideological issues involved in socialism and comprehensive schemes of economic planning. Instead he has tended to concentrate his energies on the achievement of more limited and specific goals such as higher wages, shorter hours of work, social security measures, and collective bargaining rights.[20]

In its approach to foreign policy, the C. C. F. was no more successful than in the field of domestic politics. Although the party had originally been a strong advocate of collective security, by the late thirties it was becoming more and more isolationist. When war broke out in 1939 the party favored only limited participation and was opposed to sending any troops overseas.[21] This lack of enthusiasm for the war effort cost the C. C. F. many votes among the English-speaking section of the population without increasing significantly its support in Quebec. As the war progressed the attitude of the party gradually changed, and by 1942 it had become fully participationist. This evolution in policy from the isolationism of the thirties to an all-out war effort met with favorable response among the English electorate, but lost to the party what little possibility it had of making inroads in Quebec. In the post-war years the C. C. F. supported the government's policies of international coöperation through the United Nations, and gave its official endorsement to the Marshall Plan and Canada's participation in the North Atlantic Pact. It had trouble, however, with its leftist fringe (the Canadian Bevanities) which attacked these

[20] In this regard see Jean Pierre Despres, *Le Mouvement ouvrier canadien* (Montreal, 1947), p. 107.

[21] See statement of party policy toward the war by M. J. Coldwell, National Chairman, Canada, *House of Commons Debates, Special War Session*, September 9, 1939, p. 55.

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measures as mere instruments of "American imperialism".[22] These statements of the party's small but extremely vocal Left wing undoubtedly made many voters think twice before supporting the party.

Some Characteristics of the Canadian Party System

The analysis which we have just made of the dynamic forces in Canadian politics between 1935 and 1949 has brought to light certain basic characteristics of the party system in that country which deserve some comment. At the same time it has provided us with further insight into the nature of political parties in general and the rôle that they play in the democratic process. It would be well to bear in mind in the discussion which follows that many of our conclusions will apply equally well to the United States, where economic and social conditions and the alignment of parties are similar in many ways to those of Canada.

There is little doubt that the most important characteristic of the Canadian party system brought out by our study is that the successful party cannot be narrowly based upon a particular economic class, ethnic group or region, but must obtain a measure of support from many different social groups. This basic principle of Canadian politics arises out of the heterogeneous nature of the Canadian community, and the existence of a great diversity of conflicting interests, economic, religious, cultural and regional. For instance, although it is theoretically possible for a purely English-speaking party to win a majority, this would necessitate a much higher degree of unity of interests within the English community than now exists or is likely to in the future. The French Canadians on the other hand, as a minority group, could not possibly gain control of the government, although at different times in the past purely French-Canadian parties have been formed in the hope of holding the balance of power between the major parties.

The difficulties facing a party which attempted to win power by appealing to the interests of a particular economic group or

[22] The endorsement of the Marshall Plan by the national convention of 1948 went through only after vigorous opposition by the Left-wingers. *The Montreal Gazette*, August 21, 1948.

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class are equally obvious. An agrarian party could not hope to gain majority support as farmers constitute a minority of the Canadian population. A working-class party would have the difficult task of obtaining the support of practically all manual workers (and their families), as this group probably does not constitute much more than half of the population.[23] A party which attempted to base its support on both farmer and labor (the strategy of the C. C. F.) would have a greater chance of success, but would have to solve the problem of reconciling the interests of the two groups which in many respects are quite divergent. The really great stumbling block, however, to the success of a class party in Canada is that on many issues which are important to the electorate the basic cleavage is not between classes but between the two cultural groups. French and English workers may, for instance, see eye to eye on economic matters, but be violently split in regard to participation in a war, or the question of language and religious rights in a particular province. In an election, economic issues may be pushed to the background, and the outcome of the contest be determined by the stand taken by the various parties on these other issues.[24]

The direct result of this imperative need for a party to obtain a measure of support from many conflicting interests is that bargaining and compromise play an important rôle in Canadian politics. In fact the successful party must above all be a party of compromise. Its program cannot be too rigid or doctrinaire, but must be vague and made up of generalities so as not to antagonize any one group. On a controversial issue it must try to avoid taking a stand one way or the other as long

[23] A study made some years ago based on the 1931 Census figures estimated the class distribution of the Canadian population as follows: "Well to do", 0.6%; Middle Classes, 25.7%; Working Classes, 42.5%; Farmers and Fishermen, 31.2%. See L. C. Marsh, *Canadians in and out of Work* (Toronto, 1940), p. 391. Since that time there is no doubt that the percentage of people engaged in farming has declined, while the working class has probably increased to somewhere between 50 and 60 per cent of the population.

[24] A good illustration of this point is the Quebec provincial election of 1948, when the working-class constituencies in Montreal voted strongly for the economically conservative Union Nationale party because of the latter's record of opposition to conscription during the war.

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as possible. This has been the strategy of the Liberal and Conservative parties during most of their history. Instead of a clear-cut program, they adopt a pragmatic approach to politics, choosing here and there those policies which are likely to win the support of a bloc of voters. This flexibility in doctrine has time and again enabled them to bring about the collapse of a new party by stealing part of its program.[25] It is one of the reasons why third parties lead such a precarious existence and the two-party system has continued to prevail. We must not assume from all this that Canada's traditional parties have no political convictions whatsoever, and that there are not limits beyond which they would be unwilling to go. In the case of the Liberals, for instance, there is undoubtedly a limit to the amount of nationalization and social services which they would be prepared to adopt, although it would be hazardous to say just where that limit is.

One characteristic of the Canadian party system which has been the occasion for considerable adverse criticism is that the policies of the major parties tend to be similar. The reason for this similarity, however, should be readily apparent from the discussion above. The two parties are not appealing to entirely different sections of the electorate, but on the contrary are both following the same strategy of soliciting the support of all the various economic, ethnic, religious and regional groups in the country, by offering to each one part of its demands. It is not surprising, therefore, that their policies should run along similar lines. This similarity does not mean, however, that the two major parties are not sensitive to the shifting currents of public opinion, and that their policies never change. We have already seen their quick response to the leftward trend in political thinking from the 1930's onward. The critic of Canadian politics would probably point out, with considerable justification, that these shifts in economic and social policy were due not so much to conviction as to political expediency. However, if we assume that the basic principle of democratic

[25] It was in this way that the Liberals brought about the downfall of the Progressive party in the 1920's. See W. L. Morton, *The Progressive Party in Canada* (Toronto, 1950).

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government is that public policies should reflect changing currents of public opinion, it does not matter much whether such policies are pursued out of ideological conviction, or the more opportunistic motive of getting votes.

When we turn to the minor parties, such as the C. C. F. and the Bloc Populaire in Quebec,[26] it is at once obvious that not only is their approach to policy on most matters quite different from that of the Conservatives and the Liberals, but their programs are much more distinct and clear-cut. This arises from the fact that they are directing their appeal to one or perhaps two particular groups. It follows that as long as their appeal is so restricted they are likely to remain minor parties. At the same time we must not forget that although the vote they poll may be insignificant, nevertheless the various minor parties play an important rôle in the process of bringing governmental policy into conformity with public opinion. Their function is to bring sharply to the attention of the government the interests and viewpoints of those sections of the electorate who might otherwise be ignored. The party in power is then faced by the choice of either meeting some of the demands of the dissatisfied groups or losing part of its support to these " parties of protest ".

Another aspect of Canadian politics which has always impressed the American or British observer is that party organizations are almost completely dormant between elections, and there is very little political activity.[27] Although there are several reasons for this phenomenon, one of the most important arises out of the necessity for the party leader in Canada to evolve and pursue policies which will be acceptable to a wide variety of divergent interests. As he must have freedom to maneuver and be prepared to shift policy at any time, he is inclined to discourage the growth of strong and active extra-parliamentary organizations which would undoubtedly attempt to dictate policy and draw up a definite program to which he

[26] This party was formed in 1942, and combined an isolationist attitude toward the war with an extensive program of economic and social reform. It ceased to be a factor in Quebec politics after 1945.

[27] The C. C. F. and some of the minor parties are exceptions in this regard.

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would be asked to conform. Neither the Conservative nor the Liberal party holds regular annual or biennial national conventions at which the rank and file can discuss and criticize policy, and to which the leadership would be answerable. In fact the only time that a convention is called is on those infrequent and unpredictable occasions when a leader dies or retires, and a new one must be selected. This may be a very long time indeed.[28] The result is that in both parties the leader and a few close associates have a fairly free hand in the formulation of the policies which they think will bring the party to power. Their dominant position within the party structure is secure, however, only as long as their policies are successful. The penalty for making the wrong guesses and losing an election or two may very well be the loss of party control.

As a concluding observation, it might be worth mentioning that our study of Canadian parties and politics has provided us with at least one valuable suggestion for the development of a more adequate method of political analysis. It has brought out sharply the inherent weakness of the purely economic approach to the study of politics, that is the assumption that the economic interests of the voter are necessarily the major factor in determining his political behavior in every situation. It should be quite clear by now that interests and attitudes of a noneconomic nature, arising out of the forces of nationality or religion, may play an equally important part in the motivation of the voter, and in the determination of the party which he will support. It is only by freeing ourselves from this overemphasis on the economic factor in politics, and evolving a more accurate and empirical method of political analysis, that we will be able to acquire a greater understanding of the political process and the dynamics of party politics.

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[28] The Liberal party did not hold a national convention from 1919 until 1948. The convention of the latter year was called when Mr. King decided to retire, and a new leader had to be found.

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AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE MAU MAU PROBLEM

WHEN disasters occur, it frequently appears that an earlier analysis of existing scientific principles, and a study of currently available information on similar incidents or situations elsewhere, might have provided the foresight necessary to avert such catastrophes. This is especially true in cases involving the contact of European and preliterate cultures, such as the current one in Kenya.

Too long have social scientists, administrators and laymen felt that, whenever two cultures came in contact, one of them *had* to suffer, be trodden upon, and possibly be completely destroyed. That this need not be true has been shown clearly in the case of the Motu of Papua-New Guinea,[1] where an indigenous Melanesian population, after eighty years of continuous exposure to white contact, has been able successfully to adjust itself to new technological methods and new sociological demands, retaining at the same time such features of its tribal organization and custom as were compatible with the new situations, thus assuring the continuity of tribal and cultural integrity and values. But such a situation can be maintained only by a thorough understanding of the culture of the peoples concerned, and by a positive approach to the problems which must inevitably arise from time to time in the course of continued contact between indigenous and European cultures.

Therefore, in order to understand fully the difficulties now facing the British Colonial Administration in Kenya, and the problems of both the white settlers and the Kikuyu tribesmen who are the original inhabitants of the region, it is necessary to know, first of all, the anthropological facts underlying the current trend of events in that area.

The Kikuyu have apparently lived for about seven or eight

[1] Annette Rosenstiel, *The Motu of Papua-New Guinea: A Study of Successful Acculturation*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1953 (Ann Arbor, University Microfilm).

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hundred years on the uplands of Kenya, not far from the equator, in the hilly, rolling country of British East Africa. Kikuyu myths indicate the exact spot in the Fort Hall district where the tribe came into being, and describe in detail the physical appearance and manner of living of the people who preceded them in the area.[2] Much of this has been substantiated by archaeological discoveries in the region, and by the fact that a people similar to those described in the myths have been found living not far away.

In the days before the white man came, the Kikuyu herded goats and sheep, using bushland—not grassland—for pasture. These animals were indispensable in the round of ritual gift giving and sacrifices which continued throughout Kikuyu life, and which were required on 108 separate occasions. The cultivation of the land itself was rigorously controlled. Certain plots were set aside for forestation, certain bush tracts were reserved for grazing, and the system of farming made it possible to function as tenant farmer on another's land, or, under specific circumstances, to purchase land from another as private property. It is this latter possibility which is most important in the present instance. Kikuyu law proscribed the acquisition of land through conquest alone. It therefore became necessary, if one desired to acquire land, to secure it by purchase, according to set rules of procedure, which included mutual adoption of the families concerned to secure the appeasement of the ancestral spirits who occupy the land, and likewise involving the sanction of the entire family making the sale, and a final religious marking of the boundaries.

The education of the Kikuyu child consisted in not only the usual practical education of the primitive, concerned with the learning of industrial and agricultural techniques. It was actively organized around the conscious inculcation of codes of behavior, and instruction of the growing child, beginning at the age of eight or nine years, in the traditions of the tribe, its folklore, its religion, and, most importantly, the social duties and obligations of the child both as an individual and as a mem-

[2] L. S. B. Leakey, *Mau Mau and the Kikuyu* (London, 1952).

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ber of a specific age group, all leading to the eventual assumption of the " responsibilities of adult life ".

The Kikuyu worship an anthropomorphic god who is omniscient and omnipotent, in whom they have supreme trust, and whose places of worship are considered sanctuaries. Their religion includes also a certain amount of ancestor worship, and an animistic belief in spirits. Traditionally, there was a sharp distinction between white magic, which was beneficial, undertaken by day, and black magic, which was used under cover of darkness to work harm. Sorcerers who worked black magic were put to death, whereas " witch doctors " who exorcised magic and cured illness were honored and respected. They had a vast knowledge of the medicinal use of herbs.[3]

Quarrels which could not be settled amicably were brought to the Kikuyu judges for adjudication. To assure an equitable hearing, gifts were presented to the judges by both parties. If the judge's decision was not considered satisfactory, the aggrieved parties could as a last resort submit to the taking of the ritual blood oath. This was the most serious ritual in all Kikuyu life. Based on a deep fear of magic, it was taken only after family deliberation, and involved calling down upon one's family the wrath of the supernatural powers as a punishment for perjury when taking the oath. The first family to suffer a death after the taking of the oath was believed to have perjured itself, and, on this basis, the judge either sustained or reversed his previous decision.

Since the oath was so important that it could supersede the highest Kikuyu tribunal, and could lead to reversal of decision through the intervention of supernatural forces, it can readily be seen that the power of the oath not only was a basic part of Kikuyu justice, but was considered a powerful link between man and the supernatural. It is significant that, according to tradition, the Kikuyu oath must be taken voluntarily, by male adults only, and with the approval of the entire family. It must be taken in public, by day, and before as many witnesses

[3] Leakey says that analysis of this herbal lore would more than repay serious study by modern medical researchers.

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as possible if it is to have any validity. The power of this oath could be broken only by a ritual " cleansing ceremony ".

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, Kikuyu lands were fully occupied, and the people were busily engaged in agriculture, animal husbandry, and trading with Mohammedan caravans which touched the boundaries of their territory. It was a relatively stable population, since the high rate of infant mortality (it has been estimated at 60 per cent), religious taboos on marital intercourse for as long as three years following childbirth, and the knowledge and use of indigenous birth control measures other than abstinence acted as stringent controls on any unprecedented population increase. It can therefore be seen that, in precontact times, the Kikuyu had firmly-established roots in the land on which they lived, and a culture whose stability was threatened only by the same natural forces and phenomena which sometimes affect large segments of civilized communities, as well—namely, natural catastrophes such as epidemics, pests and plagues.

Ten years before the arrival of the first white settlers, disaster struck. Periodic epidemics of smallpox decimated the population. A rinderpest attack killed the cattle. A period of drought followed by famine killed off an estimated 20 to 50 per cent of the population. Finally, a plague of locusts devastated the entire territory. The Kikuyu living in the Kiambu district (which is now in dispute) fled for their lives to the homes of fellow tribesmen farther south, leaving their lands unoccupied. When the European settlers arrived in the opening years of the twentieth century, they found this deserted land, in many instances forested or overgrown with bush, and assumed that it was no longer wanted by the Kikuyu. It was land very much like that in England. The newcomers visualized fertile grasslands and fields, and paid the remaining Kikuyu for the land, taking immediate possession of it.[4] They

[4] Compare this indiscriminate sale of native lands with the careful policy pursued in Papua. There, the government's first proclamation, made in 1883, guaranteed permanent protection of native lands, and in 1906 the Papua Act placed all lands under leasehold and outlawed freehold transactions. The government purchases land from the natives only after determination that " the land is not required or likely to be required by the owners," and it is then leased for varying periods to settlers.

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did not know, nor did they apparently take the trouble to find out, that brushlands were the traditional pastureland for sheep and goats in Kenya, and had been specifically reserved for that purpose. This was the first mistake that the settlers made in their relations with the Kikuyu, and one to which is directly traceable the rallying cry of the Mau Mau, " Take back the land which the white man has stolen from us! "

This, of course, the white man vociferously denies, citing as evidence of his good faith the actual payment of money for the land. Nevertheless, had a study of tribal custom been made prior to the transactions, it would have been found that these particular lands were not " deserted tribal lands ", but privately owned plots, and that they could not be alienated or purchased by agreement with any one member of the tribe. Since the settlers neither spoke the language nor understood Kikuyu customs, they did not know that they had not made a lasting covenant for the land according to Kikuyu law. The binding elements of such a transaction had been lacking. They had not received the sanction of the entire family, there had been no mutual adoption ceremony, nor had any religious ceremony been held to mark the boundaries of the purchase. So far as the Kikuyu were concerned, the settlers had purchased only rights to cultivation, and not the land itself. Nevertheless, at the time, the natives either returned to the reservations which had been set aside for them, or remained as " squatters " on the now European-owned land.

With the coming of the missionaries, and the official condemnation of much of the traditional training and many of the indigenous religious beliefs and practices, the basic meaning departed from Kikuyu life, and ritual ceremony was reduced in the main to a few external manifestations accompanying the puberty rites. The training of the earlier period, with its stress on character formation, disappeared, and, since nothing really adequate was introduced in its place, the result has been one of degeneration, loss of personal integrity and dignity, and consequently an ever-increasing sense of insecurity and discontent.

This was further emphasized in family life, by the introduction of the multi-family dwelling, in which all wives, children,

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and the husband himself lived under one roof, contrary to tradition.[5] This led to the breakdown of the autonomy of the individual family groups, and the increase of intra-family friction. The gradual disappearance of the "marriage insurance" gift,[6] and the substitution of money for the traditional gift of animals, led to a lessening of the serious aspect of the gift, and the consequent insecurity of marriage itself, since it was no longer a matter of concern for the entire family group when the question of the arrangement—or disruption—of a marriage arose. With the gradual discontinuance of the giving or sacrifice of animals at the various life crises, these ceremonies likewise dwindled to mere vestiges of what had formerly been very significant features of Kikuyu life.

In the period following the arrival of the white man, the Kikuyu population began to mount rapidly. This is attributable partly to improved health conditions, and partly also to the fact that indigenous birth-control methods had been discontinued as a result of missionary disapproval. The native reservations became seriously overcrowded, and those people whose lands had been originally located in Kiambu instituted claims for the restoration of their lands, which they now needed desperately. When these claims were refused, on the grounds that the lands had been legitimately purchased, the native interpretation of the invalidity of the "sale" was revealed. Nevertheless, although some compensation was given to the Kikuyu, it was declared impossible to restore the lands, since they were then being profitably worked by the settlers occupying them. The natives remained on their reservations, overcrowded and more dissatisfied than ever.

Beginning in 1922, a series of native movements arose, whose avowed purpose was to secure the return of these "lost lands". They were led by men like Harry Thuku, whose Kenya Central

[5] The Kikuyu are traditionally polygamous. Each wife, by custom, has her own hut, and the husband has his own hut, where he sleeps alone. The new type of dwelling is contrary to this custom.

[6] This was the traditional gift of animals (sometimes called the "bride price") made by the groom's family as a unit to the family of the bride. In the event of the breakup of the marriage, if the bride was judged at fault, the gift had to be returned intact, plus the estimated increase over the period of the marriage. It was therefore a potent factor in assuring the permanence of the marriage.

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Association later made violent demands and was declared subversive, Jomo Kenyatta, Jesse Kariuki and Joseph Kangetha, "men with a mission," who formed separatist churches with autonomous schools independent of government control. Many Kikuyu joined these separatist movements. In the 1930's, the Kenya Teachers College was started by Peter Koinange. It was later headed by Jomo Kenyatta, who had been educated abroad in England and Moscow. Here the precepts of the secret order known as the Mau Mau were taught, safe from government detection or interference, for the school refused to accept a government subsidy, and thus was not subject to governmental inspection or check of any kind.

Here were positive indications of dissatisfaction, and the potential for later active anti-white reactions. Nevertheless, apart from coercive measures such as the arrest of leaders of movements which were demonstrably subversive, the government took no steps to remedy the situation, being apparently oblivious to the deeper issues involved. The really surprising thing is that, in 1922, a study had been published which presented an anthropological analysis of much significance for the future well-being of both Europeans and natives in the area, *if its message had been heeded.*[7] Hobley's analysis of the beliefs and customs of the people provided many vital clues which the administrators would have found of great help in planning their programs and in maintaining order and administering justice. It has been well said:

> . . . without some such knowledge of the natives' point of view it is impossible to govern him wisely and well . . . to legislate for savages on European principles of law and morality, even when the legislator is inspired by none but the most benevolent intentions, is always dangerous, and not seldom disastrous. . . .[8]

Hobley emphasized also the importance of understanding the tribal language, and the ineffectiveness of the use of Swahili as a lingua franca, since so few of the elders of the tribe—those who know the tribal law best—were conversant either with it or with English, and he stressed the necessity of intercultural

[7] C. W. Hobley, *Bantu Beliefs and Magic* (London, 1922).

[8] *Ibid.*, Introduction by James Frazer, pp. 8-9.

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understanding for the establishing of permanent, amicable relations between the two peoples.

But Hobley's hope that his material might be considered as of more than academic value was apparently not realized. The native discontent continued, fanned by the teachings of the Mau Mau. Reaction became more violent, and, with the granting of city status to Nairobe, in 1948-1949 the native leaders again pushed their claims for " the land that was stolen by the white man." Membership in the ranks of the Mau Mau swelled, and in 1953 active terrorism broke out, resulting in thousands of tribal deaths, reprisals by government troops, retaliatory actions by non-Mau Mau tribesmen, and, more recently, guerrilla warfare and intra-tribal conflict on an organized scale. Today, thirty years after Hobley's suggestions were ignored, Kenya is rife with fear, tension and military action. The solutions now under consideration are:

1. Arrest, imprisonment and punishment of all Mau Mau ringleaders.
2. Organized military action against the Mau Mau.
3. Scientific inquiry into the basic problems involved, to be followed by adoption of measures which will be compatible with native custom and tradition.

Of these, the first two are in continuous use at the present time, with dubious results, and the third is in the process of being undertaken. The question now is whether it will prove more effective than the other two have been, and under what conditions. The success of this last plan depends, in the main, upon the extent to which it incorporates the cultural antidotes for the factors employed by the Mau Mau organizers in the formation of the closely knit group which they now control. It must be realized that the leaders of the Mau Mau movement are fully conversant with every phase of Kikuyu culture and belief. They have seized on the most important ones, which are precisely those which the white man overlooked in his early contact with the Kikuyu, as the foundations of the movement —the importance of the land as a religious, social and economic link within the society; and the sacred, fearsome and binding quality of the Kikuyu oath. Upon these rests their case.

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The Mau Mau are bound together with the same type of blood oath their ancestors used in the settling of difficult problems which could not be settled amicably before the judges, calling down on themselves the punishment of the supernatural powers in the event of perjury under oath, or failure to keep it. In the present case, the oath was sworn to rid the country of the white man, in order to regain the land which once was theirs. Had the movement been understood from the beginning in its wider ramifications, and the proper steps taken at the outset, the present strife and bloodshed might have been averted, and an equitable solution found sooner. As early as 1922 (if not even earlier) a specific was offered for the solution of the problem: the study of the cultural background of the people in an attempt to understand their ideology and point of view, and thus to avert misunderstanding and errors in administration which grow increasingly difficult to rectify.

Such foresight was lacking in this instance; with hindsight, it may be possible to prevent similar occurrences elsewhere in the future. Scientifically, there is a precedent for the treatment of such nativistic outbreaks as the one in Kenya, a method which has worked very effectively in the past. The pattern of the Mau Mau movement is similar to that observed in the study of cargo cults in Melanesia, and other nativistic cults throughout the world. The common basis for these movements lies in native dissatisfaction with things as they are, a feeling of inferiority, of having had withheld from them the things which they believe are rightly theirs. The reactions, with local variations, consist in the appearance of native leaders, having supernatural sanctions, who promise to secure the expulsion of the white man from the area, and yet enable the natives to retain all the " wonders " of the white man's civilization. The movements incorporate from the indigenous ideology and religion those features of greatest significance to the natives, and at the same time often require destruction of objects hitherto considered sacred. Thus in the movements themselves we find further demonstration of the confusion existing in the culture from which they arise.

The Mau Mau movement displays all these features. It is a

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spontaneous manifestation of the Kikuyu people. Since all nativistic movements are reactions against white domination, the Mau Mau cannot be considered as distinct in this respect. Jomo Kenyatta was trained in England and Moscow, it is true, but all leaders of cargo and nativistic cults have been exposed to European (or mission) training. In this instance, it is only the degree of exposure that differs. The movement is based upon the emphasis on the importance of the land as a religious and social symbol, and most of all upon the sacred, binding quality of the oath. The conflict (which in Melanesia resolves itself into the rejection of such religious items as bull-roarers, the destruction of gardens, and the replacing of traditional ceremonies by new ones devised by the leaders) among the Mau Mau has arisen out of the very quality of the oath itself.

We have seen how the oath is a fearsome thing, taken voluntarily but never lightly, never under any circumstances broken except under penalty of severe supernatural punishment, but removable by a ritual "cleansing ceremony". Upon this the Mau Mau counted for the upholding of the morale of their organization. But, when matters did not proceed as rapidly as they desired, they attempted to speed up their "membership drive" by instituting procedures which to many Kikuyu—Christian and non-Christian alike—destroyed the very validity of the oath which was their mainstay. They forced men, women and children to take the oath secretly, at night, inside their huts. They forbade members to talk of the oath to others not in favor of it, and threatened, further, to murder anyone attempting to take the "cleansing ceremony". Since tradition requires that the oath be taken voluntarily by day, before a large group of witnesses, and with full permission of the entire family group, and is restricted to adult males only, it is easy to understand that a conflict in interpretation as to its validity should arise. By its current method of administration, according to native belief, the oath became a tool of black magic instead of an aid to the administration of justice, as it had been in traditional times.

Such a conflict, carried to its ultimate conclusion within the society itself, could conceivably have led to the eventual dis-

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continuance of the movement, or to the unmasking of the leaders of it as charlatans seeking personal aggrandizement rather than the good of the entire group. However, such a termination would be possible only if the movement were allowed to run its own course. It is difficult for an administrator, who is naturally interested in the successful termination of his own term of service in the area, to allow such a movement to run its course uninterrupted. The tendency is usually to seek to control it as quickly as possible, and this often involves police or military tactics. Therein lies the most vital error in the attempted control of such movements as the Mau Mau. But it is important that such "lack of interference" be based upon scientific information. This is always more valuable if secured before action is taken, rather than after the horse has run away from the stable, so to speak, as has occurred in the present Mau Mau outbreak.

An excellent precedent for the amicable settlement of such nativistic disturbances through a nonintervention policy on the part of the administration exists in Papua, where the Australian government has from the outset operated under a long-range, scientific policy, and has based its actions and regulations on the reports and suggestions of trained anthropologists in its employ.[9] As a result of cultural analysis of the factors involved in a cargo cult which had been spreading rapidly over the Gulf Area of Papua, the government (in spite of the fact that the administrator disagreed personally with some of the anthropologist's interpretations) took his general advice and refrained from interference, with the ultimate result that the movement died out gradually, and some of the leaders were unmasked as impostors by their fellow tribesmen.[10]

In other instances, also, the Australian administration in Papua has showed an understanding of the necessity for close coöperation between administrators and anthropologists, and of

[9] Annette Rosenstiel, "The Importance of the Time Factor in the Effective Administration of Social Change" (unpublished Ms.).

[10] F. E. Williams, "The Vailala Madness", *Anthrop. Report* #4, 1923; "The Vailala Madness in Retrospect", in *Essays Presented to C. G. Seligman* (London, 1934), pp. 369-80.

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the scientific application of administrative policy in accordance with the cultural background of the native peoples.[11] In cases involving native land tenure, the administration in Papua was careful not to alienate any native land by methods contrary to native custom. It employed native interpreters and "assessors" in its conduct of court cases involving natives, so that penalties were imposed in accordance with tribal custom, and the law was flexible enough to vary the punishment to fit the degree of "sophistication" of the native. Murder to the Papuan is often retributive justice, but in cases where such murder was committed by a member of a tribe which had been for many generations in close contact with the white man's ideology, the punishment was more severe than it would have been for a "bush" native, who was relatively unfamiliar with the white man's customs. Compare this with conditions in East Africa, where native customs were not fully understood, and where Kikuyu appearing before a court of law, in following native custom by attempting to give presents to the judges in charge, were accused of attempted bribery!

The administrative program in Papua, too, was geared to a long-range plan for the improvement of the condition of the natives, a development from within the native culture, on a solid foundation of indigenous social, religious and economic life. In this way, cultural substitutions were made gradually, and were accepted even before the native way of life was significantly affected to accord with the changes introduced by European culture. This program, instituted in 1907 under Sir Hubert Murray, was in full force at the time of the first organization of the Mau Mau in Africa in 1922. It is amazing to note that at the same time that significant anthropological data regarding this latter area were apparently being consigned to dusty bookshelves, material of the same type was being actively employed in Papua in an effort to guarantee the continuance of the "Papuan way of life", while giving the Papuan the opportunity of advancing in accordance with the white man's technology and ideology, on a voluntary basis.

[11] Rosenstiel, *The Motu of Papua-New Guinea.*

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It is only now, apparently, that the administration of East Africa has come to the realization that in order to govern a people effectively you must understand them; that in order for them to coöperate with you, you must first speak their language, and see that they understand yours and perceive the true significance of what you are proposing. In Papua this is so. The native dialects have all been recorded, and are understood by the administrators responsible for the particular areas. In East Africa we are told that Swahili is used as a lingua franca, but, since it is not understood by the elders of the Kikuyu tribe and few of the whites speak Kikuyu, it is practically impossible to reach an understanding on a given issue which is satisfactory to all concerned. Leakey suggests, rather naïvely: "As Kikuyu is a very hard language for Europeans to learn, the alternative would be more teaching of English to Africans." [12] This would necessitate the simultaneous acquisition on the part of the Kikuyu of both the mechanics and the conceptual implications of the English language, both of which are difficult to grasp at the outset, even for a person educated in the Indo-European tradition. This policy was tried in Papua and discontinued as unsatisfactory. It was replaced by preliminary training of the native in his own language, followed at a later time by training in English. But the administrators spoke the native language, and white settlers made it a point to speak the language of the people among whom they lived.

The studies now being made by the Royal Commission on Land and Population can reach an effective and permanent solution of the present difficulties in Kenya only if they take into account the cultural factors involved in the present dispute, making fullest use of all available anthropological data now extant on the area and requesting, in the future, periodic anthropological reports which would reveal the manner in which the program was affecting the tribe. In this way the administration could keep its finger on the Kikuyu pulse and would be able to avert—or settle in its incipient stages—any

[12] L. S. B. Leakey, "Behind the Blood Oath of the Mau Mau", in *New York Times*, May 3, 1953, pp. 14 *et seq.*

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further manifestations of dissatisfaction or frustration on the part of the natives. In view of the present crisis, and the urgent need of an early halt to the waves of Mau Mau terrorism, it would seem that a wise and constructive policy should immediately be undertaken—one not conjured up in the spirit of vengeance or retribution leading to the wholesale execution of Mau Mau leaders if discovered and brought to trial, but in a manner reflecting the wisdom and understanding of the administrators. Once again, utilizing the precedent set in Papua by the adaptation of white man's justice to the native code, would it not be feasible here, as it was in Papua, to " make the punishment fit the crime," by basing it upon the degree of familiarity of the accused Mau Mau with white man's culture and the length of his exposure to it; on whether he was a ringleader, an active member, or an unwilling dupe of the ringleaders; and upon the degree of his voluntary participation in the activities of the group?

By such a scaling of punishment, and by a program of disseminated information, assuring the people that only the guilty ringleaders will be punished, and that the little man who seeks release from his unwilling oath will not be punished for the things which he did under duress, the movement will in time disintegrate of its own momentum. The duplicity of the leaders will have been exposed, and the people will be only too willing to free themselves of the onerous burden of guilt and secrecy which has been imposed upon them, and to seek the equitable adjustment of their grievances, which the government will then be in a better position to make.

This more sanguine point of view than those generally presented is based upon the fact that scientific principles have been successfully applied in Papua, and the belief that they can be applied again.

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REVIEWS

The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science. By DAVID EASTON. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953.—xiii, 320, x pp. $4.00.

David Easton has brought together in this book the results of sustained and vigorous thinking on his part about the dilemmas of political science, and has attempted to sketch the requirements of more coherent and cumulative work for the future. It is his central theme that political science has lacked a systematic theoretical scheme which would give meaning, coherence and direction to research, and that there has correspondingly been confusion as to the scope and focus of the discipline.

The rather limited and somewhat verbose onward march of political science has been also marked, he finds, by more particular obstacles. It has shared with the other social sciences the problems of data which are largely culture-bound in time and place. Not only are data often difficult of access, the number of interdependent variables is hard to control. Generalization about social phenomena runs the risk of feedback, now distinguished as "the law of the self-fulfilling or self-denying prophecy." There has been the question of the proper relating of values and scientific method. The author spells out, in addition, the peculiarities of American political science during the last several generations. For the most part, he finds, political science has dealt with ideas of reform in the immediate situation and has thought of facts and research as substantiation for these "theories". It has succumbed to "hyperfactualism" and has dealt in narrowly limited generalizations. It has dealt with policy and process within a given system, and there only on the surface, failing to reach the core of politics, "the fundamental distribution of power among the basic social aggregates" (p. 42). It has been static in its view of political life, and has largely missed the crucial problems of major change through time. Political theory, though retained as the unifying core of the curriculum, has declined to "historicism" and a moral relativism which leaves the research worker "unable to estimate the full extent to which his moral frame of reference might limit and distort his efforts towards the construction of systematic theory" (p. 254). Normative theory has been used to supply a too superficial postulation

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of values that are socially acceptable. Empirical work is trenchantly criticized for lack of precision of concepts, for relying on imagination and intuition, which provides ready communication with the layman, but which robs the work of technical adequacy. As a glaring example, one notes with appreciation the author's sharp words for group process analysis, which has uncritically lumped a wide variety of social aggregates, from social class, ethnic or regional sentiment to organized interest group, into the single term group, and made of this the building block of a considerable literature.

Professor Easton does not propose himself to construct in this book the necessary systematic theory. He does, however, push toward clarification of scope and focus for political science. He believes the inherent logic of the discipline requires it to concern itself with the question, how values are "authoritatively allocated for a society" (p. 106). Under this definition, politics is "a kind of activity that may express itself through a variety of institutions" (p. 113). He rejects the state as primary focus, since it is only one of the relevant relationships, and since it is involved in the political myths of the past hundred years. He rejects power as a focus since it has been misused in a fashion to imply, in much of the literature, that power per se is the only or the primary goal of political activity.

He finds a suggestion of a framework in the "theory of political equilibrium". For some, this concept has been a point of stability which is, at times and in reality, though momentarily, reached by the interacting elements of society. Others have pointed to a moving equilibrium, with alternating periods of disequilibrium. Little has been done in political science with the idea of equilibrium as a theoretical norm or point of reference in a model, against which can be measured the political situation at a given time, nor does the author believe that the elements of the political process can be quantified, nor the number of variables limited, sufficiently to allow of this kind of analysis. Indeed, his discussion of the idea of constitutional equilibrium leads him to conclude that students of politics may have to deal with qualitative rather than quantitative description, an arresting and challenging train of thought which he unfortunately does not develop more fully.

The book closes with a well-balanced perspective of the rôle of political theory in the shaping of a systematic theory. Political theory has had and can have important insights for a conceptual framework, since it must always deal with propositions that are factual, moral, applied and theoretical, using theory to relate the factual and the

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moral in the shaping of proposed application. The plea, then, is for mutual reinforcement across the board on the part of those working with systematic causal theory, constructive and analytical moral theory, and verifiable generalizations developing from the theoretical propositions.

As a comment on the author's analysis, one may suggest that the commitment to historical perspective in political theory has made a positive contribution in sensitizing political scientists to dimensions and relevancies that are missed by some other social scientists. It is hard, parenthetically, to join the author in thinking of Professor McIlwain as a moral relativist. Finally, it may well be that political science has made somewhat halting progress in research not alone because of its confusions with overarching conceptual theory. There has been, for all the hyperfactualism noted by this author, a marked preference for work in the library rather than in the field, the clinic or the laboratory, even the statistical laboratory, and many of the most markedly significant bodies of accessible data have been hitherto most sparingly sampled. There is a case to be made for disorderly but vigorous field research at the same time that work is going forward with normative theory of the broad type soundly demanded by Professor Easton, and with causal theory at several levels of generalization. It is doubtful that difficulty at any single point of political science will be found to be at the root of its intellectual dilemmas.

OLIVER GARCEAU

BENNINGTON COLLEGE

Why Democracy? By ALF ROSS. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952.—viii, 249 pp. $4.50.

The debate about the compatibility of democracy and socialism has been so protracted that by 1952 or 1953 the author of yet another book dealing with this topic cannot expect his readers to have unjaded appetites: Laski, Hayek, Schumpeter, and others have expounded the arguments on both sides of the question fully. In view of this adverse circumstance, Professor Alf Ross of the University of Copenhagen must be congratulated for publishing his own examination of what, barring the Communist subversion issue, remains the foremost problem of modern democratic politics.

The word "democracy", says he, signifies a constitutional process so contrived that the law is influenced to a considerable degree by the populace. Such a system has its own merits—in that it presupposes

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freedom of expression and association, prohibits arbitrary arrest, and discourages violent social change—quite independent of the content of the law. There is, the argument continues, despite the declamations of socialists and capitalists, no logical need that democracy be accompanied by any special type of economic organization. The current confusions of democracy and full equality and of democracy and liberalism are merely the accidental offspring of historical coincidence. On the one hand, the democratic movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did denounce feudal inequalities. And, on the other, the young democracy was advanced by merchants and manufacturers for whom the essence of good government was freedom of contract and the right of private property. But now the time has come to recognize that democracy is mortgaged to neither of these notions.

Professor Ross, while he execrates both communism and fascism, seems to believe that the latter is likely to be the more virulent threat to democracy in the West. In this American edition of his new book he warns (pp. vi, 3-4, and 195-97) that in the past fascism was not confined to Germany and Italy, that the "spirit of Fascism" probably is still lurking in the same circles of American and European society that were delighted with Hitler's tactics, and finally that "perhaps the fruit is ripening now without our noticing it." No longer do the laws made by the democratic process conform to the prescription of liberalism. Democracy has ceased to be capitalist democracy and is becoming socialist democracy. Thus challenged, the privileged may discard their loyalty to the community and resort to fascism. This thesis is not new. It has been familiar at least since the appearance of *Democracy in Crisis*. No discussion of its validity is required here.

Objections must be lodged against two points on the ground of historical misinterpretation. Professor Ross proposes (p. 4) that "all political thought throughout the Middle Ages and right down to the time of the French Revolution revolved around two ideas: the divine right of kings and popular sovereignty." His concern for those theories that provide an explicit explanation of the origin of law has led him to ignore argument from common law, which—witness the flowering of Magna Carta, Burke on the American Revolution, and even James I at times—was a warrant for rights that may have had more practical consequences in Britain and America than any other political idea. Secondly, scholars such as Mr. E. T. Williams and Sir Lewis Namier years ago demolished the view, reiterated by Ross (p.

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7), that in England since "the Revolution of 1688 the Crown has had no appreciable influence in politics, the power resting entirely with the nation's representatives." Incidentally, Newfoundland (p. 6) was not a British Dominion in 1939.

It does seem unfortunate that this studious work is likely to receive attention in America only from academicians; and they probably are already quite familiar with much that it contains.

J. B. STEWART

BARNARD COLLEGE

Catholic Political Thought, 1789-1848. Texts selected, with an Introduction and biographical notes, by BÉLA MENCZER. London, Burns Oates, 1952.—viii, 205 pp. 18s.

This book should be welcomed, although with severe reservations, as an addition to the growing study of nineteenth-century conservatism. It offers English translations of selections from de Maistre, Bonald, Chateaubriand, Balzac, F. von Schlegel, Metternich, Donoso Cortés, Jaime Balmes and Louis Veuillot—examples with which most American readers are probably unfamiliar. In addition, Mr. Menczer has written an introduction of fifty-seven pages which gives a historical framework, albeit a highly personal one, for the selections. He has also included biographical notes for each writer.

According to Mr. Menczer, the main theme of Catholic political thought has been the conflict of "Authority and Liberty"; he believes that the conflict was foreshadowed in the Reformation which by deserting the Church posed the alternatives of despotism or anarchy and that, since then, the conflict has been most evident in the French mind.

Especially to be commended in the book is the inclusion of Donoso Cortés and Balmes. According to Menczer, Spain was the testing ground of the whole historical and ideological trend of Napoleonic times; thus, he claims, it is fitting that Donoso was the first to sense the main current of our time: "The profound and universal cultural crisis of Europe—the great theme which Burckhardt and Nietzsche took up a little later."

It is, however, in his note on Metternich—which is, incidentally, completely in the so-called "revisionist" vein, seeing Metternich as pursuing peace and reconstruction against the nationalism (soon to be Fascism) and the democracy (soon to be mob rule and communism) of the time—that Menczer strikes the important note of the book. Here he raises a question of great topical interest, the same question

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as D. W. Brogan raises in *The Price of Revolution*: "Is a governing class wrong in itself? Are we bound to take it for granted, and on whose authority, that the will to preserve—the most fundamental of social facts . . . is in itself an evil, and that upheavals and radical changes are necessarily an improvement on the principles of preservation?" Menczer fulfills a real service in providing us with excerpts from men who have thought deeply on this issue.

Nevertheless, one may ask why, if the book is to be primarily considered as dealing with Catholic political thought, 1789-1848, such figures as Ballanche, Lemennais, Montalembert and Dalberg are not included. Obviously, then, the book is concerned not with all Catholic political thought of the period but with only the conservative thought of the period. As such, it contributes to a shelf previously understocked in our libraries. However, Menczer states that "Anarchy or despotism is the Protestant alternative to the Catholic synthesis of Authority and Liberty." This leaves in question the fact that the major countries of resistance to both anarchy and despotism, England and the United States, are primarily Protestant. It also tends to exclude as synthesizers of "Authority and Liberty" such conservative, but Protestant, stalwarts as Burke, Rehberg, Brandes, Stein, Gentz, and innumerable others. Surely, the addition of non-Catholic thinkers would have enriched the presentation of conservative thought while not weakening that of Catholic thought; in fact, it would have put the latter in a much needed broader perspective. One may hope that Mr. Menczer, or someone else with his interest and background, will soon take unto himself the larger task.

BRUCE MAZLISH

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Reflections of an Australian Liberal. By SIR FREDERIC EGGLESTON. Melbourne, F. W. Cheshire; London, Angus and Robertson, 1952.—iii, 300 pp. 29/6.

Every now and then a book appears that gives the reader a clear insight into a side of the national *character* not theretofore clearly seen. Such a book was Lincoln Steffen's *Autobiography,* and such a book is the one here reviewed. For in the happy combination of the author's explicit conclusions and in his incisive, but inarticulated, assumptions any careful reader can discover why the responsible state (the "welfare state") developed so thoroughly and so early in Australia. At the same time that reader will receive a fascinating exposition of the internal trials and stresses of an English-speaking community, com-

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mitted to egalitarianism, national development, and the maintenance of significant overseas cultural ties. The uniqueness of this study, the third major political analysis presented by Sir Frederic Eggleston, has been generally acknowledged: the most unusual manifestation of which was the necessity for the Melbourne publisher to call in police assistance to control the queue that bought out the first printing within two hours.

Who is Sir Frederic Eggleston? Born in 1875 the author was admitted to the Victorian bar in 1897. He served on the Australian Delegation to Versailles in 1919. He was a Right-wing member of the Victorian lower house, 1920-27, and held the portfolios of Irrigation, Electricity, and Railroads (1924-26) and those of the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General (1924-27). On the basis of these ministerial experiences, he published a "classic" study of the political problems of the state administration of public utilities, *State Socialism in Victoria* (1932). He also served as delegate to three Institute of Pacific Relations Conferences (1927, 1929, 1936). From 1941 to 1944 he was Australian Minister to China, and from 1944 to 1946 he held a similar post in Washington. He also was on the Australian delegation to the 1945 San Francisco United Nations Organization sessions.

In 1941 he published *Search for a Social Philosophy*, in the Preface of which he summarized the problems he faced in his political career:

> The difficulties involved in managing [the public] services with justice to the various interests—state, worker, consumer—were to me most embarrassing. Their finances were so difficult to control in the face of pressures brought to bear that they became a burden on the State and rendered the conduct of responsible government almost impossible. These disadvantages were not due to defective planning nor to inefficiency in administration. . . . The evil arose from the fact that the average citizen considered it to be his right to manipulate the services of these concerns for his own benefit if he could, and he was ready to organize politically. . . .

In his autobiographical *Reflections*, Sir Frederic makes an overt attempt to analyze the typical Australian's *Weltanschauung* particularly as it affects the political party programs. The author is overwhelmed with the success of the Australian Labor party, and unlike many writers recognizes its essential Catholic-oriented pragmatism (while undoubtedly a theoretical paradox, nonetheless a political reality) as the basis for its success. He notes wryly that the Australian Labor party has little use for planners and even less for intellectuals.

There is a first-rate analysis of political leadership in the other

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(Right-wing) parties, as well. Eggleston has much knowledge and few illusions regarding either politicians or the public. Unlike many writers on the subject, he disregards the platitudinous arguments that "liberal democracy" must "demonstrate" to the voter or the "Asiatics" that it is more moral than communism (presumably the reputation of the NKVD carries the burden of that proof). For a popular "liberal" writer, he has an uncanny ability of placing the value of ideas in practical perspective.

What is most amazing, however, is the implicit assumption that development must be centrally planned by disinterested parties. The author recognizes the pitfalls of politics, and the practical difficulties of the operation of the civil service, yet he cannot imagine, for all of his experience, trusting semi-private groups to function aggressively and to effect an efficient equilibrium. Thus the reader is left with the undeniable impression that the author does not really belong in a "Right-wing" party—rather that he, like the conservative in J. S. Mill's *On Representative Government,* lacks an independent philosophical approach and merely seeks to mitigate the more obvious poor judgments of the "near-Left". But Sir Frederic's view is general in his country, and this observation is not posed as a criticism—it merely emphasizes how well he presents the Australian mind. It is not often that a reviewer can point to the reflections of a living statesman and note that between the covers of a book lie not only the record of an active political life, but also the incisive musings of a serious mind that represents clearly the outlook of a great people. This is a book which preferably should be read in conjunction with his earlier works—more than that, this is a study to which anyone concerned with state-controlled social services either on the academic or politico-emotional levels will eventually turn.

MARK PERLMAN

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Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals: Babbitt Jr. vs. the Rediscovery of Values. By PETER VIERECK. Boston, The Beacon Press, 1953.—xvi, 320 pp. $4.00.

The last decade, understandably, has seen the growth of a literature not only disillusioned with Marxism but dedicated to the furtherance of a modern conservatism, a conservatism neatly located on the political map by Arthur Schlesinger's title, *The Vital Center.* Peter

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Viereck's present book is an interesting and often penetrating contribution to this literature. As such it is to be welcomed, for there can be no genuine and vigorous conservatism without an adequate and attractive intellectual expression. This book says many things that need saying, however they may embarrass intellectuals in general and academics in particular. But Viereck proudly remains a member of the gild he criticizes, and condemns anti-intellectualism, subtle or crude.

The importance of the task to which this book is directed furnishes the standard by which it must be judged, and, regretfully, it cannot be said that it measures up as well as one would wish. It is too uneven in both content and style, at times overworking satire into burlesque. It appears to have been pinned together, scraps and thoughtful essays intermixed, and, for this among other reasons, is unlikely to support the publisher's claim that Viereck is "America's outstanding spokesman for the New Conservatism."

Viereck's main theme is the contrast between the glory of the intellectuals, in their rugged opposition to Fascism in the name of freedom, and their shame, the refusal of many of them to wage the same principled struggle against Communist tyranny. In a sense, therefore, the book is an extended commentary on Arthur Koestler's *Eight Fallacies of the Left Babbitt* (1948). What Koestler called the "fallacy of the false equation" is Viereck's favorite—and thoroughly legitimate—target. In criticizing his fellow intellectuals, Viereck strives always to be fair and moderate, and is more successful than his shrillness of tone initially permits his reader to perceive. Having properly condemned the blindness of presumed liberals to Soviet slave labor while concentrating their wrath upon injustice to the Trenton Six (or "Anyburg Umpteen", as he says), Viereck aims his fire at the witch-hunters, and calls upon Eisenhower to "pop" the McCarthy "balloon ogre". He reiterates the important point that what usually passes for American conservatism is an unintelligent expression of classical economics.

Viereck's own version of the "New Conservatism" is not altogether clear, however. His hope lies in "the rediscovery of values", the values of the Judao-Christian tradition, and he describes his general outlook as Niebuhrean and Burkean. But, to one who shares this general outlook, it is uncertain how he understands it. It is not merely a system of values, but a way of arriving at those values, a method of applying them, a subject matter to which they must be applied, and a spirit in which this must be done. Moderation, sound knowledge and humility are surely of the essence of this point of

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view; no more so, however, than breadth in defining problems, and concreteness in solving them. Great conservatism has never been exhortation. One wonders whether Viereck's tendency to shoot beyond the mark (in *Conservatism Revisited,* as well as in the present book), to be critical more than constructive, to be glib and even superficial when he leaves the "contemplative" he prefers for the judgments that contemplation eventually induces—whether his tendency toward these failings is not somehow related to his acute distaste for economics. Accepting unreservedly, and, one feels, without examination, the sharp dichotomy between economics and values asserted by some economists, Viereck bars the entire sector of economic thought and history from the proper concern of a conservative thinker. His conservatism therefore has no real reference to some of our most important issues and problems.

As a poet and historian, Viereck can play a worthy rôle in the formation of a modern conservatism. But he tends to read his rôle too simply, and therefore both to overplay it and to give a narrow performance. His very real gifts will be more fruitful when used in a conservative manner. And perhaps he will borrow from the great wisdom to be found in the writings of a Schumpeter, a Keynes, or a J. M. Clark, to name but three savants of a science long since not dismal or unconcerned with human values.

Wesleyan University Eugene O. Golob

International Trade and Economic Development. By Jacob Viner. Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1952.—154 pp. $2.75.

This volume comprises six lectures delivered in July and August of 1950 at the National University of Brazil. Although small in size the book is impressive in its power of penetrating analysis, its historical perspective, and its eloquent insistence that economic thinking shall be realistic and relevant.

In this very timely and scholarly work Professor Viner discusses with both clarity and courage many of the basic economic issues that must be taken into account understandingly by statesmen and other molders of public opinion. We are reminded by him of the important contribution "that theory can offer to policy-making in the international economic field if it is reasonably good theory, but also of the irreparable harm it can do if it is seriously defective theory" (p. 11). Reasonably good theory, he goes on to point out, is that which meets successfully the test of relevance; theory, that is to say, which directs

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its attention and analysis to the facts and existent problems of industry and commerce rather than toward artificial problems conceived in the mind of the theorist. On this score Professor Viner declares that, during the nineteenth century, it " can be said for the English classical school of economics, and especially in the field of the theory of international trade, that it met the test of relevance very well "; and, he goes on to add, " that *Hansard*, the record of the British parliamentary debates, is not a bad source from which to learn what the classical theory of international trade was " (p. 15). That is indeed relevance par excellence; suggesting, as it does in the first place, that the economists of the classical school applied their thought in general to the same problems as those which interested the general public, and, in the second place, that the members of parliament in the course of debates on specific proposals for legislation adopted widely not only the thinking of the classical school but also very much the same terminology used by that school.

This notable, one might even say unique, degree of relevance of the English classical economists was however a " relevance for their own time and country, and therefore not necessarily for other times and for other countries " (p. 15). Thus for example we are told that the thinking of the classical school would today no longer be acceptable even for England. For economically less-advanced countries it would not have been appropriate at any period. During the nineteenth century, owing to an unusual combination of circumstances, policies relating to foreign trade which were beneficial to England were generally speaking in the interest also of the world at large. In consequence the English classical school in the main could take a cosmopolitan approach while simultaneously serving the national interest of Britain. Since the turn of the century however, and particularly since World War I, important changes have taken place in economic and political conditions the world over and new problems appear to have arisen such as mass unemployment and short-run disequilibria. Today therefore it is necessary for economists, as it was not for those of the English classical school, (a) to differentiate clearly between the national point of view and the cosmopolitan when considering for example a problem of commercial policy, and (b) to accept a purely short-run analysis as a valuable supplement to the traditional classical long-run analysis.

In his discussion of the classical theory of international trade in chapter 1, Professor Viner concedes that it " has shortcomings as a guide to national or to world policy under present-day circumstances " (p. 11). Nevertheless he insists that " it still has a great

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deal to teach us." In chapter 2, he deals with the "recent trends in the theory of the mechanism whereby international balances of payments are maintained in or restored to equilibrium" (p. 30). Following an examination of the classical theory of the equilibrating mechanism and of the modern criticisms advanced against that theory by many of the followers of Keynes, Mr. Viner reaches the conclusion that "the chief improvement in the classical theory which Keynesian analysis can be made to contribute is the systematic incorporation into it of income 'propensities' and elasticities" (p. 48). In subsequent chapters the author in like fashion offers suggestions as to how classical theory and modern developments in economic thinking can be most advantageously joined together, with specific reference to the "Gains from Foreign Trade" (chapter 3), "Interrelations Between Monetary and Fiscal Policy and Commercial Policy" (chapter 4), "The Influence of National Economic Planning on Commercial Policy" (chapter 5), and "The Economics of Development" (chapter 6).

The author's broad general conclusion is that what is needed is an incorporation into the classical theory of important elements of the Keynesian analysis without however abandoning any of the basic elements of the classical doctrine.

The reviewer feels obliged to call attention to two or three very minor typographical errors. The first appears in the table of contents —one of the numerals is in error. What appears to be a second slip occurs on page 41 in line ten—the word "factor" would seem preferable to "factory". And finally, while the meaning of the sentence, situated exactly half-way down on page 102, is clear, the structure would appear very much at fault.

The reviewer's estimate of Professor Viner's book may finally be judged by his declaration that his latest regret over having retired from active teaching grows out of his inability therefore to assign this admirable volume as a text in his classes in international trade.

THEODORE H. BOGGS

VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA

A Study of Moneyflows in the United States. By MORRIS A. COPELAND. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952.—xxxii, 338, 241 pp. $7.50.

This book deals with three aspects of economic measurement and theory: (1) annual estimates, for 1936-1942, of money-transfers and selected collateral and concomitant value-transfers associated with the production and marketing of the nation's output of goods

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and services; (2) concepts and terms used in these measurements and their relation to older sets of concepts and terms; and (3) the contribution of the measurements and associated concepts to the theory of business fluctuations.

The moneyflows selected for measurement are those in the " main money circuit ". These include final product transactions, income distribution transactions including " transfer payments ", and other product and service transactions. They exclude the " fluff " in bank debits: money changer, agency, and financial turnover transactions.

Each transaction included in the tabulations involves two transactors and has two phases for each transactor: for example, acquisition of a commodity and reduction in cash for a purchaser, and relinquishment of a commodity and increase in cash for the seller. Consequently, with double-entry bookkeeping, there are four accounting entries for each transaction; and if transactors' books were kept in a uniform manner with identical timing of entries, all four would show the same dollar amount. These accounts, aggregated by groups of transactors and types of transactions, Professor Copeland calls " social accounts ". His major task has been development of estimates of such aggregates for eleven transactor groups (or sectors of the economy) and fourteen types of transactions (with one of these representing the net sum of several categories).

The moneyflows estimates are presented in two forms: aggregate annual amounts for the selected sectors and types of transactions, and receipt and expenditure statements for each sector. The latter are balanced statements, and therefore include net changes in cash balances and other " loan fund " accounts (accounts receivable and payable, loans and securities, and other debts). In this form they become source and disposition statements (similar to the sources and uses of funds statements utilized in recent years in business accounting), with receipts from sales or other transactions and reductions in cash or other loan fund balances treated as " sources of money ", and expenditures for commodities or other items and increases in cash or other loan fund balances treated as " dispositions of money ". The net changes in loan fund accounts are derived from estimates for each sector of the amounts in these various accounts at each year-end, 1935-1942.

Copeland's estimates of the foregoing moneyflows and loan fund accounts, as far as the reviewer is able to ascertain, are superbly done. They are a great contribution to economic knowledge which will be found useful in many ways, particularly when the series are extended

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to the present time and currently maintained. Their preparation was a mammoth task involving multitudinous decisions which have been made with great perception and excellent judgment.

Presentation could have been improved by adoption of terminology less confusing to readers. Of the four accounting entries accompanying each purchase-sale transaction, two represent actual moneyflows in the sense of cash payments, or else book credit or other accounting entries which may be thought of as money-substitutes (temporarily in most cases, but permanently in some, as in offset settlements). Expansion of the term "moneyflows" to cover the latter is perhaps logical, though it has the undesirable result of tending to obliterate the real difference between money, in the sense of something which is customarily offered and received as a payment, and book credit which is considered by the transactors as a delay in making payment and not a substitute. But in portions of Copeland's discussion, the term "moneyflows" also seems to cover the two entries representing the value of the commodity or other item to which title or possession is transferred. Those entries represent value-transfers, but not money-transfers nor substitutes for them, and should not be confused with moneyflows.

The older sets of concepts and terms with which Copeland compares his usages are (a) those used in national income estimates, and (b) those associated with traditional ideas of the quantity and velocity of money and the equation of exchange, and the hydraulic analogy often used to illustrate those ideas. The first comparison is well done and illuminating; the second only partially so. Copeland casts well-deserved barbs at overdrawn or inaccurate statements of economic relationships by users of the hydraulic analogy; but in his eagerness to contrast the viewpoint and conclusions of "social accounting" with those of traditional theory he speaks of contradictions and contraries —"theses" and "antitheses"—which are not real because they depend on differing definitions of words.

The least satisfactory part of Copeland's book is his appraisal of the contribution of the moneyflows approach to an understanding of the causal mechanism operative in business fluctuations. He properly emphasizes the discretion lodged in each transactor, the varying attitudes of transactors ("bulls, bears and sheep"), the necessity of mutual conditioning of the exercise of discretion, the strategic position of banks because of the initiative opportunities open to them, and the influence of monetary policy and central bank operations upon those opportunities. However, he overemphasizes the impor-

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tance of the direct effect of an expansion or contraction in bank loans for specific purposes, and underemphasizes the impact of the accompanying disturbance in the quantity of cash balances available for use over and over again by nonbank transactors without regard to the kind of assets acquired by the banks. Also, Copeland has not gone so far as his predecessors in matching theory (regarding the *modus operandi* of business fluctuations) with observational data, largely because of the limitations of his data. In addition, his hostility to the hydraulic analogy seems to prevent him from realizing that his own conclusions are essentially the same as those developed in the nineteenth century, and that the social accounting approach is consistent with the traditional approach to problems of the flow of money through the economy.

McLEAN, VA. CLARK WARBURTON

The Political Economy of Monopoly: Business, Labor and Government Policies. By FRITZ MACHLUP. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1952.—xvi, 544 pp. $5.50.

The Economics of Sellers' Competition: Model Analysis of Sellers' Conduct. By FRITZ MACHLUP. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1952.—xx, 582 pp. $6.50.

While these two volumes stand separately, they are joined by common ground in subject matter, the intention of being comprehensible to readers willing to do without the techniques of mathematical economics, and the distinction of dealing lucidly with their particular issues. *The Political Economy of Monopoly,* although a candidate for undergraduate courses in government control of business, is not likely to be limited to that market. Students in other fields than economics should find it a more sophisticated introduction to what economists have thought on this subject than is to be found in possibly any competing text. *The Economics of Sellers' Competition,* which will find a place in advanced courses and will interest economists pursuing independent study, consists in a "model" analysis, that is, an abstract rather than an empirical exposition of sellers' conduct. Yet so clear is Professor Machlup's nonmathematical presentation that the noneconomist possessing a modicum of familiarity with marginal concepts should find a close reading taking him near the outer boundaries of advanced economic inquiry into the issues raised.

The first volume begins with a conceptual framework appropriate

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for the description and analysis of monopolistic and competitive phenomena. This is followed by a "taxonomic" treatment of monopolistic practices by business, an "historical" account of governmental policies toward monopoly and competition, a "theoretical" analysis of trade-union policies affecting competitive mechanisms, and an appraisal of the limitations of and interrelationships between abstract analysis and empirical research.

Among the features of this volume which seem likely to excite critical interest, three may be mentioned. The first is the extended argument that tax legislation offers unexploited opportunities for the implementation of governmental policy in support of competition. The second is an admirable account of economists' efforts to measure the extent of monopoly; reasons for the meagerness of results to date are made quite clear. The third is a theoretical treatment of the impact of big unions on wage rates, employment, and resource allocation. Fresh insights are many, yet to the present reviewer the detailed argument that union wage pressure cannot indefinitely be absorbed within an essentially competitive system invites question on three grounds: (1) the contribution of collective bargaining to industrial peace carries with it advantages of the marketwise type which Professor Machlup barely mentions, much less explores; (2) the traditionally rough treatment given "productivity" and "ability to pay" slogans for wage increases seems to do less than justice to the proposition that when the appearance of supernormal profits in a competitive field does in fact draw additional resources into the field, the compensation of any or all previously employed factors of production may appropriately rise; and (3) the acknowledged difficulties in measuring trends in and impacts of union policies weaken the force of the author's almost wholly pessimistic judgment of their meaning for the economy.

The Economics of Sellers' Markets constitutes a catalogue of possible selling situations. Some empirical trends, magnitudes and proportions are hinted at, but by and large the author does not attempt to assess the relative importance of models featuring many sellers, few sellers, many existing sellers with the possibility of newcomers' competition, and so on. Welfare considerations are not developed.

Analytically, the bulk of the exposition is based on these propositions: (1) The analysis of the firm can be most meaningfully conducted in marginal terms; current methods of average-cost analysis are subjected to unsparing and compelling criticism. (2) The assumption that firms try to maximize profits is the key to understand-

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ing even where other motivations operate; demonstration is offered that objectives other than maximum profits can be assimilated into the profit-maximizing framework. (3) The abstract construct, an industry, and with it the concept of entry into an industry, not only can be given analytical integrity, but are necessary for an understanding of potential competition and the rôle of supernormal profits in reallocating resources. And (4) uncertainties affecting the firm's planning can be taken into account without vitiating the profit-maximizing treatment.

These propositions mark Professor Machlup's work as traditional rather than modernistic. Yet so persuasive is his rehabilitation of marginal analysis and so incisive his dissection of competing approaches that the work takes on the character of a reinterpretation. Economists and their colleagues in other fields will find many themes provocatively reformulated. A sample may be suggestive: one item in it is an interpretation of selling costs that permits a truly coördinate treatment of the firm's average revenues and average costs; another is a remarkably lucid presentation of the classical duopoly cases, which constitute the taking-off point for much of the modern theories of oligopoly; a third is the sorting out of meanings to be given the notion of "indeterminacy" in analyses of sellers' behavior. A brief review of such a volume cannot easily be written in terms that convey Professor Machlup's success in exposition, but as the word gets around he may expect that political scientists and others will join the forum of appreciative critics.

Columbia University

Donald W. O'Connell

The Economic Development of Iraq: Report of a Mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the Government of Iraq. Published for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development by the Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1952.—xix, 463 pp. $5.00.

The Mission which prepared this report was organized at the request of the Iraqi government by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and was composed of fourteen experts from various specialized agencies of the United Nations, who visited Iraq during the spring of 1951. The report is the only available comprehensive study which reviews the general economic and social conditions of the country. It makes recommendations to the government for the formulation of a program designed to develop the country's productive resources.

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Economic and social conditions in Iraq, as viewed in this report, need urgent reform. About two thirds of Iraq's five million population draw their livelihood from agriculture and animal husbandry where production and breeding are primitive and yields low. Very few *fellahin* (farmers) are landowners. There exists considerable underemployment. Industry is little developed. The majority of Iraqis suffer from extreme poverty, the average per capita income being around $85 annually; the illiteracy rate is about 90 per cent; housing and sanitation are primitive; men and animals often share the same shelter; the infant mortality rate is around 250 per 1,000 births, and endemic diseases have a high incidence.

The Mission's estimate of the future of Iraq is bright, for the combination of rich natural resources—in land, water and oil—and abundant capital for investment can provide a higher standard of living for a larger population. It is recommended that, of the large revenues accruing to Iraq under the new agreement with the oil companies, $472 million (about 80 per cent of the total) be allocated among various development projects over the five-year period beginning with 1952.

The Mission's guiding principle in performing its task has been the formulation of well-balanced plans and investment priorities directed toward "the attainment of a much higher output in a manner that will benefit the people as a whole." Thus a due emphasis is placed on the development of agriculture through construction of irrigation dams, drainage, land reclamation, development of agricultural extension services, provision of incentives for the use of fertilizers and cultivation of soil-building and fodder crops and facilitating the access of farmers to improved means of production. In industry the utilization of natural gas is recommended for the production of large quantities of fertilizers, sulphur, carbon black and cement. Development of the petroleum industry is left to the oil companies. Other plans deal with the development of transportation and communication, improvements and extension of education and health services, community planning, and statistical administrative organizations.

In the light of the objectives set by the Mission one would have expected that the important problem of income distribution would receive more effective proposals. Yet the Mission leaves the problem of the sharecropping system for a future study by a land tenure expert and conceives the likelihood of the "short-run" improvement in the sharecropper's position "only as the landowner takes steps to improve his lot." According to law the sharecropper is forbidden "to leave

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the land as long as he is indebted to his landlord, which is generally the case." Remedies for the solution of this problem have received insufficient emphasis. The report recommends the organization of cooperatives only "on small, experimental scale among existing sharecroppers." Also the Mission recommends an inadequate increase in the capital of the Agricultural Bank, the only agricultural credit institution. In the case of labor a better enforcement of the existing laws (which do not even include provisions for minimum wages) is urged. Real improvement in working conditions is left to "a growing realization among employers that it is to their own interest."

The Mission recommends that, in order not to impair the incentive of those who might buy tractors for their own use or rental, the government should discontinue providing low rental tractors to farmers and instead put simple tools and better draft animals at their disposal. Turkey's successful experience in the mechanization of agriculture speaks against this recommendation. Again, the Mission recognizes "moderate protection of certain industries", but conditions the establishment of a new sugar-refining industry, to supply the domestic market, "on reasonable assurance that sugar can be produced at a cost competitive with the landed price of imported sugar [thus exclusive of import duty]."

On the whole, the report is an excellent and comprehensive study of the economic and social conditions of Iraq, and makes valuable suggestions for development. But unless the problem of income distribution receives adequate consideration, one is skeptical of the realization of the central objective of the recommendations. The targets fixed are admittedly ambitious and their complete achievement within five years doubtful.

BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA JAVAD VAFA

The Dominion of Ceylon: The Development of its Laws and Constitutions. By SIR IVOR JENNINGS and H. W. TAMBIAH. London, Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1952.—xvi, 319 pp. $9.35.

The Economic Development of Ceylon: Report of a Mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1953.—xxxii, 829 pp. $7.50.

Ceylon is a small island off the southern tip of India, with an area of 25,000 square miles and a population of about 8,000,000. The country's exports and geographic position give it an importance con-

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siderably greater than its size and population would suggest. The island's population is rather heterogeneous. The Sinhalese, who are the descendants of early migrations from northern India, constitute over two thirds of the population. Tamils represent the second largest group, accounting for about one fifth of the total population. They are divided into two groups: the Ceylon Tamils, who are the descendants of early migrations from southern India, and Indian Tamils, who came to the island after the British occupation to obtain work on the estates. Many of the latter are temporary immigrants. Besides Sinhalese and Tamils there are communities of Ceylon Moors, Indian Moors, Malays and Dutch Burghers. Religiously the population is also heterogeneous. Two thirds of the inhabitants are Buddhists, a fifth are Hindus, nearly a tenth are Christians, and about 6½ per cent are Moslems.

For about four centuries Ceylon was under Western domination, first of the Portuguese, then of the Dutch, and since 1802 of the British. In 1948 Ceylon acquired its independence. Its path to freedom was a peaceful one, and today Ceylon is one of the most loyal members of the Commonwealth of Nations.

Political scientists will find the volume by Jennings and Tambiah of great interest and usefulness. Sir Ivor is a very competent British political scientist who for the past decade has been vice-chancellor of the University of Ceylon. He has been frequently called upon by the government of the Dominion and has helped draft some of its most important legislation. Mr. Tambiah is a lawyer and visiting lecturer in the University over which Sir Ivor presides. The book is divided into three parts, namely, "Public Law", the "Courts of Law", and "Civil and Criminal Law". The first part contains brief but excellent analytical descriptions of the numerous constitutions under which the island was governed during the British period, and an examination at greater length of the present constitution. Some of these constitutions, especially that of 1931, contained features worthy of the attention of students of comparative government.

The laws of Ceylon are a mixture, or, as the authors put it, "perhaps a confusion", of five systems of law, namely, Roman-Dutch, English, Hindu, Kandyan and Islamic. There does not yet exist a comprehensive digest of cases and there is no annotated edition of legislative enactments. This volume represents the first attempt at giving a coherent account of this complicated system of law and as such meets a real need.

In the second volume under review we have another splendid economic survey of an underdeveloped country by a mission of the Bank

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for Reconstruction and Development. Sir Sydney Caine, the chief of the Mission, was assisted by a very competent staff of specialists. The scope of the survey covers the following fields: foreign trade and commercial policy; money, banking and public finance; coöperatives and rural development; agriculture; colonization; water resources and irrigation; power; industry; transportation; and public health. The surveys of each of these selected fields of development are concluded with recommendations. These are generally pertinent and sound though some are so obvious that their inclusion in a survey of this character seems unnecessary and even a bit ridiculous. The value of the book is much enhanced by numerous excellent tables, charts, graphs and maps. For any one interested in the economics or politics of Ceylon this is an indispensable volume.

It will also be read with great interest by all persons interested in the problem of underdeveloped countries. This report sharply presents the basic problem as it exists in Ceylon, where conditions are probably more favorable than in any of the other countries of South Asia. If the challenge is serious in Ceylon it is acute in other countries of the region. Population pressure is dangerously threatening even the unsatisfactory standards of living which now prevail and promises to nullify the benefits of any technological development which may be attempted.

Over the past 75 years Ceylon's population has increased threefold, yet living standards have improved. This was made possible by a revolution in agriculture and a limited industrialization. The revolution consisted of the development of the large-scale production of agricultural commodities for export—namely tea, rubber and coconut products. Today these three commodities utilize so large a part of the island's developed agricultural land that Ceylon has become heavily dependent upon imports for food. Until now production of the three export commodities has been able to keep pace with the rapid increase in population, but it is doubtful whether it can continue to do so, as the limits of available land suitable for the cultivation of tea has about been reached and the future demand for rubber is uncertain. Ceylon has discovered that science and medicine have made it relatively easy to reduce the death rate drastically. In 1921 the death rate stood at 31.2; in 1952 it was only 12.6. But the birth rate remains as high as ever, between 34 and 41 per thousand. As a result Ceylon's population is soaring. At the present rate of increase—2.4 per cent annually—the population in 1962 will be nearly ten million and in 1972 will approach thirteen million.

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Can any government, can any technical assistance program, cope with an explosive population problem like that? That is the challenge in Ceylon which this report seeks to meet, and that is the challenge in most of the underdeveloped countries of the world.

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY AMRY VANDENBOSCH

Raising the World's Standard of Living: The coordination and effectiveness of Point Four, United Nations Technical Assistance and related programs. By ROBERT T. MACK, JR. New York, The Citadel Press, 1953.—xviii, 285 pp. $4.00.

The Point Four enthusiast will be attracted by the title of this new book but will be disappointed to find that the text deals with only a small segment of the broad field which the title encompasses. The author is primarily concerned with the managerial problem of coordination within and among the various technical and economic assistance programs undertaken to aid underdeveloped areas. He is far less concerned with the broader and more significant subject of the actual substance and effectiveness of such programs. Moreover, most of the work on the book was completed before June 1950, when neither the newly established United States Technical Cooperation Administration nor the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program had obtained funds to start the proposed new programs.

The book is in the main limited to problems of coördination of predecessor programs and to plans for future coördination of these new United States and United Nations programs. By extensive library research and numerous interviews, the author was able to bring together most of the pertinent material and to illuminate it with much behind-the-scenes interpretation. He was able to identify the two major problems of coördination in the multilateral programs: the lack of good country-development planning within the aid-receiving areas; and the unwillingness of the relatively autonomous Specialized Agencies to coöperate wholeheartedly with each other. The author somehow failed to uncover, however, the additional problems of coordination which have beset the bilateral aid programs undertaken by the United States, as a result of the excessive autonomy and go-it-alone tendencies of the technical departments and agencies of the United States government, and the unfortunate division of activities between the Technical Cooperation Administration and the Economic Cooperation Administration (subsequently the Mutual Security Agency).

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The author briefly alludes to the internal United States government agreement of 1950 to split up the underdeveloped areas of the free world, for technical assistance purposes, into a TCA area and an ECA area. In what appears to be a major omission, however, he fails to make any mention of the extensive activities of ECA (many started before June 1950) in the underdeveloped countries of Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey, China, Southeast Asia, and the dependent overseas territories of OEEC nations, which include most of Africa; or of the methods used by ECA to achieve coördination with the other departments of the United States government and with the United Nations and Specialized Agencies.

One of the book's reiterated themes seemed unrealistic to this reviewer. This is the author's contention that a country-development plan could and should have socio-economic goals that are "objectively good" for that country, and that are not "distorted" by the special interests of particular groups. Such a view seems to ignore both the realities and the desirabilities of government. One may disagree with the weight given to particular interests, but hardly with the fact that all interests should be given some consideration. This theme recurs on the international level, where the author implies that the United States Point Four program was meant to be and should be a "world-wide" development program with "socio-economic" objectives, uncontaminated in any way by "politico-strategic" considerations. Does the author really believe that there is a dichotomy in American foreign policy, and that a major foreign program like Point Four can or should be inconsistent with—or indeed not contribute to the achievement of—the national objectives of the United States? The United States has undertaken to aid in the development of underdeveloped countries not solely because of humanitarian motives (although these are certainly important), but in large measure because that development is expected to serve the national objectives of the United States—peace, which requires greater security, prosperity, and freedom for individuals and nations. To speak of Point Four as somehow neutral in purpose is to miss the whole sense of former President Truman's Inaugural Address of 1949, which launched Point Four. Point Four is positive; it is constructive; it is in the interest of the aid-receiving country; and it is given without political strings. It is not, however, empty of "politico-strategic" interest to the United States.

SAMUEL P. HAYES, JR.

MUTUAL SECURITY AGENCY

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The Russian Mind: From Peter the Great Through the Enlightenment. By STUART RAMSEY TOMPKINS. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1953.—xi, 291 pp. $4.00.

In this book Professor Tompkins studies the formation of the Russian mind, especially under impact of foreign influences, from the period of Peter the Great through the Enlightenment. And an important by-product of the investigation is the effort to point out the degree of continuity in Russian characteristics between this period of the tsars and that of the Soviets. The book is in no sense a philosophical study of the theory of knowledge, but rather an attempt to evaluate the contribution to Russian intellectual history of a series of developments in class structure, the peasantry, education, censorship and historiography. Our understanding of these varied subjects is considerably enhanced by the extensive research and fresh interpretations of Professor Tompkins. At the end of his investigation he singles out two predominating characteristics of Russian thought as worthy of special emphasis: " a preoccupation with theory to the exclusion of facts ", and " the acceptance as a fixed point in thought of some concept arrived at (usually in someone else's mind) intuitively." Thus, he concludes, there " is laid a philosophical basis of intolerance which refuses to accept a factual basis of agreement and rejects all compromise."

There would be considerable agreement among experts as to the validity of these two conclusions. Russian thinkers have often been guilty of rejecting compromise because they preferred to stand on principles which had little reference to the facts in the case. And it is true that prominent Russian thinkers have accepted to a degree of intolerance certain concepts which they have made their own but which in turn have often been derived from Western thought. Indeed, one of the solid contributions of this book is the extent to which it treats the indebtedness of the Russian mind to Western intellectual history and culture. In this sense, however, it is perhaps unfortunate that the book did not begin with an introductory chapter surveying Russian contacts with the West before the time of Peter the Great; for these early relations with the West played a significant part in the formative stages of the Russian mind. Russian students were sent abroad long before the time of Peter, and, however resistant the country may have been to the West, cultural influences from England as well as France amounted to something more than a trickle before 1700. Further, Professor Tompkins does not appear to have placed sufficient emphasis on the cultural influences of England and France,

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and of Germany to some extent, on the development of Russian culture and intellectual thought. One is puzzled by his statement: "Russians simply had few points of intellectual contact with eighteenth-century France" (p. 231), which is hardly borne out by the record or by Professor Tompkins' own evidence of the extent of such contacts. In fact, much of the liberalism, humanitarianism and critical attitude toward government, religion and law in eighteenth-century Russia was the result of French influence. The works of Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderot and Rousseau were translated and discussed, at least before the French Revolution. It has been estimated that three fourths of the books read in Russia during the reign of Catherine were French, and French culture was easily the chief influence in Russia's intellectual awakening during this period.

A word of praise should be said of the excellent bibliography which Professor Tompkins has appended to his important study, and one awaits with interest the second volume he promises which will carry the story of the Russian mind up to the present day.

ERNEST J. SIMMONS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

A Window on Red Square. By FRANK ROUNDS, JR. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953.—304 pp. $3.00.

A young American assigned to the Embassy in Moscow as a translator for eighteen months in 1951-1952 has published parts of his diary. For those who have served similar stints in the Soviet capital, the story will seem like a rereading of their own efforts. Except for the more careful police supervision of foreigners, all seems the same as it has been for decades. For those who have never lived in Moscow the story will provide an entertaining gossipy account of what can be learned by an inquisitive and ingenious young American about the U. S. S. R. today. It still appears possible to see a good deal of the country and of its people, if not to make the pleasant personal friendships so common before the war.

Two conclusions stand out of the jumble of anecdotes, travel accounts and personal reflection which Mr. Rounds has strung together with only the calendar sequence to provide a thread of continuity: (1) the Soviet government's propaganda in the "hate America" campaign has had no effect upon the common people; and (2) the Russian people sense that something has gone wrong with their revolution but they are unable to put their finger on the cause. Both conclusions are well documented.

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To those who teach in the various Russian area programs offered by American Universities the book suggests that their efforts have been justified. Here is a young man prepared for his experience by work at Harvard, knowing the language, the history, the literature, the music, the art and the politics of the past and the present in Russia, who observes well and wastes not a minute. Older hands will question some of his minor conclusions on the basis of their own experience in the relatively free pre-war days when foreigners were welcomed in Russian homes. Thus there will be quite a few Americans who will marvel at the conclusion that " the Russian people have been reduced to sullen drinking " as a release from tension, and that they have no gay drinking parties. Before the war the gay " evenings " with a phonograph and *rumichki* of vodka and dancing even in very crowded ancient apartments of the Russian hosts were anything but sullen. One wonders whether such parties are not still going on behind shutters closed against foreign eyes. Yet in spite of such excusable generalizations which appear faulty, the book contains much with which all former members of the American colony in Moscow will agree.

The crippling effect of an experience in the U. S. S. R. upon an American boy is to be seen in Mr. Rounds's changing attitude as the months rolled by. He arrived " so interested that I have barely slept ". Ten months later he is so overcome with his experience that he is unable to force himself to go down to his Embassy office to translate more Russian propaganda. He finds that evil exists in Moscow as a thing, a Presence. He reports that he dreamed constantly in Moscow but never once a pleasant dream. In spite of this homesickness, Mr. Rounds seems generally able to see that there are features which seem to please the local populace and other foreigners who have been converted to the cause. He wonders how this conversion could occur, but he finds that it has engulfed some people. He recounts with wonder an interview with the correspondent of the New York *Daily Worker*. He has discovered, as our own President has discovered, that communism has taken on for some people the emotional character of a religion, which cannot be understood but must be acknowledged if we are to understand what keeps the Soviet system going along with the more obvious police measures.

JOHN N. HAZARD

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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Citizens of the World. By STRINGFELLOW BARR. Garden City, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1952.—285 pp. $3.00.

Mr. Barr is in the tradition of the old-time pamphleteers—the best of them. He is polemical, trenchant, vivid, witty and hard-hitting. He looks at the world of his time and lays about him where he thinks blows are due. He is not afraid nor does he resort to tact as a cover for fear, which in itself is refreshing just now. He knows what he thinks and says it bluntly, knowing perfectly well that that is unpopular, if not unseemly.

In this book Mr. Barr expands with closer reasoning the theme of his earlier pamphlet, *Let's Join the Human Race.* The theme is that the world should be but is not one. The division within it is not so much political as social or, rather, technological. There is on the planet a City of the Rich and there is a City of the Poor. Part of the world dwells at ease and amid plenty, part grovels in a squalid slum; and of these the second part is the larger. Herein lie the seeds of a conflict more deadly than what is called the cold war; indeed, it is already intensifying the cold war.

For Mr. Barr the great human need is a gigantic project of slum clearance: that is, introducing into those parts of the world still without benefit of science the means of elevating their standard of livelihood to the level accepted as normal in the West. What he has in mind is that which was adumbrated in Point Four, but he conceives of it as something broader and deeper, different in degree, intent and spirit, if not in kind. He objects to Point Four because its auspices are American rather than international and because its object is military rather than social, arraying the underdeveloped countries against Russia rather than bringing them into the twentieth century and thus giving them the inner health without which there can be no peace, regardless of Russia.

Since this is a world enterprise, Mr. Barr wants to see a world effort. He proposes an International Development Authority, a public corporation functioning as a kind of world T.V.A., autonomous but under the general sovereignty of the United Nations. Thus would be circumvented many of the political difficulties that would frustrate Point Four even if the United States were willing to appropriate the necessary funds. For the loans for capital investment required for social reconstruction would not be construed by recipient countries as a bribe or at least as payment in advance for allowing themselves to become battlefields in a Russian-American war.

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Mr. Barr does not evade any of the obstacles, the principal one being the cold war itself: how get world effort when the world is cut across by a chasm as yet unbridgeable? How get Russia into such an autonomous international authority? He meets all the arguments and thinks they are not insuperable. He reasons them closely and sometimes impressively, but not, one is bound to say, on the whole convincingly. With all his eloquence and persuasiveness, with all the proof that he is on the side of the philosophers as well as the angels, one still can say only of his thesis: What might have been. What gives his book its value—and that it most certainly has—is not the soundness of the central thesis but the imaginativeness, perspicacity, wisdom and humaneness of his outlook on the world and the time. His program may be for the moment futile; his insight marks him as one to respect.

NATHANIEL PEFFER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Cambridge Economic History of Europe. Vol. II: *Trade and Industry in the Middle Ages.* Edited by M. POSTAN and E. E. RICH. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1952.—xvi, 604 pp. $9.00.

The second volume of the Cambridge economic histories surveys the trade and industry of the Middle Ages. Its first part is introductory, comprising essays on trade and industry in antiquity and the early Middle Ages by V. Gordon Childe, Frank W. Walbank and Steven Runciman. The second part is composed of two long articles on the commerce and trade of western Europe by Michael Postan and Robert S. Lopez. The third part contains special essays on the wool industry, mining and metallurgy, and the building industry in western Europe by Eleanora Carus-Wilson, John U. Nef and Gwilym P. Jones. Thus organized, the volume has a homogeneity and rhythm which impress one as superior to the first volume of the Cambridge economic histories, that on medieval agrarian life.

The two central articles by Postan and Lopez set the tone of the whole volume. They are excellent. Postan's essay on northern European commerce is marked by intellectual candor and a taste for argument. He dominates the volume and provides Lopez and other contributors with their basic framework of ideas. Lopez on Mediterranean commerce is different. He is ebullient and colorful. His il-

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lustration of the diversity of medieval commerce by means of brief biographies of merchants and business men, great and small, is dramatic and meaningful. He is addicted to grand pronouncements, and his sensationalism occasionally leads him astray. As is the vogue nowadays, he attacks Henri Pirenne's views on the decline of Mediterranean trade during the Carolingian period. He remarks that the so-called change from a gold to a silver standard in this period was due to causes " political rather than economic ", and that the contemporary dietary change in northern France from olive oil to butter was due to an apparently unmotivated " change of taste ". Perhaps a historian ought to remember that any historical thesis may be destroyed by splitting man into economic as against political parts, and that, by ascribing man's actions to gratuitous choice, history itself is made meaningless.

The division of the two central essays into one on north Europe and another on the Mediterranean presents difficulties. Both authors are wary of treading on each other's toes, and little space is given to Spain, South Germany and France. As a result, Postan neglects to compare the degrees of economic and social maturity of the various regions of Europe in the later Middle Ages. Admittedly, he treats in this way areas which lie within his principal zone, such as Brabant and Scandinavia. But he slights the grand contrast between France and northern Germany despite his own evidence to show that Germany experienced its bloom and entered its crisis from fifty to a hundred years later than France. Moreover, by dividing Europe into north and south, both authors contrive to leave unstressed the greatest achievement of medieval commerce: the urbanization of Atlantic and Baltic Europe.

Another difficulty derives from the nature of the volume itself. Its concentration on economics makes its social history terse and schematic. Postan repeats the view that the early medieval town was wholly distinct from the countryside and further claims that the early merchant and artisan were " professionalized ", in all ways unlike the landlord or peasant. These statements seem overbold. Certainly, the growth of trade caused towns to become specialized and therefore increasingly unlike the villages of the countryside. But this was not initially so. The maturing of urban economic specializations required long development and even, on occasion, forcible suppression of similar specializations in near-by rural communities. Moreover, it seems doubtful that there was any clear initial dividing line between mer-

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chant, artisan, landlord, or peasant. Postan's view disregards the importance of early medieval ministerial relationships as well as the fact that, until there was relatively advanced specialization, no substantial medieval group could subsist solely upon profits from interregional traffic.

The same indifference to the complexities of social history inclines Postan to favor mechanistic causes. To him, the rise and fall of medieval economy is fundamentally explained by the rise and fall of population. While there is much insight in his argument, there is danger in using demography as a sole radical factor. It leads to a self-evident proposition. Postan writes about the rise of Europe in the earlier medieval centuries, " trade grew because Europe expanded." One might just as well say about the decline of the later Middle Ages, " trade shrank because Europe contracted." Demographic determination is not enough: it is a historian's duty to examine the reasons for demographic movements. Surely Postan's claim that the economic rise and fall of medieval Europe " is easier to diagnose than to measure " could well be reversed.

If Postan sometimes oversimplifies social history, Lopez often shows insouciance. His understanding of the social ethics of business enterprise seems undeveloped. To him, it appears, the medieval merchant was simply a fellow out to " turn a fast buck " for his own private good. Recalling the effort of the Church to define usury and the growth of the commonwealth idea from the thirteenth century, it is hard to accept a casual proposal that medieval business men consistently defrauded the ideals of the society in which they lived. It is perhaps this indifference to any reason for trade other than private profit that makes Lopez' handling of later medieval commerce so brief and unsympathetic. To him, the rise of monarchy, of Italian princes, or of the state in general trammeled the merchant seeking private gain, thereby crushing trade and enterprise. Doubtless this is in part true. But it has also long been evident that the rise of the state had much to do with that mobilization of European energies which made possible the inventions, discoveries, and ideologies of early modern Europe.

Throughout their essays, both authors present contrasts and parallels between what they feel are commensurable aspects or trends in the medieval and modern economic scenes. Some of these are not felicitous. When Lopez writes about the rise of medieval trade that " no other economic upheaval has had such an impact upon the world,

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with the possible exception of the Industrial Revolution," he overstates his case. Other such contrasts and parallels are successful. Postan's remarks, for example, contrasting the relative importance of grand commerce and local trade in the Middle Ages and in the nineteenth century are provocative and good. In fact, whatever one may criticize, both essays offer such clear lessons from the past that they serve to correct the vanity of the modern man who bases his understanding of today solely on the experience of the present.

JOHN MUNDY

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German Nationalism: The Tragedy of a People. Extremism Contra Liberalism in Modern German History. By LOUIS L. SNYDER. Harrisburg, The Stackpole Company, 1952.—xiv, 321 pp. $3.75.

History is a depressing subject, and most of modern German history particularly so. Since Mr. Snyder's book is largely concerned with the rise of German integral nationalism over the last century and a half, it is anything but pleasant reading. Still his subject is a most important one. Nazism, he says, had its roots deep in the German political and intellectual tradition. The militarism of a Clausewitz, the autarchism of a List, the racism of a Wagner and a Stoecker, the general intolerant, aggressive nationalism of a Treitschke and a score of other thinkers, writers, scholars—these have been the most powerful influences shaping German political thought and tradition since the early nineteenth century.

There is certainly much to be said for this view of German history, and Mr. Snyder's documentation of it is impressive, as is the evidence he adduces at the very end of his book to show that the political currents he had earlier traced for the period up to 1933 seem now to be acquiring new vigor. And this too strikes me as correct; indeed Mr. Snyder might well have said much more concerning such shocking developments as the post-war reappointment to professorships in history in various West German universities of men whose past record of intellectual integrity is none too good.

Snyder's documentation, I have said, is impressive, but I should perhaps at once have added: as far as it goes. For, while the Germans who have since the war been busy telling us that Nazism had no place in the German political tradition are either uninformed themselves or are trying to mislead us, Snyder's view of the almost unchallenged

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predominance of extremist nationalism in German politics and thought is equally open to question. Has Germany no liberal tradition in the true sense of the word, no tradition of a struggle for constitutional government and human rights? Snyder thinks not. It seems to me, however, that this position is quite mistaken. For, if not as liberals, how else are we to describe men like Hansemann and Mevissen, Forckenbeck and Richter, Freytag and Mommsen, and the others who tried in 1848 and again in the 1860's to give Prussia a constitutional form of government? It is true that the German liberals failed—for want, I think, of mass support which they seemed unwilling to try to attract and hold, a weakness they certainly paid for dearly in the end. But if the German historians are wont even now, after Hitler, to glorify the Bismarckian tradition, is it not important for us to revive and celebrate the memory of the great and noble tradition of the German opposition to Bismarck? There are a number of excellent works on the history of German liberalism already, as well as a number of important source collections—volumes like Droz's *Le Libéralisme Rhénan, 1815-1848*, Hansen's many volumes, and Heyderhoff and Wentzcke's *Deutscher Liberalismus im Zeitalter Bismarcks*—works every historian writing on the development of German nationalism and the German political tradition will need to take into account. In Snyder's case, unfortunately, there is no evidence that he has done so.

He has, in a word, overstated his position; and in a way, moreover, that leaves him curiously open to attack: he has quoted out of context, and in footnotes cited works he has not used. One example of this is his chapter on Meinecke, where his general point, well taken and important, is that Meinecke has been much more of a conservative, nationalist historian than he is nowadays thought to be; but as early as 1917 and 1918 Meinecke had begun to have occasional doubts concerning the wisdom of Bismarck's policies, as of the state of German constitutional and political life in general, doubts he recorded in a number of fine essays later reproduced in the collections *Nach der Revolution* (1919) and *Staat und Persönlichkeit* (1933). No purpose is served, and many doubts are raised, when the citation of such volumes is followed by complete disregard of them. And the rest of Snyder's book is filled with minor but very irritating slips, evidence of haste and sometimes inadequate research.

FRANCIS L. LOEWENHEIM

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Thomas Mifflin and the Politics of the American Revolution. By KENNETH R. ROSSMAN. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1952.—xiii, 344 pp. $5.00.

A sort of genius is needed for the writing of a biography of a minor political leader whose career extended over a fairly long period. The importance of such a man does not justify an elaborate history of the times. Yet the story of his life has interest mainly as it relates to the general course of events. The biographer needs to be able to sketch quickly the background of issues and actions and to show almost at a glance the relation of his subject thereto.

Such a minor figure was Thomas Mifflin, Philadelphia merchant, " gentleman-politician ", member of the First and Second Continental Congresses, first quartermaster-general of the American Army (1775-1777), member of the Board of War, major-general, president of Congress in 1783, member of the Constitutional Convention, and governor of Pennsylvania between 1790 and 1799. His public career is difficult to re-create by reason of his often evasive conduct, his elusive character, his silences concerning important actions, and his skill in walking warily, in covering his tracks, and in avoiding open commitments. He was a man of essentially conservative nature who courted popularity. In many respects he reminds one of John Hancock. A note of indistinctness is imparted to Mr. Rossman's biography by the nature of his subject and the material. This is best illustrated by the vagueness that envelops the most celebrated incident in which Mifflin was involved—the so-called Conway Cabal.

To Washington, Mifflin owed his appointment as quartermaster-general. He took part in the opposition when Washington's fortunes were at the lowest ebb. After the latent strength of the great man manifested itself, Mifflin denied any hostile intent and became cooperative. As governor of Pennsylvania, at the time of the Whisky Rebellion, he was reluctant at first to act against the insurgents. He quickly yielded to pressure from Washington and the Federalists and won favor as a sword-waving upholder of law and order.

Mr. Rossman does not give a full description of Mifflin's character, a summary of his achievements, or an evaluation of his work. The limitations of the study are mainly those of the subject. One of the two main themes is the technical and confused problem of supplying the Continental Army, the records of which are incomplete and inconclusive. The other is the internal politics of Pennsylvania between 1778 and 1800. At points the work is in a rather raw state, resem-

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bling a set of notes. Although the writing lacks ease, emphasis and fluency, the scholarship is careful, impartial, restrained, and respectful of evidence and fact.

CURTIS NETTELS

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Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States. By WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY. 2 vols. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1953.—xi, viii, 1410 pp. $20.00.

These immense volumes are about the division of the supreme power, that is, the sovereignty of the people of the states, between the states in their united and the states in their individual capacities—a division ordained and established by the Constitution.

According to Professor Crosskey, the Founding Fathers had a very simple notion of this division: everything was given to the nation; nothing was reserved to the separate states. The latter were, to be sure, continued in corporate existence, but their powers, newly created by the Constitution itself, were subordinate, not sovereign.

This was the arrangement at the outset. Unfortunately it was soon altered. A political party arose under the leadership of Jefferson, the main object of which was to destroy the national authority in the name of state rights. By deliberate distortions of the plain words of the Constitution, by silences, half-truths and full lies, the members of this party—Madison, in particular—started the idea that the Constitution *really* divides the sovereignty; the portions surrendered by the states, composing the federal sovereignty over specified objects; the portions retained forming the sovereignty of each over the residuary objects within its sphere. Laughed at in the beginning, the doctrine of compound sovereignty acquired some color of probable truth as the nation, year after year, failed to use the powers which that doctrine claimed the nation did not have. Presently probability became certainty: the meanings of words changed; the political and legal ideas of the Founding Fathers were forgotten. Nowadays the original Constitution is completely unknown: the lying gloss has taken the place of the true text.

Such is the theme of Professor Crosskey's work, of which these two volumes are only a first installment. His method of proof is somewhat curious. Recognizing that the legitimate meaning of the Constitution must be derived from the text itself, or, if a key is to be sought elsewhere, that it must be in the sense attached to it by the

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people of 1788 in their respective State Conventions, where it received all the authority which it possesses, he looks for that sense, not in the writings of those Americans who had anything to do with the framing, ratification, or practical operation of the Constitution, but in the antecedent works of such men as Daniel Defoe, Malachy Postlethwaite and George Grenville.

The Founding Fathers, we are told, are not to be trusted as the expositors of their own ideas; in discussing the Constitution they seldom meant what they said or said what they meant. Take, for example, Madison: his great object was to tear the Constitution to pieces; his every word must be read in the light of this sinister design. Take Hamilton: his policy was to lull the opposition; consequently his expressed views are merely refracted shadows of his real views. Take Marshall: he was fighting a rear-guard action in a packed Supreme Court; if he conceded any portion of sovereignty to the separate states, that was only because he was trying to preserve some vestige of sovereignty to the nation. The true views of the Founding Fathers can be ascertained only by indirection. The Founding Fathers were men of the eighteenth century; they spoke and thought like other men of the eighteenth century. If, then, we compile a specialized dictionary of eighteenth-century words and ideas—taking care to exclude from this dictionary any quotations from the Founding Fathers—we shall be in a position to read the Constitution as the Founding Fathers really read it, not as they said they read it.

And so Professor Crosskey proceeds to build up his specialized dictionary and apply it to the text of the Constitution. Needless to say, the Constitution turns out to mean exactly what Professor Crosskey wants it to mean and just the opposite of what Madison—and, for that matter, all the rest of the Founding Fathers—said it means.

A few examples will serve to illustrate his method and his manner of applying it. He is much concerned to prove that the power of Congress to regulate commerce "among the several States" is not a power confined to the regulation of interstate commerce. He, therefore, collects a large number of instances in which the phrase "among the states" does not or cannot mean "interstate"; he omits every contrary instance; and he fails to notify the reader that the phrase thus defined differs from the constitutional phrase by the omission of the word "several".

In another place he undertakes to prove that "*ex post facto* laws" and retrospective laws are synonymous terms. Here he parades the philological arguments of the counsel for the plaintiffs in error in the

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case of *Calder* v. *Bull*, supplementing them by a few irrelevancies of his own. He dismisses as a fabrication Madison's testimony that the phrase "*ex post facto* laws" was understood in the Federal Convention to relate solely to criminal and penal statutes. He treats as nonexistent Hamilton's definition of the phrase in the eighty-fourth number of the *Federalist*. He explains the decision of the Supreme Court in *Calder* v. *Bull* by imputing corrupt motives to the Court as a whole.

It is in wrestling, however, with the Tenth Amendment that Professor Crosskey achieves what he at least must consider his greatest success. This amendment has hitherto been understood as corroborating Hamilton's statement in the *Federalist* that, "as the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the state governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not by that act *exclusively* delegated to the United States." But now we are told that the word "reserved" has been misapprehended: "A technical legal word, it was, and long had been, in common use to indicate the creation of a *new* interest, *never previously existing as such*, in respect of *a thing conveyed*." To prove this common use of a technical legal word, Professor Crosskey quotes not a single example. The definition itself he draws from Sheppard's *Touchstone*, a seventeenth-century treatise on the theory of conveyancing (not published in the United States until 1808) where we learn that in a deed there is a difference between an exception and a reddendum, or reservation. "An exception is a clause of a deed whereby the feoffor, donor, grantor, lessor, &c. doth except somewhat out of that which he had granted before by the deed": as if a manor be granted excepting one acre thereof. "A reservation is a clause of a deed whereby the feoffor, donor, grantor, lessor, &c. doth reserve some new thing to himself out of that which he granted before": as if a manor be granted rendering a rent. Is it not obvious, asks Professor Crosskey, that the people of the states surrendered their entire sovereignty to the nation, reserving to themselves a dependent and controllable authority to exercise whatever powers the general government might choose to leave with them?

The fact that none of his conclusions was at all obvious to the Founding Fathers does not disturb the author. Nor is he troubled by the further fact that his conclusions cannot be justified by the common-sense rule, "that the surest and most recognized evidence of the meaning of the Constitution, as of a law, is furnished by the evils which were to be cured or the benefits to be obtained; and by the im-

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mediate and long-continued application of the meaning to these ends." In a future volume the Founding Fathers will be given their "come-uppance", and the facts of history will be revised. "We shall conclude"—so the promise runs—"that events occurred of which there is no record in our histories: we shall find politics and motives ruling events, of which those writings give not the slightest inkling; we shall find the roles of individuals, states, and whole regions of the country quite reversed."

Maybe so; but in this reviewer's opinion we are more likely to find a mass of aberrations produced by a faulty method. The true meaning of the Constitution, as understood by the nation at the time of its ratification, can never be discovered in the manner of a schoolboy searching for the sense of some Latin text, now in isolated words defined grammatically, now in a whole sentence divined by intuition, now, finally, in some lexicon consulted without sufficient critical acumen. The mechanism of analysis, the hazards of intuition, the perfidious suggestions of the dictionary can make nonsense and countersense out of even the plainest language.

Lucius Wilmerding, Jr.

Princeton, N. J.

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BOOK NOTES

Though Jeremy Bentham fashioned it more expressly in an attempt to reform the processes of political debate, *Bentham's Handbook of Political Fallacies,* edited by Harold A. Larrabee (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1952; xxxii, 269 pp. $4.75), is not without a definitive connection to his general philosophic system. Essentially an attempt to inject the principles of utility, and logic and reason thereby, into English political life, the main burden of the volume is in the exposure and analysis of the duplicities, or, in Benthamite terminology, the fallacies, used in debate. Fallacies are defined as " any argument . . . or topic . . . for the purpose . . . of producing the effect of deception, or of causing some erroneous opinion to be entertained . . ." (p. 1) and categorized under the general headings of Authority, Danger, Delay, and Confusion. The exposition on the use of fallacies, and the attack on them, is highly effective, and eminently readable, thanks to Professor Larrabee's judicious editing. Certain of Bentham's observations have an uncomfortable validity today; for example, the chapter on " Vituperative Personalities " (pp. 83-92), a fallacy of Danger, allows us the sorry satisfaction of discovering that the " imputation of suspicious connections " (p. 83) is neither a new device nor an untried stratagem. His reflections on the sanctity of the English Constitution and its use as a tool of debate in Westminster make the early 1800's sound uncomfortably as modern as 1945-50 or 1910-12. Fleeting passages are of special interest to an American reader. A brief development of the concept of the repugnancy of laws, although a footnote does draw attention to Lord Coke's doctrine, reads as if it were a direct commentary on Marshall's dictum in *Marbury v. Madison.* The Doctrine of " sinister interest ", touched on in several places, is in remarkable parallel, both in language and concept, with the theory of " faction " as developed in Number X of the *Federalist Papers.* Bentham assumed a too easy reliance on the doctrinal premises of utility as being the only foundations for a methodology of oratorical technique. Consequently, in his ire at opponents he falls prey to the very fallacies he cautioned others to beware, most markedly in the highly vitriolic passages attacking the Bar. However, this detracts nothing of essence from the book, nor from its inherent validity in Bentham's day or our own. In ad-

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dition to the editing, Professor Larrabee has contributed a brief introduction that is adequate but lacking in effective analysis. Other than the general historical data presented, a more precise delineation of the place of this volume in relationship to Bentham's philosophy as a whole and of its connection with reformist literature of the period would have been desired. Naturally this should not obscure the fact that the editor has rendered a very commendable contribution by making available this all too neglected work of the Great Utilitarian. —WILLIAM L. ROFES, Norfolk, Va.

Although *The Physiocrats* (New York, The Langland Press, 1952; x, 158 pp. $3.25) is a reprint of a series of lectures delivered by Henry Higgs at the London School of Economics and published in 1896, the text is fresh and the argument timely. Indeed, Professor Higgs's book displays more common sense about the Physiocrats, who have been variously interpreted and generally misunderstood, than any others I know, including those of recent scholars of the school. I agree with his judgment that: "Finding the bow bent too much in one direction, they bent it too much in the other in the effort to make it straight. The miserable state of the nation seemed to demand a *volte face.* Taxes were many and indirect. Let them be single and direct. Liberty of enterprise was shackled. Let it be free. State-regulation was excessive. *Laissez faire!* Their economic plea for liberty is buttressed by an appeal to Nature, greater than kings or ministers, and by an assertion of the natural, inherent rights of man to be unimpeded in his freedom except so far as he infringes upon that of others. Unlike Locke and Montesquieu and Rousseau they refuse to admit that man's natural rights are modified by any form of social contract. To these rights even the State must bow; and the Declaration of Rights which precedes the Constitution of 1791 borrows from them its second article—that liberty, property, and security are inalienable and imprescriptible rights." The chief criticism which I would have of Higgs's appreciation of the Physiocrats is his insistence upon them as the "first school of economists". This well-established verdict has been taken so categorically that historians of economic doctrines have shown an excessive neglect of the mercantilists and of the Church fathers.—SHEPARD B. CLOUGH, Columbia University.

William H. Riker's well-written book, *Democracy in the United States* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1953; ix, 428 pp.

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$2.25), can be an excellent manual for discussion. Its usefulness as a text will depend upon approval of (1) its telic approach, and (2) its conclusions. Professor Riker first presents his argument that the core of democracy is self-respect. He then moves quickly to his central contention: that our government of 1789-1953 cannot fully achieve the democratic ideal. Suffrage, the principal source of democratic self-respect, is not universal. This fault should be corrected. But more than this, the major parties are fractured and undisciplined; separation of powers, checks and balances, the federal system, and innumerable Congressional hurdles make it impossible to secure workable majority rule. The solution for this chaos lies in the President. He must be a " hero President ", a " greater schoolmaster ". He must be a man who can unify the disparate molecules of government through effective party leadership. He must more fully carry into effect the Roosevelt party-purge techniques of 1938. He must give strength, by his heroism, to the democratic " myth "—a myth (whatever might have been said about democracy in earlier pages) to be " propagated by leaders whose authority rests on their teachings." All of this would strengthen our democracy because democracy can be achieved only by unobstructed majority rule. Why would not such a Presidency destroy what we have of democracy? Because our " St. George " must also be humble and democratic—and also because Americans are traditionally opposed to dangerous Presidents. Furthermore, he could be impeached—though the author's principal hope is for a sort of unity of party, imposed by the " hero President ", that would make his impeachment impossible. Many will agree with Professor Riker's plea for wider suffrage. Many will disagree with his major theme: that the success of our popular government requires the emergence of a virtually omnipotent Presidency. In order to " insure domestic tranquillity," we have adapted our political ideals to our many differences and our huge geography. We have no majority on any one set of issues, even when a President is elected—nor do we consider it a political virtue to stampede to some preconceived destination over the trampled bodies of the opposition. In the United States, we may have a bungling mess as far as rapid decision, efficiency, and even majority rule are concerned. Much of our inefficiency results precisely from the fact that, while we do what we can for the fleeting majorities, we also try to take care of the more persistent minorities as they reëmerge after each election. In times of peril, we do take action. Otherwise, any attempt at translating the assumed will

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of a transient election majority into a course of streamlined action must lead to the very enthronement of minority rule. In short, the net result of such a scheme must be the impairment of that stability amid conflict and those basic protections of everyone which are central features of democracy in the United States.—JAMES L. BUSEY, University of Colorado.

Benjamin Sacks, in *J. Ramsay MacDonald in Thought and Action: An Architect for a Better World* (Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1952; xx, 591 pp. $8.00), has produced a compendium, based on speeches and writings, of MacDonald's opinions on aspects of politics, society, industry, imperialism, and international affairs. The recognition in the conclusion that MacDonald was a politician and prime minister belonging to a young and difficult party is not much in evidence in the text, and so the book is static, arid, and in good part beside the point. The proportion seems to have been determined by the volume of MacDonald's expressed views, so that forty pages are devoted to "mathematical formulas for party representation" and the referendum, while security and disarmament in the twenties receive twenty-three pages, only three of which deal with the Geneva Protocol. Much of the heavy documentation is useless, and the writing is execrable. At one point a reference to "a Dr. Livingstone, a Moffat, a Colenso, a Mackay" involves a separate footnote for each name; yet this passion for precision does not prevent Sir Robert Peel's loss of title or the appearance of a famous social investigator as an unfamiliar Benjamin Rowntree. Whole pages could easily have been reduced to sentences, and the size and price of the book cut to something manageable. Editing might have spared the reader embarrassments like the repeated "fledgling Labour Party", or the reference to the "vast collection of tomes" in the British Museum, which elsewhere the author feels it necessary to tell us is located "in Bloomsbury district, London." When a speaker at a meeting which MacDonald was about to address mentioned God, a tiny boy turned to his mother and asked, "What is God like?" "Wait a moment," she replied, "and you'll see." In the contrast between this story and the present low level of his reputation in the party lies the challenge of MacDonald. A significant study would pay little attention to many of the ideas set out here. It would emphasize his years in power more than his apprenticeship and would ask how a party learns to govern and how a leader loses contact with his

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movement, by changing or sacrificing his beliefs. It would require broad vision and great imagination. Certainly MacDonald's own words are not enough. The historian who must some day undertake such a study will find Mr. Sacks's ill-digested account of little help, unless it is in forcing him to write a good book out of sheer exasperation.—R. K. WEBB, Wesleyan University.

The study, *Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, 1913-1917*, by Tien-yi Li (Kansas City, University of Kansas City Press, 1952; 268 pp. $4.50), covering only the first four years of the Wilson administration, was, in its original form, a dissertation presented by the author for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Yale. It is a carefully prepared and documented study not without interest to the general reader. Dr. Li points out that President Wilson reversed Taft's policy of international coöperation in a financial consortium and, while he favored the Hay policy of equal opportunity of investment in China, would not support any favored group of American bankers, and disapproved the participation of the American bankers in the Six-Power consortium. He also consistently supported Yuan Shih Kai against the Kuomintang, despite the fact that Yuan had little or no interest in democracy. Wilson thought that the maintenance of a strong, stable government in China was of more importance than the establishment of a democratic régime. In this respect, President Wilson compromised with his well-known advocacy of democratic government. The author feels that Wilson failed in his attempt to check Japanese aggression in China during World War I, but contends that he did manage to "temper the Twenty-one Demands to something short of a complete Japanese protectorate over China." In dealing with American economic activities in China during his first administration, Dr. Li is of the opinion that failure of American firms to make large loans or to enter upon major construction projects was chiefly due to "the unwillingness of the government of the United States to guarantee diplomatic protection for the execution of these proposed contracts, that is, to see to it that the Chinese government paid these loans which the department of state encouraged the American creditors to make." Accordingly, the volume under review seems to be more a chronicle of failures than of accomplishments. Dr. Li holds the highest opinion of President Wilson and particularly of his minister to China, Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, who, together with Mr. E. T. Williams, Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the Department of

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State, supplied the expert knowledge of Far Eastern politics so lacking in a president who was " no deep student of the Far East " and whose " knowledge of China was chiefly acquired through his contact with American missionaries and friends working in that country." It is to be hoped that Dr. Li wil continue his study of American foreign policy in the Far East, carrying it into a period of more notable successes than were experienced by Woodrow Wilson during his first administration.—Leon H. Ellis, Duke University.

Dr. Héctor Parra Márquez, a member of the Federal Supreme Court at Caracas, is an outstanding Venezuelan lawyer and historian. He has devoted much time to the study of the history of the legal profession in his country. The results of his investigations are being published in *Historia del Colegio de Abogados de Caracas,* Vol. I (Caracas, Imprenta Nacional, 1952; xii, 610 pp.), a three-volume work of which this is the first. According to the author this volume comprises the history of the Caracas association of lawyers " from the installation of the Colegio de Abogados of Caracas in 1788 to the definitive approbation of the statutes or constitutions by the King in 1792." However, it covers rather more than this limited period. The early chapters include general considerations, a survey of the development of the legal profession in Spain as well as in other countries and an account of the early legal practices in Venezuela. The founding of the *Colegio,* together with the names of the founders and the details of the early organization, is then discussed and this is followed by a complete analysis of the first statutes of the association. Other chapters treat of the establishment of the *Montepio de Abogados* (gratuity fund for widows and orphans of lawyers) and the creation of the Academy of Public and Spanish Law. Chapters are devoted to the activities of the *Colegio* during each of the annual terms of the first three deans. In these chapters there is included an extensive biography of the dean, which naturally covers a period much beyond the year of service. The problems involved in the workings of the new association and the measures taken to solve them are fully set forth. The treatment is such as to give a clear picture of the way in which the legal profession functioned in Caracas at the close of the eighteenth century. The appendix comprises documents dealing with the *Colegio.* These include: the text of the first statutes of the association; documents relating to the *Montepio;* a list of the lawyers registered with the Royal Audiencia of Caracas; constitutions of the

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Academy of Public and Spanish Law and of a proposed professorship of law in the university; and a lengthy series of documents dealing with the incorporation of a lawyer whose right to membership was disputed, 1798-1801 (pp. 445-596). The illustrations include a reproduction of the original seal of the *Colegio,* facsimiles of pages of the first edition of the statutes and views of some colonial buildings of Caracas. There is a bibliography of printed original and secondary materials. The volume provides an excellent account of the Association of Lawyers of Caracas and consequently will be useful to those desiring to know the early history of the development of the legal profession in Venezuela.—ROSCOE R. HILL, Washington, D. C.

For some years the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has been, at the request of the various governments, making economic surveys and recommending development programs. *The Economic Development of Nicaragua* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1953; xxxi, 424 pp. $5.00) is the report of a mission of the IBRD which spent eleven months in Nicaragua. A thorough analysis of the present economic and social situation, the report recommends some sweeping changes as well as a basic investment program over a five-year period. Accepting as a basic premise that the objective of the program is to raise the standard of living for the mass of the population, the Mission recommends a minimum expenditure of $59,300,000 and an optimum expenditure of $75,990,000 during the next five years. Of the total expenditure, about a third is to be dedicated to improvement in the agricultural field, another third to the field of transportation and communication, and the major part of the remainder in the fields of public health and education; the Mission has quite properly considered the improvement of health and education as a *sine quo non* of an improved economy. The recommendations for expenditures in the health and education fields, and a portion of those in the agricultural and transportation fields, are for government expenditures in improving permanent facilities or in carrying on experimental work; this accounts for slightly more than half of the recommended investment. A major portion of the expenditures in agriculture, a part of those in transportation, and the bulk of those in the industrial and power fields, however, are to be handled by private persons borrowing from a new *Instituto de Fomento*; this is necessary in view of the limited amounts of money from private sources for medium- or long-term loans. The Mission believes that Nicaragua can

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well afford to make the recommended investments, but only if the government is willing to make a number of administrative changes, particularly in the fiscal field. The anachronistic revenue system, depending almost wholly on consumption and import taxes, must be completely reorganized on a different basis so that the tax burden will fall more heavily upon the 1 per cent of the population to which accrues 25 per cent of the national income, rather than upon the 99 per cent which has an average annual income (after taxes) of approximately $100. The Mission is encouraging concerning the economic potential in Nicaragua, but the tenor of the report is highly discouraging concerning the present situation. In spite of the careful and diplomatic language in which the report is couched, from a thoughtful reading will emerge a picture of administrative inefficiency, governmental irresponsibility, political favoritism, and business backwardness which is little short of appalling.—Charles C. Cumberland, Rutgers University.

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ROBERT MURRAY HAIG

With deep sorrow the Editors of the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY record the death of their colleague, Robert Murray Haig, McVickar Professor Emeritus of Political Economy, on June 9, 1953, at the age of 65, in New York City, and less than a year after he and Mrs. Haig had set up their new home in Santa Barbara, California, upon his retirement from Columbia in October 1952.

Professor Haig received his doctoral degree at Columbia in 1914, and accepted an instructorship in the School of Journalism, but moved shortly to the newly established School of Business. There he assisted in assuring the new school an unusual breadth of interest and intellectual independence. He helped organize and teach a basic course in business, but also offered courses in his special field of study, public finance, especially income taxation.

In 1931, upon Professor Seligman's retirement, Professor Haig was appointed McVickar Professor of Political Economy, and took over the lecture course and the seminar on public finance in Fayerweather Hall.

Teaching, and the guidance of student research, represented only a part of the time and the energy that Professor Haig gave so freely to the University. He served as a member, and as chairman of the executive committee, of the Columbia Council for Research in the Social Sciences; as a member of the University Council, and of the Committee on Conference. He took his turn in serving a three-year term as executive officer of the Department of Economics, July 1, 1940 to June 30, 1943. As chairman or member of ad hoc committees too numerous to list here, he was called upon to take part in the consideration of many of the University's problems. He also served for thirteen years as a member of the Board of Directors of the Academy of Political Science.

Meanwhile, Professor Haig developed a capacity for combining public service with scholarship, to the benefit of both the public and the academic world. He was frequently called to head the research staff of a special commission, or the commission itself, set up by a state or a local unit to suggest solutions for current problems, usually in the field of taxation. In this connection, he adhered steadily to two principles. First, he refused all offers from private bodies or individuals to represent them in tax matters, believing that only so could his freedom from private influence in this field be guaranteed to the gov-

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ernments that he served. Second, he accepted a directorship of research with such a commission only with the stipulation that the findings of the research staff would be published. The public was thus guaranteed direct knowledge of the facts, and of the inferences drawn from them by the director of research.

Among the products that resulted from the application of these principles, coupled with an intense concern for accuracy, and unusual analytical power, were the 1922 and 1925 Reports of The New York State Special Joint Committee on Taxation and Retrenchment, the 1929 Report of the California Tax Commission, the 1932 Report of the New York State Special Commission for the Revision of the Tax Laws, the 1931 Report of the St. Lawrence Power Commission, the 1936 Report of the New York State Commission on State Aid; and, completed just a year before his death, the Report of the New York City Finance Project. Professor Haig also contributed substantially to the shaping of governmental tax policy without the instrument of the special commission: research for the United States Treasury in World War I; assistance rendered to Governor Lehman in planning the budgets of New York State; research and policy formulation for the Government of Puerto Rico, on two occasions; similar services for the cities of Richmond, Virginia, and Grand Rapids, Michigan.

Even more lasting, in their influence on scholars in public finance, are the volumes of which he was author, and the numerous papers, articles, committee reports (as chairman) for the National Tax Association (of which he served a term as president), and similar writings. His name will always be associated with contributions on excess profits taxation, land-value taxation, the concept of income, the taxation of capital gains, intergovernmental fiscal relations in many countries, the public finances of post-war France, 1918-1926, and metropolitan growth and arrangement.

Those of us who worked with Professor Haig on research projects can recall how steadfastly he withstood all pressures for impairment of quality of output or compromise with principles, for he was supported by a strong ethical sense and by devotion to the ideal of intellectual integrity. The many students whose doctoral work was done under his supervision, and who, both in number and in achievements, give impressive evidence of their training, will recall the scrupulous care with which he reviewed their manuscripts. He was always eager to search out talent, and, having found it, to encourage it. And always we could count on a warm cheerfulness, and a sympathetic understanding of our own problems. We shall miss him greatly.

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